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the Efficacy of Interventions Against a Dark Web Cryptomarket 
Vincent Harinam 
Abstract 
Objective. The overarching goal of this thesis is to better understand not only the 
network dynamics which undergird the function and operation of cryptomarkets but the 
nature of consumer satisfaction and trust on these platforms. More specifically, I endeavour 
to push the cryptomarket literature beyond its current theoretical and methodological limits 
by documenting the network structure of a cryptomarket, the factors which predicts for 
vendor trust, the efficacy of targeted strategies on the transactional network of a 
cryptomarket, and the dynamics which facilitate consumer satisfaction despite information 
asymmetry. Moreover, we also aim to test the generalizability of findings made in prior 
cryptomarket studies (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017; 2020; Norbutas, 2018). 
Methods. I realize the aims of this research by using a buyer-seller dataset from the 
Abraxas cryptomarket (Branwen et al., 2015). Given the differences between the topics and 
the research questions featured, this thesis employs a variety of methodological techniques. 
Chapter two uses a combination of descriptive network analysis, community detection 
analysis, statistical modelling, and trajectory modelling. Chapter three utilizes three text 
analytic strategies: descriptive text analysis, sentiment analysis, and textual feature 
extraction. Finally, chapter four employs sequential node deletion pursuant to six law 
enforcement strategies: lead k (degree centrality), eccentricity, unique items bought/sold, 
cumulative reputation score, total purchase price, and random targeting.  
 
Results. Social network analysis of the Abraxas cryptomarket revealed a large and 
diffuse network where the majority of buyers purchased from a small cohort of vendors. This 
theme of preferential selection of vendors on the part of buyers is repeated in other findings 
within this study. More generally, the Abraxas transactional network can then be viewed as 
set of transactional islands as opposed to a large, densely connected conglomeration of 
vendors and buyers. With regard buyer feedback, buyers are generally pleased with their 
transactions on Abraxas as long as the product arrives on time and is as advertised. In 
general, vendors have a relatively low bar to achieve when it comes to satisfying their 
customers. Based on the results of the sequential node deletion, random targeting was found 
to be ineffective across the five outcome measures, producing minimal and a slow disruptive 
effect. Finally, these strategies are based on a power law where a small percentage of deleted 
nodes is responsible for an outsized proportion of the disruptive impact. 
Conclusion. As with all applied research examining emergent phenomena, this thesis 
lends itself to a more refined understanding of dark web cryptomarkets. While the results and 
conclusions drawn from these results are not perfectly generalizable to all cryptomarkets, 
they should serve to inform law enforcement on the dynamics which undergird these markets. 
To this extent, a sombre consideration of trust, consumer satisfaction, and tactical 
effectiveness of interventions is a necessary step towards the development of more effective 
countermeasures against these illicit online marketplaces. For law enforcement to be more 
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Introduction: What’s to Come 
Gone are the days when prospective consumers need rely solely on local dealers to 
procure drugs and other illicit goods and services. The advent of digital encryption and 
internet connectivity has facilitated the rise of cryptomarkets. Similar to Amazon or eBay, 
these are illicit online marketplaces hosted on the dark web which facilitate the truck, barter, 
and trade of illegal goods and services. Much like licit online markets, cryptomarkets permit 
those seeking to purchase illicit goods and services to do so from the comfort of their own 
home, placing their order with a vendor and receiving the product through the postal service. 
Be it marijuana, cocaine, bladed implements, or hitmen, these platforms are replete with a 
variety of illicit wares.   
 
Cryptomarkets represent a unique permutation that both improves upon traditional 
criminal dynamics while introducing new elements that challenge the capabilities of law 
enforcement. Moreover, these platforms present a novel opportunity for researchers to test the 
accuracy of key theoretical precepts that are present in terrestrial markets. How are trust and 
reputation associated with the network structure of a cryptomarket? How is information 
asymmetry mitigated or overcome and what can we learn from it? What factors create and 
sustain consumer satisfaction? What are the structural vulnerabilities in cryptomarket 
transactional networks? Which strategic interventions initiated by law enforcement work 
best? How do these strategic interventions differ in their stated objective and measured 
outcomes? These are some of the questions which will be investigated in the forthcoming 
chapters.  
 
To this extent, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to better understand not only 
the network dynamics which undergird the function and operation of cryptomarkets but the 
nature of consumer satisfaction and trust on these platforms. More specifically, I endeavour 
to push the cryptomarket literature beyond its current theoretical and methodological limits 
by documenting the network structure of a cryptomarket, the factors which predicts for 
vendor trust, the efficacy of targeted strategies on the transactional network of a 
cryptomarket, and the dynamics which facilitate consumer satisfaction despite information 
asymmetry. Moreover, I also aim to test the generalizability of findings made in prior 
cryptomarket studies (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017; 2020; Norbutas, 2018). This thesis utilizes 
several methodological techniques to answer the various research questions it posits, 
leveraging a combination of social network analysis, statistical modelling, text mining, and 
adaptive computer simulations. 
 
The specific aim of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I seek to push the theoretical 
boundaries of cryptomarket research in order to better understand the functional mechanisms 
of cryptomarkets. That is, I will use cryptomarkets as a testbed for social scientific theories 
that propose conditions under which anonymous actors are more likely to trust each other, 
and the mechanisms that increase cooperation under uncertainty. While the technology that 
allows cryptomarkets to operate in the manner that they do is certainly important, I am 
primarily interested in the network dynamics between participants and how these affect the 
overarching structure and robustness of these markets. Furthermore, computer-mediated 
interactions on the Internet provide new opportunities to examine the links between 
reputation, information asymmetry, and the development of trust between individuals who 
engage in various types of illicit exchange. While some researchers have dealt with some of 
topics featured in this thesis, crytomarket scholars are uncertain about the generalizability of 
these findings given the novelty of this criminological phenomenon. Indeed, more research is 
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required in specific areas to better understand the function and operation of these illicit online 
marketplaces.  
 
The second aim of this dissertation is to use the findings herein to inform targeted 
interventions by law enforcement against cryptomarkets. Past law enforcement strategies 
targeting cryptomarkets have been ineffective and, in some cases, counterproductive (Soska 
and Christin, 2015; Decary-Hetu and Giommoni, 2017; van Buskirk et al., 2017). As such, 
this thesis’ explicit focus on trust dynamics, consumer satisfaction, and efficacy of law 
enforcement interventions might offer some insight into how law enforcement might 
structure their cryptomarket intervention strategies to achieve maximum long-term disruptive 
impact. By posing new questions and revisiting old ones, I seek to explain how cryptomarket 
participants engage with one another despite the limitations of information asymmetry and 
how this affects consumer satisfaction and the structure of a cryptomarket’s transactional 
network.   
 
Dissertation Structure and Chapter Overview  
 
This dissertation is structured around four disconnected chapters, with the first serving 
as an up-to-date consolidation of the cryptomarket literature and the second, third, and fourth 
chapters addressing a distinct set of research questions pertaining to a specific topic that is 
unaddressed or partially examined within the extant literature. To this extent, chapters two, 
three, and four will focus, in order, on: 1) the network structure and trust dynamics of a 
cryptomarket, 2) the elements which predict for consumer satisfaction or dissatisfaction on a 
cryptomarket, and 3) the efficacy of six targeting strategies in disrupting a cryptomarket’s 
ease of operation. Each of these topics and their associated research questions were selected 
after an extensive examination of the cryptomarket literature. Indeed, they both represent a 
critical gap in the scholarly literature and function as a key pedagogical hurdle that must be 
overcome for cryptomarket research to progress further. 
 
Chapter 1 is an up-to-date summary of the extant cryptomarket literature, drawing 
upon a vast swath of studies across a decade of research. As such, there are no research 
questions posed or analyses conducted in this chapter. The objective of this chapter is to both 
explain what cryptomarkets are and situate these illicit platforms within the cybercrime and 
organized crime contexts. A secondary objective is to take stock of the current state of 
cryptomarket research, tracking major scholarly themes across a decade of research. To this 
extent, this chapter will be separated into six sections: 1) what is cybercrime and how 
organized is it?, 2) what are cryptomarkets?, 3) the organizational structure and governance 
within cryptomarkets, 4) the who, the what, and the where of cryptomarket studies, 5) trust 
and reputation on cryptomarkets, and 6) law enforcement interventions and network 
disruptions of cryptomarkets. 
 
The body of this thesis will consist of three distinct (though interrelated) research 
papers that cover a separate area of inquiry. Following Duxbury and Haynie (2017) and 
Norbutas (2018), chapter two examines the network structure of a cryptomarket. More 
specifically, I seek to identify the market-level metrics that predict for vendor selection as 
well as the developmental trajectory of vendor trustworthiness. In short, this chapter seeks to 
disentangle the overarching concept of trust on cryptomarkets by both revisiting the findings 
made in prior studies (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017; Norburtas) and generating new findings 
using new conceptualizations and methods. This chapter seeks to replicate findings relating to 
the network structure of cryptomarkets made in prior studies. It will, however, contribute new 
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material to the literature by examining new predictors across three conceptual definitions of 
vendor trustworthiness. This will also include an examination of the developmental trajectory 
of vendor trustworthiness; a first within the cryptomarket literature. Importantly, the Abraxas 
cryptomarket will be examined. Chapter 2 answers four research questions: 
 
1. What is the network structure of Abraxas? 
2. What is the composition of transactional communities within the network? 
3. What market-level metrics and/or vendor characteristics predict for vendor 
trustworthiness (i.e. success (completed transactions), popularity (unique buyers), and 
affluence (revenue))? 
4. What is the developmental trajectory of vendors’ success, popularity, and affluence 
during their tenure on Abraxas?  
Chapter three seeks to identify and compare the determinants of customer satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction among buyers on a cryptomarket. This is the first such study to both 
examine the lexical predictors of vendor ratings as well as the sentiment structure of 
qualitative reviews. As such, there is an explicit focus on determining the similarities and 
differences between five-star and non-five-star ratings and how this might affect information 
asymmetry on dark web markets. Additionally, I examine role of “finalizing early” in 
mitigating information asymmetry. While previous studies (Hardy and Norgaard, 2016; 
Janetos and Tilly, 2017; Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten, 2017; Tzanetakis, Kamphausen, 
Werse, and von Laufenberg, 2016) have examined the impact of dark market rating systems 
on vendor success and profitability, none have examined this phenomenon using textual data. 
Moreover, there has been no research on the factors that affect the written reviews buyers 
leave for vendors and whether and how consumers’ attitudes affect their overall ratings of 
vendors. Chapter 3 will continue to focus on Abraxas, answering three research questions: 
 
1. Based on written reviews, what are the determinants of consumer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction among buyers on Abraxas?  
2. Does the sentiment structure of positive and negative reviews differ? If so, to what 
extent? 
3. What words best predict five and non-five ratings among buyers? 
Finally, chapter four examines the efficacy of six law enforcement targeting 
strategies: lead k, eccentricity, total revenue generated, cumulative reputation score, listing 
amount, and random targeting. To this extent, sequential node deletion will be utilized. Five 
outcome variables (number of isolates, number of components, average number of nodes in 
components, average geodesic distance, and number of nodes in the largest component) are 
used to measure the efficacy of each targeting strategy. The study seeks to test the 
generalizability of Duxbury and Haynie’s (2018; 2020) findings on a different cryptomarket, 
Abraxas. More importantly, however, this study is the first to answer questions regarding the 
similarity of targeting strategies as well as their short and long-term efficacy. It will serve as 
the most in-depth examination of strategic interventions against cryptomarkets. Whereas 
several studies (Xu and Chen, 2003; Keegan et al., 2010) have failed to incorporate network 
adaption and preferential selection processes into their simulations, this study will set 
parameters to govern the (purported) behaviour of actors when nodes are removed. This 




1. Of the six proposed disruption strategies, which offers the greatest initial amount of 
damage to a criminal network?  
2. Of the first 100 nodes that are removed per each disruption strategy, does their impact 
carry-over across all outcome measures? 
3. What do these strategies tell us about the efficacy of dark web disruption strategies?  
 
Importantly, as chapters two, three, and four are individual research papers containing 
their own distinct literature reviews, there will be some overlap between portions of the first 
chapter and portions of the literature reviews in each succeeding paper. Nevertheless, each 
chapter offers unique insight into the functional mechanisms which govern transactional 
exchanges on cryptomarkets between buyers and vendors.   
 
Data and Methodological Overview  
 
I realize the aims of this research by using a buyer-seller dataset from the Abraxas 
cryptomarket (Branwen et al., 2015). Apart from the anonymous cryptomarket analysed by 
Duxbury and Haynie (2017), this is the only marketplace where unique identifiers are 
available for buyers. As such, it was the only known publicly available dataset which allowed 
for network analysis and adaptive computer simulation. With assistance from Lukas Norbutas 
of Utrecht University and Cambridge University’s Computer Laboratory, this data was 
extracted from a public data repository established by independent researcher, Gwern 
Branwen. This data repository contains scraped webpages from 2013 to 2015. Given the 
infrequent nature of the scrapes, not all webpages have been collected. Nevertheless, 
Norbutas (2018) estimates that crawls of Abraxas have successfully collected 92.4% of all 
listed items on the Abraxas cryptomarket. This includes information on vendor name, vendor 
shipping location, listing title, listing price, listing description, transaction date, buyer unique 
identifier, buyer rating, and buyer feedback. 
HTML links in the dataset were restitched together in Python to recreate the Abraxas 
website. Thus, this recreated website serves as a copy of the original Abraxas cryptomarket, 
possessing information on transactions that were successfully scraped. Furthermore, each 
webpage in the dataset was manually inspected to identify duplicate transactions based on the 
feedback provided. While buyers might leave feedback on their original post, they may return 
to alter the message. As such, extracting data from these webpages would yield duplicate 
transactions if each transaction was not properly inspected. Once all duplicates were 
identified and removed, I was left with a total of 5434 transactions over a period of 7 months 
(January to July) in 2015. These were stored in an Excel spreadsheet. While Abraxas was 
established in December of 2014, the first transaction occurred on January 15 th of 2015. It is 
important to clarified that this dataset does not include all recorded transactions on Abraxas. 
This is due to both the infrequency of the scrapes conducted by Branwen (2015) and the vast 
number of broken webpages that could not be repaired and accessed. As such, while this 
dataset includes numbers sufficient for analysis, it does not include the full cohort of 
transactions on the cryptomarket. This is a clear limitation. 
Nevertheless, there were 269 unique sellers and 2794 unique buyers in the dataset. 
Importantly, the Abraxas dataset was previously used by Norbutas (2018) in an examination 
of the geographical distribution of transactions. For my purposes, I reconstruct a two-mode 
buyer-seller trade network. These data were used in chapters two and four while chapter three 
utilized written feedback provided by buyers from each successful transaction. 
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Given the differences between the topics and the research questions featured in 
chapters two, three, and four, this thesis employs a variety of methodological techniques. 
Chapter two uses a combination of descriptive network analysis, community detection 
analysis, statistical modelling, and trajectory modelling. Descriptive statistics were used to 
summarize market transactions. This is done to understand both the nature and composition 
of illicit transactions on Abraxas. In contrast, community detection analysis is used to discern 
the subgroup structure of this transactional criminal network. As well, three regression 
models were used to determine the predictors of vendor trustworthiness. To measure vendor 
trustworthiness, three proxy variables were created: success, popularity, and affluence. As 
trust is manifested in a variety of ways, each of these dependent variables reflects a key 
element of trust. Finally, this chapter leverages k-means trajectory modelling to examine the 
developmental pattern of vendor trustworthiness on Abraxas.  
 
Chapter three utilizes three text analytic strategies: descriptive text analysis, sentiment 
analysis, and textual feature extraction. All analyses and visualizations were conducted in R. 
Descriptive text analysis is a fairly standard text mining procedure. Simple term frequencies 
are conducted to identify the words used by Abraxas buyers to describe their experience. 
Furthermore, sentiment scoring is conducted on the written reviews. Sentiment scoring 
measures the positive or negative intent in a writer's tone. Finally, feature extraction is used 
to understand what words predict for customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction. To this effect, 
a supervised machine learning technique, logistic lasso regression, is utilized.   
Chapter four employs sequential node deletion pursuant to six law enforcement 
strategies: lead k (degree centrality), eccentricity, unique items bought/sold, cumulative 
reputation score, total purchase price, and random targeting. Five outcome variables (number 
of isolates, number of components, average number of nodes in components, average 
geodesic distance, and number of nodes in the largest component) are used to measure the 
impact of each targeting strategy. This study sets parameters to govern the purported 
behaviour of actors when nodes are removed. As such, the transactional network’s overall 
behaviour can be accurately modelled (Bright et. al, 2018) through an evidence-based 
calculus. 
Conclusion 
As with all applied research examining emergent phenomena, this thesis lends itself to 
a more refined understanding of dark web cryptomarkets. More importantly, the following 
chapters were conceptualized, developed, and written with the sole intent of improving 
current law enforcement strategies which target cryptomarkets. While the results and 
conclusions drawn from these results are not perfectly generalizable to all cryptomarkets, 
they should serve to inform law enforcement on the dynamics which undergird these markets. 
To this extent, a sombre consideration of trust, consumer satisfaction, and tactical 
effectiveness of interventions is a necessary step towards the development of more effective 
countermeasures against these illicit online marketplaces. For law enforcement to be more 






Chapter 1: Cryptomarkets: History, Operation, and Law Enforcement Interventions 
 
 This chapter serves to consolidate the scholarly literature on cryptomarkets, 
identifying and explicating all strands of scholarly work on this topic. As such, this chapter 
will function as an extended literature review, distilling findings from peer-reviewed works 
while offering a measured examination of cryptomarkets within the context of the cybercrime 
and organized crime literatures. Moreover, this chapter will consist of six sections. First, I 
detail the phenomenon of cybercrime, exploring its origin, transformation, and the extent to 
which it is organized. Second, I explore the genesis and general operation of cryptomarkets, 
examining the importance of onion routing and cryptocurrencies. I then examine the 
organizational features of cryptomarkets. Here, I highlight the hierarchical administrative 
structure of cryptomarkets as well as the mode of governance and flexible exchange networks 
imbedded within. Fourth, I explore the three primary strands of cryptomarket research which 
detail the participants, countries, and products featured on these platforms. Fifth, I consider 
the role of trust and reputation on cryptomarkets, detailing the various mechanisms used by 
vendors to instil trust in buyers. Finally, I close out this chapter by exploring the various 
actions taken by law enforcement organizations against cryptomarkets. This will also include 
research on simulated interventions against the transactional network of these illicit entities.  
What is Cybercrime and How Organized is it? 
The volume and sophistication of cybercrime operations have dramatically increased 
in the last decade (Holt, Bossler, and Malinski, 2016). Fraudsters are exploiting email 
systems to ensnare unassuming victims with faulty services and get-rich quick schemes 
(Grabosky, 2007), internet chatrooms and message boards are being used to solicit sex and, in 
some cases, prop up the international sex trade (Farley, Franzblau, and Kennedy, 2013), and 
social media platforms are being used by youth to bully their classmates (Hinduja and 
Patchin, 2012). In addition, technology has given birth to entirely new forms of crime. 
Distributed denial of service attacks and malicious software are two such computer-assisted 
offenses that have produced substantial economic harm (Bossler and Holt, 2012; Holt and 
Turner, 2012). Each day brings new challenges for law enforcement within the realm of 
cyber. 
Though there exists no formal definition, scholars generally agree that cybercrime 
“involves the use of cyberspace or computer technology to facilitate acts of crime and 
deviance” (Bossler and Holt, 2016, 45). Moreover, Grabosky (2007) categorizes cybercrime 
along three conceptual dimensions: computers as the instrument of crime, computers as the 
target of criminal activity, and computers as incidental to criminal activity. Nevertheless, this 
categorization falls in short in one respect. While this classification system creates conceptual 
boundaries, it is often subject to categorical overlap. In short, certain cyber-enabled crimes 
can fall within multiple categories. Consider botnets. These are networks of infected 
computers that are remotely controlled by another computer (Ianelli and Hackworth, 2005). 
In this case, computers are both the instrument and the target of the offence.  
However, Wall (2001) subdivides cybercrime into four categories: cyber-trespass, 
cyber-deception, cyber-pornography, and cyber-violence. Much like trespass in an offline 
setting, cyber-trespass involves accessing a computer system without the expressed consent 
of the owner. Similarly, cyber-deception, the second category, involves the use of the internet 
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to illegally acquire information from people or corporations. Importantly, cyber-trespass and 
cyber-deception are fundamentally linked to the concept of hacking. Holt and Bossler 
characterize hackers as “individuals who create viruses and botnet codes which lead to 
automated malicious attacks and/or actively participate in attacks against computer systems 
and sensitive networks” (2014, 22). Indeed, the authors’ primary contention is that hackers 
are best conceptualized as criminals and deviants. Brewer and Goldsmith, in contrast, attempt 
to establish the moral and legal versatility of hackers in proposing the term “digital drift”. 
The authors maintain that “new technologies enable individuals to both ‘embed’ and ‘dis-
embed’ themselves in a variety of criminal activities and lifestyles off- as well as online” 
(2015, 113). As such, hackers do not perpetually lead a life of crime but instead drift between 
periodic stints of cyber-criminality and obedience to the law. 
The third category, cyber-pornography “encompasses the range of sexual expression 
enabled by computer-mediated communications and the distribution of sexually explicit 
materials on-line” (Wall, 2007, 32). This particular category is the most controversial of the 
four. Indeed, online pornography is not an illegal activity in and of itself but is rather a 
feature of the internet, representing a large proportion of internet traffic. Nevertheless, cyber-
enabled child pornography and sexual exploitation are crimes which might better fit this 
category. The fourth category in Wall's (2001) cybercrime typology is cyber-violence. This 
refers to actions taken by individuals which harm others in both online and offline settings. 
This generally includes stalking, harassment, and bullying online. There is, nevertheless, a 
glaring conceptual problem with this category. In particular, the use of term “violence” is not 
wholly descriptive of crimes within this category. More specifically, whereas violence 
typically constitutes a physical action causing bodily harm, online stalking, harassment, and 
bullying are not themselves physical acts. Each of these crimes occur in cyberspace and do 
not allow for physically harm against the victim. In general, Wall’s (2001) categorizations, 
while helpful at the time of its conception, are not satisfactory in a contemporary cybercrime 
setting. Indeed, the constantly changing nature of cybercrime renders definitions and 
categorizations obsolete over time.   
Of critical importance then is the larger debate surrounding the novelty of cybercrime. 
Is it “old wine in new bottles” or “new wine in new bottles” (Grabosky and Smith, 2001; 
Wall, 1999; Wall, 2007; Yar, 2005)? That is to say, are cybercrimes merely terrestrial crimes 
that have taken a different form or are they an entirely new permutation that is actualized in a 
different manner? Indeed, the composition of a crime committed in cyberspace is, by 
Grabosky’s (2001) estimation, congruent to those committed in a physical setting. To 
elaborate, cybercrime, like any terrestrial crime, can be explained by the intersection of three 
requisite factors: a suitable target, motivated offender, and lack of a capable guardian. This is 
referred to as routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Per Cohen and Felson’s 
(1979) theory, the infiltration of a medical database or distribution of malware must possess 
these qualities for it to have taken place (Grabosky and Smith, 2001). This is the same for the 
theft of a car or the murder of a rival gangster.  
However, the application of routine activities theory to cybercrime is refuted by Yar 
(2005). To this extent, Yar (2005) contends that “whereas people, objects and activities can 
be clearly located within relatively fixed and ordered spatio-temporal configurations in the 
‘real world’, such orderings appear to destabilize in the virtual world” (424). As such, one 
cannot easily extrapolate the precepts of routine activities theory to cybercrime. Indeed, one 
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of the key characteristics which separates digital criminality from terrestrial criminality is the 
potential for transnational offending. Many, if not most, cybercrimes can now take place in 
one jurisdiction but be initiated in another. This presents serious complications if the laws 
and priorities in each involved jurisdiction differs. If a citizen of one country were to fall 
victim to an online investment fraud originating in another, both or neither of the authorities 
in each involved nation may have an investigative or punitive interest.  
Regardless of its novelty or lack thereof, the organizational structure of cybercrime is 
a matter that has been rigorously discussed by scholars (Grabosky, 2007; Lusthaus, 2012; 
Wall, 2001; Wall, 2015). Since cybercrimes are the product of networked computers, they 
have fundamentally transformed the scale and efficiency of criminal operations. These 
transformations have given rise to sophisticated organizations that are locally-hosted yet 
globally-active. More importantly, the use of technology contributes to the reorganization of 
traditional divisions of labour within a criminal organization. On one hand, they serve to both 
automate and deskill certain criminal activities, while on the other reskilling and empowering 
individuals and groups to operate a criminal enterprise (Pease, 1991, 24; Savona and 
Mignone, 2004; Wall, 2007). 
In this regard, Lusthaus (2018) makes the argument that cybercrime has evolved from 
mischievous activities carried out by disparate actors to a profit-driven industry that is 
dependent on anonymity. The historical evolution of hacking is demonstrative of this change. 
Between the 1950’s and 1980’s, hacking resided within the domain of scientific inquiry as 
university and government-backed researchers waded into the maliciousness of phreaking. 
This changed, however, in the 1990s with the proliferation of desktop computers. Individual 
hacking metathesized into organized trading forums which then gave way to professional 
groups that carried out coordinated attacks. As such, a growing level of collaboration paired 
with an increasing desire for professionalization created an economic infrastructure based 
around trust and anonymity.  
Cybercrime operations, be they carding forums or hacker groups, function according 
to the same principles followed by industrial organizations (Lusthaus, 2018). That is to say, 
there are clear divisions of labour by which different activities, from hacking to coding, are 
handled by different specialists. Moreover, increasing specialization leads to increasing 
professionalization. By specializing in a specific activity or task within the cybercrime supply 
chain, participants are encouraged to both hone their creative talents and market them to 
willing customers and business partners. An influx of actors and associated firms creates 
more options for collaboration and networking. Under these conditions, monetization 
becomes inevitable. Profit and plunder have superseded past desires for fun and intellectual 
challenge (Grabosky, 2007; Lusthaus, 2018). This change in motivation puts additional strain 
on law enforcement as they must curtail the efforts of malicious, enterprising actors as 
opposed to those looking for a good time.   
All told, the unique and enduring characteristic which typifies cybercrime, organized 
or otherwise, is its malleability. It is never a simple, stagnant operation or enterprise. Rather, 
it is a practice and activity that shifts in form and orientation depending on the technology 
available and the expertise required. In this regard, advances in digital cryptography and 
peer-to-peer monetary systems have allowed for the growth of illicit online marketplaces that 
have taken root on the dark web. These cryptomarkets, as they are called, are a unique 
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permutation that both improves upon traditional crime dynamics while introducing new 
elements that challenge the capabilities of law enforcement. I will detail the history and 
operation of these illicit platforms in the next section.  
What are Cryptomarkets? 
Though unaware of its distal impact, Peter Grabosky (2007) was one of the first to 
consider the looming possibility of emerging technologies amplifying the organized 
distribution of illicit goods and services. Of course, our propensity for using exponential 
technologies to engage in the truck, barter, and trade of illicit commodities is not new. The 
first official e-commerce transaction occurred in 1972 when students from MIT and Stanford 
University utilized ARPANET (a 1960’s packet switching network that evolved into the 
Internet) to negotiate the sale and purchase of marijuana. From this inauspicious beginning, 
illicit online transactions have evolved at a rapid pace. 
Buoyed by technological advancements, globalization, and market innovations, illicit 
goods and services are more readily accessible to those with the requisite know-how. In fact, 
recent research (Martin, 2014a) has indicated that illicit online markets have become “hybrid 
markets that combine traditional social and economic opportunity structures with newer 
opportunities provided by the internet. Not only has the internet created new avenues for 
criminal networking, but it has also reconfigured traditional relations among suppliers, 
intermediaries, and buyers” (56). These developments are punctuated within cryptomarkets. 
These entities are the culmination of many decades of innovation within the realm of cyber.  
The operational history of cryptomarkets is rather brief, dating back to as early as 
2011. The first cryptomarket, Silk Road, was founded in 2011 by the enigmatic Ross 
Ulbricht, a physics major from Austin, Texas (Martin, 2014a). However, this site was shut 
down in 2013 following the FBI’s arrest of Ulbricht. In the succeeding months, new 
cryptomarkets began to emerge with Silk Road 2.0 (a direct successor), Agora, Atlantis, and 
CannabisRoad leading the way. These markets would be shut down in 2014 following 
Operation Onymous, a joint initiative by the NCA, FBI, and Europol (Decary-Hetu and 
Giommoni, 2017). By 2015, however, the markets would again readjust as AlphaBay became 
the most prosperous cryptomarket to date. Finally, in July 2017, Operation Bayonet, a joint 
operation by the by the FBI, DEA, Europol, and Dutch National Police, led to takedowns of 
AlphaBay and Hansa, the first and third largest cryptomarkets at that time. But the question 
remains: what are cryptomarkets?  
James Martin defines a cryptomarket as “an online forum where goods and services 
are exchanged between parties who use digital encryption to conceal their identities” (2014a, 
2). While Martin’s (2014a) definition is the most popular, it is not without its flaws. In 
particular, this definition lacks a marked level of specificity, conflating illicit online 
marketplaces with forums. While online forums do cater to the trade of illicit goods and 
services by advertising them (Dupont, Cote, and Decary-Hetu, 2016; Hutchings and Holt, 
2015), they are distinct podia designed primarily for discussion and debate. Functionally 
speaking, online marketplaces, licit or otherwise, do not permit for thread-based discussions. 
They are first and foremost marketplaces where goods and services are bought and sold.  
This important feature is captured in a much-improved definition created by Barratt 
and Aldridge (2016). The authors define cryptomarkets as “marketplaces that host multiple 
sellers or ‘vendors’, provides participants with anonymity via its location on the hidden web 
and use of cryptocurrencies for payment, and aggregates and displays customer feedback 
ratings and comments” (Barratt and Aldridge, 2016, 78). Though lengthy, the strength of this 
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definition lies in its exactness. It outlines the various idiosyncrasies which help distinguish 
cryptomarkets from other illicit markets that exist in cyberspace as well as terrestrial settings. 
Cryptomarkets are thus characterized by their location on the dark web, use of 
cryptocurrencies and feedback systems, and hosting of buyers and vendors.    
To this extent, cryptomarkets do not actually sell anything (Christin, 2013; Martin, 
2014b). These illicit online marketplaces function more as brokerage platforms which bring 
together buyers and vendors willing to engage in voluntary economic transactions over a 
multitude of illicit goods and services. To this extent, Christin (2013) notes that 
cryptomarkets are risk management platforms for criminals. By eliminating physical 
interactions between transacting parties, cryptomarkets serve to reduce and, to an extent, 
eliminate the potential for physical violence (Barratt et al., 2016; Morselli et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the anonymity and escrow services embedded within a cryptomarket’s 
transactional infrastructure reduces risk as it relates to fraudulent exchanges. Importantly, 
these methods aid in obfuscating the activities of cryptomarket participants, increasing the 
difficulty of law enforcement in identifying much less apprehending these actors.   
Furthermore, the financial escrow system is particularly important as it mimics the 
financial risk reduction competencies of similar systems developed by licit electronic 
commerce platforms like eBay or Amazon. To this extent, Christin (2013) notes that an 
escrow service ensures that funds are kept until a transaction is “finalized” by the buyer and 
released to the vendor. Suppose Alice wanted to purchase an item from Paolo. Instead of 
paying Paolo directly, Alice would pay the marketplace operator, Manuel, who would then 
direct Paolo to ship the item to Alice. Once Alice confirms that she has received the item, 
Manuel would then release the money to Paolo while keeping a small fee for himself. This 
payment system allows cryptomarket operators to adjudicate any dispute that could arise 
should a vendor claim that an item had been shipped, but the buyer claims to have not 
received it. Nevertheless, a buyer may “finalize early” (FE), foregoing the escrow system and 
simply transferring the funds immediately upon purchase. The phenomenon of early 
finalization has not been examined extensively by cryptomarket scholars. 
However, to truly understand what cryptomarkets are, it is important to situate these 
digital phenomena within their place of operation. The Internet, as we understand it, is 
segmented into two distinct parts: the surface web and the deep web. All content that is 
accessible via a search engine such as Google or Bing are part of the surface web. These 
websites are indexed by a search engine and are thus publicly accessible, requiring no special 
configurations or permission to access them. In contrast, web pages that are not indexed and 
accessible by a search engine are part of the deep web. According to Epstein (2014), the deep 
web is estimated to contain 96% of all networked webpages, making it nearly 500 times 
larger than the surface web. However, deep web content is for the most part legal. This 
includes “content that is locked behind paywalled websites, content accessible through 
company or academic databases, any kind of database that cannot be searched directly by 
Google, websites that are not linked to other websites, private websites and forums, and large 
amounts of social networking site content (e.g., non-public Facebook content)” (Barratt and 
Aldridge, 2016, 79).  
Cryptomarkets, however, are situated in a small subset (a hidden overlay network) of 
the deep web called the dark web. In this regard, dark web internet services are inaccessible 
without unique configurations, explicit authorization, or a specialized browser (Barrett, 
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Lenton, Maddox, and Allen, 2015, 50; Gaup, 2008). As such, these websites are not indexed 
by a search engine and are not publicly accessible. However, this is not to suggest the 
inherent criminality or maliciousness of all actors operating on the dark web. Dark web 
platforms are often utilized by political dissidents and whistle-blowers seeking to bypass 
draconian censorship laws and government overreach (Bradbury, 2014; Hardy and Norgaard, 
2016). Indeed, this was the original purpose of the software that permits access to the dark 
web. 
Importantly, the feature which separates cryptomarkets from other illicit exchange 
networks and distribution systems is its reliance on encryption technology. As Decary-Hetu 
and Giommoni (2017) contend, “the cryptomarkets’ innovation originates not in the 
development of a new stealth technology but rather from the combination of many 
technologies that, when combined, provide an enhanced level of anonymity to participants” 
(107). In this regard, there are two key encryption technologies leveraged by cryptomarkets 
to ensure functional efficiency and fluid communication among participants: Tor and 
cryptocurrencies.       
Tor (The Onion Router) is a free “circuit based low-latency communication service” 
which allows users to engage on the internet without revealing their location or identity 
(Dingledine, 2004; Mathewson et al., 2004). It is, moreover, a network within which users 
can search for and host an illicit website. This is particularly useful for individuals seeking to 
both set up a cryptomarket and conceal their hosting location from law enforcement and other 
aggrieved parties. Launched in 2002, TOR was initially designed by the Centre for High 
Assurance Computer Systems at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory for the purposes of 
protecting the anonymity of government employees (Bradbury, 2014). However, as with most 
software designed by state actors, TOR was designed for use by state actors but trickled down 
to citizens once the technology was made public.  
Tor uses a concept called onion routing which directs a user’s IP address through a 
series of random relay points to obfuscate the user’s point of origin (Bradbury, 2014, 14). 
“The sender of a piece of traffic will find an entry point and choose a random routing path 
through a selection of relays to obfuscate their point of origin. Traffic routed along this path 
will be encrypted until it leaves the last relay, to be sent to a specific IP address on the public 
Internet” (Bradbury, 2014, 12). In short, onion routing is premised on separating where you 
are in the world from where you are connecting to on the network (Lewman, 2016, 16). This 
technology is publicly accessible and easy to use. The Tor network can be accessed by using 
the TOR browser which is a standard web browser much like Internet Explorer, Google 
Chrome, or Mozilla Firefox.  
Cryptocurrencies are the second major encryption technology employed by 
cryptomarkets. This electronic currency system allows for direct and anonymous peer-to-peer 
transactions without involvement or oversight from a third-party organization. Unlike fiat 
currencies, cryptocurrencies possess a decentralized ledger that records all transactions that 
have been facilitated by that respective currency (Cox, 2016). This is called the “block 
chain”.  With the block chain, one can easily see which users hold what amount of 
cryptocurrencies in their digital wallet. To elaborate, a “block” is a series of updates of 
transfers between users. Importantly, because the block chain is a decentralized program with 
copies housed on all computers across the planet, transactions made with cryptocurrencies 
cannot be reversed, frozen, or tampered with by third-party institutions like banks and 
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governments. As this ledger cannot be controlled by a single entity, law enforcement cannot 
intervene in halting or reversing illicit financial transactions. Nevertheless, this ledger 
contains information about transactions which can pose a risk to those involved in illicit 
activity. To conceal their identity and potentially avoid prosecution if embroiled in criminal 
activities, a cryptocurrency user may separate their transactions from their identity.  
Importantly, two studies have uncovered a strong relationship between bitcoin 
transactions and purchases on cryptomarkets. Janze (2017), utilizing panel data of 296,875 
cryptomarket product listings as well as Bitcoin blockchain transactions, found a curious co-
evolution between Bitcoin and cryptomarkets. That is, transactions within the Bitcoin 
blockchain and the usage of transaction obfuscation services could be reliably linked to 
previous sales on cryptomarkets. The author demonstrated that for one additional item sold 
on darknet markets, additional transactions increased by 0.123 on the blockchain six days 
later. As well, Foley, Karlsen, and Putnins (2018) estimated that 46% of bitcoin transactions 
($76 billion) were tied to illegal activities, many of which occurred on cryptomarkets.  
Given the mandatory use of TOR (or other networks, e.g. I2P, Zeronet, Freenet, 
Openbazaar, etc.) and cryptocurrencies, participation in cryptomarkets requires a certain level 
of technical sophistication. Prospective cryptomarket participants must have a working 
knowledge of these technologies (Christin, 2013). Conducting qualitative interviews on Silk 
Road, Van Hout and Bingham (2013a) observed that training and experience with computer 
systems were viewed by vendors as an important skill to have. One participant noted, “If you 
are not a computer scientist, a lot is down to just faith. A seller has to learn a lot about the 
technology, if they are concerned with staying safe. It’s a big subject to dive into and much 
deeper than what you may initially think” (van Hout and Bingham, 2013b, 54). Aside from 
technological know-how, participants will also need access to a number of devices, programs, 
and information. In a detailed distillation of the cryptomarket literature on drug puchasing, 
Barratt and Aldridge (2016) observe that “prospective participants will require: a computer or 
equivalent device, a special anonymising browser, the marketplace URL, some 
cryptocurrency, a vendor willing to send the drugs to your location, and an address where the 
package containing the drugs can be sent” (4). 
Nevertheless, anonymity networks and cryptocurrencies have created a relatively 
anonymous transacting infrastructure that is both opened and closed to the general public. 
According to May and Hough (2004, 550-551), whereas “open markets are those that are 
open to any buyer, with no requirement for prior introduction to the seller, and few barriers to 
access, closed markets are ones in which sellers and buyers will only do business together if 
they know and trust each other, or if a third party vouches for them.” In this regard, 
cryptomarkets are open to all with sufficient knowledge of anonymity networks and 
cryptocurrencies but is, for all intents and purposes, closed to those incapable of building 
rapport with customers or conducting themselves appropriately on these platforms (Aldridge 
and Decary-Hetu 2016; Christin, 2013, Duxbury and Haynie, 2017; Paquet-Clouston, 
Décary-Hétu, and Morselli, 2018).     
Christin (2013) and Martin (2013) maintain that law enforcement organizations 
typically have more organizational experience and expertise in prosecuting terrestrial forms 
of illicit exchange. Moreover, the use of Tor and cryptocurrencies adds an additional layer of 
difficulty. It is hypothesized that the complexity of encryption algorithms that allow 
cryptomarkets to operate is such that it would require crackers tens of thousands of years to 
decrypt (Martin, 2014a, 357). Furthermore, the privacy of cryptomarkets allows for the 
formation of various communicative norms which are practiced in a reduced capacity in 
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traditional organized crime settings. This will be discussed in a later section. Importantly, it is 
unlikely that cryptomarkets usage will be mainstreamed. Based on 350 hours of unstructured 
observation during an ethnographic study, Kowalskia, Hooker, and Barratt (2019) concluded 
that the current levels of complexity and obfuscation constructed in the cryptomarket 
environment act as a barrier to the widespread acceptance of this technology. Nevertheless, as 
cryptomarkets continue to develop the ease of use of these platforms are bound to change and 
with them the likelihood that cryptomarket usage will increase. 
Cryptomarkets are a remarkable criminal innovation. They provide sellers with a 
virtual location to advertise and sell their products to a worldwide market without constant 
fear of law enforcement intervention. Within terrestrial markets, this is an extremely difficult 
undertaking as secrecy and anonymity must be maintain by fallible human actors. Moreover, 
law enforcement actors are on a relatively even playing field with terrestrial criminals, able to 
infiltrate criminal organizations and gather intelligence without the having to deal with 
technological barriers. This is not to suggest that crime prevention in an offline setting is an 
easy task as it marred with a bevy of other challenges unique to this environment. 
Organizational Structure and Governance within Cryptomarkets 
Regardless of its legality, the objectives and operational capacity of a business are 
often dictated by its organizational structure. The organized crime literature has long 
entertained discussions surrounding the horizontal or vertical composition of illicit entities. 
Indeed, it was once theorized by organized crime scholars (von Lampe, 2016) that the global 
drug trade consisted of a series of hierarchical bureaucracies that actively engaged in 
micromanagement and vertical integration. Such sentiments were strengthened by the 
media’s characterization of drug traffickers in the Columbian municipalities of Medellin and 
Cali as cartels which restricted market competition and regulated international drug pricing 
(Kenney, 2007, 233). These suppositions have not been supported by Kenney (2007) and 
Malm and Bichler (2011) who have documented the existence of a decentralized 
organizational schema within these drug trafficking organizations. Nevertheless, a portion of 
the cryptomarket literature is dedicated to the organizational structure and associated 
divisions of labour within these illicit online marketplaces. In this regard, James Martin 
(2014a; 2014b) has been particularly instrumental in matters relating to organizational 
structure and governance in cryptomarkets.   
According to Martin (2014a), cryptomarkets are hierarchically structured. This is 
reflected in some of the organized crime literature. Donald Cressey (1967) surmised that 
organized crime (at least in the American context) resembled an octopus, possessing one head 
with many tentacles. Cressey’s observation would give rise to a subset of the organized crime 
literature which details the vertical structure of criminal organizations. Von Lampe (2016) 
explains that the various components within these hierarchies perform tasks which are 
coordinated by a common manager (105). Moreover, these vertically-structured organizations 
“typically have defined boundaries and internal divisions and a centralized chain of 
command” (von Lampe, 2016, 105). According to Catino, the basic operational unit within 
the Sicilian Mafia is the “family”, a criminal group which possesses a territorial base from 
which it manages a zone or inhabited area (2014, 188). Moreover, the Sicilian Mafia 
possesses a vertical micro-organizational structure as these families are arranged 
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hierarchically with subdivisions of power which further correlate to divisions of labour 
(Catino, 2014, 188). To elaborate, this chain of command consists of a base of “button men” 
or “soldiers” who carry out operational orders, capidecina who oversee a platoon of soldiers, 
and a democratically elected “representative” who functions as the boss of the family (Catino, 
2014; von Lompe, 2016).  
This hierarchical chain of command ensures that no illegal activity occurs without 
permission from the boss. Importantly, however, the Sicilian Mafia also possesses a vertical 
macro-organizational structure. That is to say, a group of representatives will nominate a 
district boss who then serves as a member of a provincial commission which will collectively 
nominate a provincial representative who functions as a secretary and coordinator for that 
specific province (Catino, 2014, 190). These supra-local and provincial configurations allow 
for an advanced capacity in engaging the state. This, of course, corresponds with the Sicilian 
Mafia’s record for state-based violence. Von Lompe maintains that American Mafiosi, 
identical to their Sicilian brethren, have organized themselves into a number of local micro-
units, the aforementioned “families” (2016, 189). As such, the American Cosa Nostra 
possesses a vertical micro-organizational structure with a chain of command consisting of a 
boss, an underboss and consigliere, and a series of capos who supervise groups of soldiers 
(von Lompe, 2016, 188). Furthermore, the American Cosa Nostra possesses a vertical macro-
organizational structure as the bosses of the individual families have, at one point in time, 
cooperated to form The Commission. The Commission functioned as a forum where the 
various bosses “come to agreement on matters of general importance, such as the admission 
of new members and the resolution of conflicts within and between the families” (von 
Lompe, 2016, 189). These structural orientations ensure that associates and members seek 
approval from their bosses and the bosses from The Commission before carrying out a 
criminal act. 
The organizational structure of cryptomarkets is similar in some respects. From 
detailed and readily available sources of information, Martin (2014a) was able to identify 
four unique user types within the cryptomarket hierarchy. These include administrators, 
moderators, vendors, and consumers. Reflective of von Lampe’s (2016) observation, 
cryptomarkets are refreshingly transparent in their organizational structure and divisions of 
labour as each user type possesses a different but inter-reliant portfolio of responsibilities and 
capabilities (Martin, 2014a, 17). This, moreover, ensures that the platform operates fluidly as 
each category of actor possesses a specific role which they play. This, however, is not 
reflective of a purposive division of labour where each category of actor is allocated duties 
and responsibilities. Instead, actors will organically play a specific role by virtue of their 
orientation within the market’s organizational structure. This, however, is not necessarily the 
case for moderators as their duties and responsibilities are established by administrators.      
The organizational structure of cryptomarkets is dominated by an administrative unit 
which oversees the efficient operation of these platforms. It is the role of administrators to act 
as executives, managing their site and determining the policies under which users will 
operate. As Martin (2014a) maintains, administrators are responsible for “authorizing and 
suspending individual accounts, overseeing ‘stealth’ transactions not publicly listed, creating 
new product categories, authorizing or prohibiting the sale of various items, as well as 
innovating and implementing new security procedures and cyber-defences” (18). Of course, a 
vital secondary function includes the management of cryptocurrency transactions. This 
involves the provision of escrow services which yields sales commissions from each 
transaction. Christin (2013), in an analysis of financial trends on the dark web, found that 
sales commissions typically varied between 3% and 8% of the total transaction cost. 
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Interestingly, Martin also suggests that administrators serve as organizational figureheads, 
actively engaging with media outlets and scholars (2014a, 18). Below administrators are 
moderators. Given their reduced administrative access, moderators assist administrators in 
site maintenance and customer support. This mainly involves “regulating forum discussions, 
identifying fraudulent activity committed by scammers, and responding to requests for 
assistance and complaints from vendors and consumers” (Martin, 2014a, 18). As such, 
moderators will perform the day-to-day activities pursuant to cryptomarket management, 
ensuring that the fluid operation of the platform.  
At the bottom of this hierarchy are vendors and buyers. In order to operate on a 
cryptomarket, vendors must pay a registration fee to the site administrator. In contrast, buyers 
must set up a free account on the platform. From there, a vendor can set up their account and 
begin listing products that they wish to sell to buyers. When a buyer completes a transaction 
with a vendor, they have the option of providing public feedback of their experience with the 
vendor. This is a particularly important task as it assists vendors in building their reputation 
while signalling to other buyers the quality of the vendor. While vendors and buyers do not 
possess a formal administrative role that has been allocated to them, they nevertheless 
perform an essential function: engaging in voluntary economic transactions. They are, 
moreover, involved in two key community-building activities: product testing and friendly 
forum discussion. As such, these actors are responsible for the evaluation of experiential 
goods and creation and maintenance of a collegial community within a cryptomarket. 
Nevertheless, the notion that cryptomarkets are strictly hierarchical is disputed. 
Norgaard, Walbert, and Hardy (2018), in an analysis of the determinants of network structure 
and hierarchy in physical and dark web drug markets, found that illicit online markets were 
generally less hierarchically structured relative to their more monopolistic terrestrial 
counterparts. Utilizing agent-based modelling to compare the density and average path length 
of their simulated black market networks, the authors found that lower transaction costs and 
information asymmetries in cryptomarkets resulted in less of a top-down schema compared 
terrestrial markets.  
To this extent, Martin, in contravention to his previous findings, contends that the 
successful operation of a cryptomarket is deeply dependent on a decentralized exchange 
network between vendors and consumers (2014b, 363). Drawing on Natarajan (2006), 
Kenney (2007), and Bright et al. (2014), Martin (2014a) emphasizes the importance of 
structured economic relationships as developed through community engagement in product 
assessment and forum discourse. These activities serve to routinize voluntary economic 
transactions among buyers and vendors by developing a social fabric based on mutual 
interests. Brenner (2010) speculated that the various functionalities afforded by Internet 
connectivity would likely replace traditional organized crime hierarchies with decentralized 
networks. While Brenner’s contention is partially disproven by the existence of 
administrative units within cryptomarkets, it remains largely accurate with regard to the 
structure of buyer-vendor relations therein.  
Terrestrial markets are often expansive international entities, comprised of many 
distinct individuals and groups which operate a section of the supply line (Salt and Stein, 
2002; Vayrynen, 2003). This is partly the result of logistical necessity. Consider the flexible 
exchange networks of the Medellin and Cali cartels. According to Kenney (2007), the drugs 
sold by these organizations were first produced by local farmers, procured by purchasing 
groups, refined in specialized processing labs, exported to various trans-shipment points in 
the Southern hemisphere, then sold by distribution groups in a multitude of overseas markets 
(424). Of course, these node linkages were established by an array of brokers who introduced 
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interested parties and maintained lines of communication. According to Martin (2014a), 
cryptomarkets possess a similar exchange structure as illicit goods are created by producers, 
acquired by vendors (who may themselves be producers), then shipped to consumers using 
conventional postal services. However, cryptomarkets exchange networks differ structurally 
from terrestrial illicit distribution networks as they require less nodes to function (Barratt and 
Aldridge, 2016; Christin, 2013, Martin, 2014a, 55).  
Specifically, the various brokerage services offered by cryptomarkets (escrow, direct 
communication, etc.) encourages vendors and buyers to adopt a direct business-to-consumer 
schema which serves to eliminate the involvement of drug traffickers, wholesalers, secondary 
brokers, and a bevy of other specialized intermediaries. As Martin notes, “Unlike 
conventional distribution networks, where a wide range of nodes specialise in different stages 
of distribution (e.g. trafficking, wholesaling), networks facilitated online are able to connect 
nodes and end consumers, in the absence of geographic proximity or interpersonal contact” 
(2014a, 55). Christin (2013), in a study of illicit online markets, observes that such 
innovations in drug distribution results in price stability, increased product purity, and higher 
levels of customer satisfaction.  
Though the organizational structure of cryptomarket communities increases the 
efficiency of distribution networks, it is a rather remarkable development in matters relating 
to automation in illicit markets. Unlike terrestrial markets where interpersonal relationships 
are forged through friendship, kinship ties, or other personal contacts, cryptomarkets broker 
transactions by providing transparent and quantifiable information. As Martin (2014a) 
suggests, “the automation and user involvement associated with these processes mean that 
cryptomarkets are able to act as a kind of ‘super broker’” (45). 
Importantly, monetary exchanges, brokerage services, and peer-to-peer 
communications are facilitated by cryptomarket administrators and the online platform itself. 
These illicit exchange networks are particularly durable as the elimination of a node due to 
arrest or competitive violence often means that the line of distribution is rerouted though an 
adjacent node (Martin, 2014b, 363). What’s more, the criminological literature demonstrates 
that familial and associational ties allow exchange networks to function as the inherent social 
connection and economic interdependence among participants fosters communication and 
market harmonization. Of course, cryptomarket vendors and buyers are not bound by familial 
ligatures as Italian Mafiosi or Columbian drug traffickers are (Decary-Hetu, 2016). Rather, 
interpersonal relations hinge on mutual interests in libertarianism, recreational drug use, and 
other subcultural niches (Martin, 2014a; Munksgard and Demant, 2016). In fact, the original 
Silk Road was founded on libertarianism (Maddox et al., 2016). Still, many participants on 
cryptomarkets may not abide by or even support this ideology. As such, their allegiance may 
lie to a trusted vendor. We will examine the topic of trust on cryptomarkets in a forthcoming 
section.    
Importantly, a small but growing subset of the cryptomarket literature is dedicated to 
governance. By virtue of their illegality, environments which are conducive to the 
commission of crime are often perceived as spheres of lawlessness. Cryptomarkets, in 
particular, engender additional considerations as they are almost bereft of any external 
regulation or government oversight. “Products that are sold on illicit sites bypass the 
processes of government-mandated testing, quality control, and safety standardisation that are 
imposed on regular consumer goods” (Martin, 2014a, 37). However, cryptomarkets are, in 
actuality, more collegial than other illicit organizations. According to Martin (2014a), “the 
synergies produced by mentalities, technologies, resources and institutions allow 
cryptomarkets to function as sites of informal nodal governance” (18). That is to say, these 
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illicit online marketplaces possess clearly defined rules that are developed and enforced by 
administrators.  
The objectives of a business are often dictated by its organizational structure. Catino 
stipulates that vertically-structured crime organizations are “characterized by the presence of 
higher levels of coordination, centralized power, and systemic decision-making processes” 
(2014, 177). In this regard, Martin (2014a) maintains that the centralization of power within 
the hands of cryptomarket administrators encourages nodal governance. Originally conceived 
by Shearing and Wood (2003), nodal governance suggests that in the absence of formal 
government, non-government, and commercial institutions, informal groups emerge as 
substitute pseudo-governments. These informal groups carry out a range of regulatory 
functions including contract and rule enforcement, dispute resolution, security, and policing. 
Indeed, nodal governance is rife among various criminal organizations.  Diego 
Gambetta (1993) contends that the Sicilian Mafia arose in the 19th century following Italy’s 
shift from feudalism to capitalism. Specifically, the emergence of burgeoning markets 
resulted in predatory attacks from which the Italian government could not provide protection. 
As such, the gabellotti (the precursor to the Sicilian Mafia) enforced private property rights 
whilst providing impromptu governance. Though illegal markets are assumed to be stateless 
entities which lack formal conflict resolution mechanisms, the scholarly literature suggests 
otherwise (Reuter, 1985). Indeed, order can spring organically from iterated engagements 
form actors operating in an illicit environment. These repeated interactions create norms and 
customs that proliferate among the criminal actors. If these norms and customs are not 
followed by actors in future interactions, noncompliant actors will be punished compliant 
actors. This can vary from naming and shaming to ostracism.  
As it pertains to cryptomarkets, the absence of a formal regulatory body has created 
an environment ideal for the guiding hand of administrators. In a study of conflict resolution 
mechanisms in cryptomarkets, Morselli et al. (2007) observed the proliferation of official 
rules which governed the conduct of buyers and vendors. Established by administrators, these 
rules often took two forms: moral/ethical and functional. Moral/ethical rules banned the sale 
and distribution of particular items (child pornography, firearms, etc.) while functional rules 
prevented thefts and scams which might undermine market efficiency and interpersonal trust. 
Consider Ross Ulbricht’s installation of the Silk Road Charter, a utopian constitution of sorts 
which guided user interaction (Martin, 2014a, 13). The Silk Road Charter described the Silk 
Road as a “global enterprise” whose guiding principles revolved self-ownership, personal 
responsibility, user equality, personal integrity, and a commitment to self and communal 
improvement (Martin, 2014a, 12).  
Furthermore, cryptomarket administrators play a pivotal role in both enforcing 
marketplace rules and adjudicating disputes between buyers and vendors (Martin, 2014a; 
2014b). Norgaard et al. (2018) documented the dispute resolution procedures of Hansa, the 
third-largest cryptomarket in 2017. Interestingly, the authors observed that Hansa encouraged 
buyers and vendors to solve disputes among themselves but would resolve the dispute if a 
private resolution was not possible. In fact, if the dispute is ruled in favour of the buyer, 
Hansa administrators would force the vendor to compensate the wronged buyer.  
With relation to nodal governance, Zajacz (2017) contends that cryptomarket 
administrators took on “a key function of the state: protecting citizens from harming each 
other through force, fraud, or theft” (78). To this extent, a participant in Van Hout and 
Bingham’s study of Silk Road vendors noted that “We are a community, and Dread Pirate 
Roberts (Silk Road administrator) is our president in a sense” (2013a, 35). Importantly, the 
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mode of governance assumed by administrators somewhat reflects Varase’s (2010) definition 
of an organized crime group (OCG). Varase defines OCGs as a “group which attempts to 
regulate and control the production and distribution of a given commodity or service 
unlawfully” (2010, 14). In this regard, Martin (2014a) notes that administrators engage in 
creating new product categories, authorizing or prohibiting the sale of items, and overseeing 
all transactions (18). As cryptomarket administrators manage their platform’s escrow service, 
they possess complete oversight over all formal transactions conducted between vendors and 
buyers. Indeed, administrators approved cryptocurrency transfers to vendors upon receiving 
confirmation of product delivery from consumers, receiving a sales commission in the 
process (Martin, 2014a, 31).  
Indeed, Cryptomarkets, aided by their hierarchical structure, further resemble Mafia 
groups by assuming a protective role, presiding over all darkmarket transactions. To 
elaborate, as cryptomarket administrators manage all cryptocurrency transactions the 
implication is that they possess complete oversight over all interactions between vendors and 
consumers. Indeed, administrators, asserting their protective authority, may approve a 
currency transfer upon receiving confirmation of product delivery from the consumer 
(Martin, 2014a, 31). Similar to Mafias, administrators may punish those who renege on their 
contractual obligations (i.e. dark market fraudsters) by suspending their account. 
Furthermore, Mafiosi have the important task of protecting their clients from law 
enforcement (Varese, 2010, 17). Of course, Administrators must actively shield vendors and 
consumers from law enforcement by “innovating and implementing new security procedures 
and cyberdefences” (Martin, 2014a, 18). Administrators, functioning as “capable guardians”, 
prevent marketplace actors from being defrauded (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Furthermore, 
inbuilt conflict reduction mechanisms create a fairly well-regulated market. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that cryptomarket administrators, unlike 
Mafiosi, do not engage in extortion and are rather benevolent in thought and action. In 
summation, the hierarchical structure of the administrative unit in cryptomarkets is predicated 
on nodal governance which pertains to the simultaneous regulation of illicit commodities and 
provision of protection. Still, this is not to suggest that the motivations of cryptomarket 
administrators and mafiosi are the even remotely similar. This comparison between the two is 
done as a means of demonstrating that cryptomarkets possess some elements which resemble 
a traditional organized crime group. Furthermore, this does not mean that cryptomarkets are 
themselves organized crime groups or that governance therein is an uncomplicated process. 
Those who suggest that illicit online markets are organized crime groups often point to the 
hierarchical structure of these entities as evidence. However, as Lusthaus (2012) suggests, the 
provision of a secure space for illicit transactions, restriction of access to deviant members, 
and third-party enforcement of contracts are not themselves qualities which make an illicit 
online marketplace an organized crime group. Indeed, a mere structural design does not make 
an illicit entity an organized crime group.  
Furthermore, Lusthaus (2012) offers three reasons for the ineligibility of illicit online 
markets as organized crime groups. First, illicit online markets are individual marketplaces 
rather than regulatory bodies which preside over entire industries. Indeed, while the Sicilian 
mafia did not itself sell fish it was firmly in control of Palermo’s fish market. To this extent, 
cryptomarkets are merely brokerage platforms which allow vendors to advertise their wares 
and buyers to purchase them. While administrators can ban the sale of specific goods and 
services (e.g. child pornography) they have no control over the supply and demand of 
products which are advertised on their platform. Secondly, online markets are comprised of 
autonomous groups and individuals which lack a single, coherent objective. Intuitively, 
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cryptomarkets participants have no overarching objective outside of engaging in voluntary 
economic transactions. There are no broad organizational goals which tied individuals 
together.  
Finally, governance, namely protection and the enforcement of contracts, is especially 
difficult to actuate as violence, a key regulatory tool for terrestrial organized crime groups, 
cannot be exercised in cyberspace. While violence is a constitutive element in regulating and 
governing illicit markets, its employment comes at tremendous costs as it draws unwanted 
attention from law enforcement, normalizes violent retaliations, and discourages potential 
customers and partners (Reuter, 1985; Campana and Varese, 2013). Open markets and illicit 
markets whose lack of barriers to entry permits for unregulated admissions, are privy to 
violent turf wars as dealer-dominated locales are subject to unwanted incursions from new 
competitors. Nevertheless, the anonymity and geographical dispersion afforded to 
cryptomarkets means that participants cannot simply harm other disreputable actors. The 
improbability of violence in cryptomarkets lies in the platform’s dematerialization of 
voluntary economic transactions. Indeed, the cryptomarket literature is replete with studies 
that point to broad-based reductions in violence among users (Aldridge and Decary-Hetu, 
2014; Morselli et al., 2017; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a).  
Mohamed and Fritsvold (2010) found that cryptomarket vendors have a reduced 
likelihood of violence enacted against them compared to “street” dealers as most of their 
clientele are middle-class, university students who are generally averse to serious 
interpersonal violence. Furthermore, Barratt et al. (2016), surveying 3794 respondents from 
57 countries on drug use, found that 1.3% and 1% of cryptomarkets users experienced 
“threats to personal safety” and “physical violence”, respectively. In contrast, 14% and 6% of 
those who purchased from friends, 24% and 10% of those who purchased from known 
dealers, and 35% and 15% of those who purchased from strangers experienced “threats to 
personal safety” and “physical violence”, respectively. The authors concluded that 
“cryptomarkets are associated with substantially less threats and violence than terrestrial 
market that are also used by cryptomarket customers” (Barratt et al., 2016, 20). In general, 
buyers reported safer and more convenient transactions given the complete circumvention of 
face-to-face meetings with potentially dangerous dealers (Barratt, Lenton, and Allen, 2016; 
Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b).  
 Still, the relative absence of animosity much less violence within cryptomarkets may 
be a by-product of vendor behaviour. As Martin indicates, the cryptomarket vendors are 
encouraged to create a “socially constructive public image that is both free from violence and 
more attuned to the perceived priorities of their customer base” (2014a, 40). Moreover, there 
is a certain futility to violence in cryptomarkets as it retains no strategic value. Indeed, 
financial success of a cryptomarket vendor is often contingent on more benevolent qualities. 
This is substantiated by Aldridge and Decary-Hetu (2014) who state that “a different set of 
skills is required of cryptomarket vendors to succeed (e.g., good customer service, writing 
skills) compared with conventional dealers who can utilize physical intimidation to maintain 
market share” (25). To this extent, creating rapport and behaving in a trustworthy manner go 
farther on cryptomarkets that would violence were it a readily available option.  
 This is not to suggest that the inability to use violence precludes any malicious 
activities that may hamper the operation of a cryptomarket. Buyers and vendors are often 
victims of scams perpetrated by other participants. As Morselli et al. (2017) suggest, “the 
most common scams are thefts by vendors (when lying about having shipped the drugs) and 
buyers (when lying about not having received the drugs).” Furthermore, bad management by 
cryptomarket administrators is often singled out by patrons as the primary reason for why 
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scams are allowed to take place (Martin, 2014). This typically comes in the form of 
negligence where administrators are slow to take action against bad actors on their platform. 
This mismanagement by cryptomarket administrators reduces consumer confidence and 
creates instability within a market. However, this inability to wholly govern the conduct of 
actors on a cryptomarket is perfectly understandable given the level of anonymity and 
encryption on these platforms. As such, a more formal top-down form of governance is 
particularly difficult to achieve on cryptomarkets.  
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties of top-down governance in cryptomarkets, 
buyers and vendors can resolve conflicts amongst themselves. In Disorganized Crime, Peter 
Reuter (1985) argues that while illegal drug markets are “stateless” entities, participants can 
themselves resolve their disputes without aid from a regulatory body. In this regard, Morselli 
et al. (2017), in an investigation of several cryptomarket forums, found six peer-to-peer 
conflict resolution strategies that are traditionally absent in off-line drug markets. These 
include: 1) demonstrating tolerance/patience when dissatisfied, 2) avoiding conflict and 
refusing to intervene, 3) ostracizing or naming and shaming bad actors, 4) levying threats 
against bad actors, 5) negotiating a private settlement, and 6) calling upon a third-party 
mediator. Furthermore, Morselli et al. (2017) note that four channels are available to 
cryptomarket participants when conflicts arise. Participants can initiate direct contact though 
built-in messaging systems, use the formal support ticket system to notify administrators of a 
conflict, publicly shame disreputable actors on a forum, or damage the vendor’s reputation by 
leaving negative feedback. 
Governance on cryptomarkets is characterized by an innovative combination of 
private ordering and nodal governance. This hybridity has various functional advantages 
including greater ease of operation, transparent communication, and greater awareness of 
consumer satisfaction. In general, a decentralized exchange network increases the fluidity of 
voluntary economic transactions while a competent administrative unit supervises these 
transactions to ensure satisfaction among all parties involved in a transaction. This mixture of 
governmental paradigms aids in the function of these illicit online markets. In this respect, 
cryptomarkets are unlike traditional organized crime groups as they are both marketplaces 
and mediators with enhanced communication and anonymity. Moreover, it is this encryption 
and anonymity which reduces the capacity for a more traditional top-down form of 
governance on cryptomarkets. 
The organizational structure of cryptomarkets can be described as it is an innovative 
stitching of a hierarchical administrative unit and a decentralized exchange network. Of 
course, such hybridity is rarely documented in the organized crime literature as it seems illicit 
entities are primarily horizontal or vertical in structure. Moreover, a cryptomarket’s 
amalgamation of organizational features from Mafias and drug trafficking organizations is a 
rarity in and of itself. Nevertheless, this hybridity has various functional advantages. A 
decentralized exchange network increases both the durability of the distributive chain and the 
fluidity of voluntary economic transactions while a powerful administrative unit oversees the 
legitimacy of these transactions while establishing codes of conduct. This mixture of precise 
governance and free market economics is appropriate in illicit markets. Indeed, the lack of 
conventional enforcement mechanisms in illicit markets necessitates the existence of an 
overarching entity to moderate market transactions and punish those who renege on 
contractual obligations. Nevertheless, the supremacy of cryptomarket administrators often 
means that their elimination may topple the platform. On the other hand, the loose network of 
vendors and consumers allows for user mobility and the expedient rebirth of the platform.  
The Who, the What, and the Where of Cryptomarket Studies 
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The vast bulk of scholarly literature on cryptomarkets are either descriptive or 
qualitative (Baratt and Aldridge, 2016). To elaborate, descriptive studies document the range, 
type, and quantity of illegal goods and services (Aldridge & Decary-Hetu, 2014; Martin, 
2013a) while qualitative studies seek to identify the characteristics and motives of 
cryptomarket participants through interviews with buyers and vendors. In this respect, these 
studies can be neatly separated into three categories of query and investigation: what items 
are sold, who sells them, and where they are shipped to/from. It is important to stipulate that 
this is not an exhaustive categorization as there are several studies which do not fall into any 
of these categories. These include studies of trust, confliction resolution, and network 
structure.       
Reflecting its wide array of illicit wares, the motto of Silk Road was “If you can 
smoke or, inject it, or snort it, there’s a good chance Silk Road has it” (Goodman, 2016). 
Indeed, cryptomarkets offer a prodigious selection of drugs, malware, weapons, credit card 
and banking information, airplane tickets, counterfeit money, child pornography, chemical 
substances, and hitmen, among other illicit goods and services (Baratt and Aldridge, 2016; 
Christin, 2013; Decary-Hetu, Mousseau, and Rguioui, 2017; Hutchings and Holt, 2015; 
Martin 2014a). Although it is difficult to quantify the exact number of transactions conducted 
on cryptomarkets, Aldridge and Decary-Hetu (2016) have developed a suitable metric: 
counting the number of buyer feedback messages on a listing. While not perfect, this method 
provides researchers with reliably accurate estimates of monthly revenue by item type.  
Most to-date studies of items sold on cryptomarkets have fixated on controlled 
substances. In an extensive study of 16 marketplaces, van Buskirk, Naicker, Roxburgh, 
Bruno, and Burns, Breen, and Roxburgh (2016), identified “cannabis, pharmaceuticals, 
MDMA, cocaine and methamphetamine as the five most commonly sold substances, with the 
popularity of new psychoactive substances declining slightly” (20). With regard to the sale of 
fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic opioids, researchers (Lamy et. al, 2020) found 
that DreamMarket, the largest cryptomarket in history, offered a steady supply of synthetic 
opioids at both retail and whole-sale prices. Curiously, China was the main country of origin 
of novel synthetic opioids while 52.6 % of all fentanyl-type drug listings were posted by 
unique vendor names who indicated they were shipping from the U.S. and Canada. 
Utilizing digital trace to examine the prevalence of nonmedical prescription 
psychiatric drug use on 31 cryptomarkets, Cunliffe, Decary-Hetu, and Pollak (2019) found 
that diazepam, alprazolam, Adderall, modafinil and methylphenidate were the most popular 
sedatives and CNS stimulants. Moreover, the US and UK were the primary suppliers of these 
products, accounting for 41.4% and 31.1% of all sales, respectively. Surprisingly, 
antidepressants and mood stabilisers were not particular popular on cryptomarkets. The 
authors conclude that only the nonmedical prescription psychiatric drugs that have a potential 
for abuse are sold at high levels. 
As it relates to the popularity drugs on cryptomarkets, there appears to be a 
remarkable level of consistency from market to market. “Since 2015, cannabis, MDMA 
(ecstasy) and cocaine-related products have been the most popular drugs sold online, 
representing about 70% of all sales” (Soska & Christin, 2015, 55). This consistency seems to 
suggest that cryptomarkets cater to specific drug types over others. Nevertheless, the size and 
scope of smaller niche drug markets on the dark web has increased in recent years. In a study 
of the six largest cryptomarkets, Barrera, Malm, Decary-Hetu, and Munksgaard (2019) found 
that tobacco sales reached US $194,940 annually as a lower-bound estimate. Of importance is 
Barratt et al.’s (2016) Global Drug Survey (N=3794) which found that MDMA/Ecstasy 
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(55%), cannabis (43%) and LSD (35%) were the drug types most commonly obtained 
through cryptomarkets.  
Nevertheless, a novel subset of these item-centric studies seeks to uncover the effect 
of changing drug policies on both cryptomarket sales and rates of user harm in light of the 
growth of these marketplaces. Using an interrupted time series analysis, Martin, Cunliffe, 
Decary-Hetu, and Aldridge (2018) investigate the association between the rescheduling of 
hydrocodone products in the US and the subsequent increase of illicit prescription opioids on 
cryptomarkets. The authors found that the opioid market share on cryptomarkets increased 
from 6.7% to 13.7% following the implementation of the hydrocodone rescheduling. 
Moreover, there was a statistically significant change in the composition of the opioid market 
as fentanyl sales spiked dramatically. However, despite increases in the use of harmful drugs, 
cryptomarkets may also decrease the deleterious effects of drug use by providing harm-
reduction information to buyers. To this extent, the benefit of these analyses is their 
elucidation of consumer preference for cryptomarket transactions (van Buskirk, Roxburgh et 
al., 2016). Indeed, drug quality seems to be a major factor in consumers’ decision to use 
cryptomarkets. Caudevilla et al. (2016) reported results of laboratory testing of samples sent 
by cryptomarket vendors. In general, the authors found that the samples were purer and less 
adulterated relative to samples provided by terrestrial sources.  
Much of the early cryptomarket literature had an explicit focus on either analysing 
Silk Road data or examining user experiences and vendor characteristics through interviews 
(Maddox et al., 2016). As it pertains to qualitative assessments, studies by Van Hout and 
Bingham (2013a, 2013b) examined consumers’ decision-making processes and motivation 
for participating on cryptomarkets. Relying on a single case study, van Hout and Bingham 
(2013a) insisted that the variety of controlled substances mixed with cryptomarket reputation 
dynamics encouraged user participation. More importantly, the same authors (van Hout and 
Bingham, 2014b), monitoring discussion threads and conducting anonymous online 
interviews (N = 20), found that users frequented the Silk Road out of curiosity and concerns 
for personal. This study was the first to examine the demographical breakdown of 
cryptomarket participants; reporting that the majority of users were white males between the 
ages of 18 to 25 who preferred MDMA, ketamine, cannabis, and cocaine. None of the 
findings from this study can necessarily be generalized due to the small sample size. Three 
additional papers (Bancroft and Reid, 2016; van Buskirk, Roxburgh et al., 2016) corroborate 
these findings.  
As it pertains to consumer participation, however, Barratt, Lenton, Maddox, and Allen 
(2016) conducted a digital ethnography which spanned two years (2012-2014) and included 
17 Silk Road buyers. These in depth and unstructured interviews revealed that consumer 
participation on cryptomarkets amounted to being “a kid in a candy store” with high product 
availability reducing the need to hoard drugs, and by extension, helping to moderate drug use. 
The honeymoon period that is often experienced by buyers upon successfully purchasing 
drugs from a cryptomarket for the first time transforms into a stable or decreasing trajectory 
of drug use (Bancroft and Reid, 2016). Similarly, Van Hout and Hearne (2016), examining 
cryptomarket forum members’ views and perspectives on new psychoactive substances 
(NPS), found that buyers “appeared well informed, with harm reduction and vendor 
information exchange central to purchase decisions”. In general, Van Buskirk, Roxburgh et 
al. (2016) have reported that cryptomarket consumers are typically a more “entrenched” 
consumer group with active ties within their own community.  
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Studies by Aldridge and Decary-Hetu (2016b), Decary-Hetu, Mousseau, and Vidal 
(2018), and Demant, Munksgaard, and Houborg (2018) demonstrate that cryptomarkets 
increasingly cater to business-to-business transactions and social drug dealing as opposed to 
simple business-to-consumer transactions. In this regard, the potential for the dark web’s 
globalization of the drug trade is demonstrated by several studies. With regard to the 
geographical distribution of cryptomarket activity, Dolliver, Ericson, and Love (2018) found 
that Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States accounted for the largest number of listings and transactions for heroin, cocaine, and 
prescription drugs. Moreover, while heroin and cocaine are generally mass-produced in South 
Asia and South America, the products originated from the U.S., Australia, and the 
Netherlands; nations well known for consuming these drugs.  
Similarly, Van Buskirk, Naicker, Roxburgh, Bruno, and Burns (2017) found that the 
majority of drug listings on the Agora market originated in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, China, and the Netherlands. These nations accounted for 61.8% of all 
identified listings and 68% of all unique vendors. Interestingly, Australia possesses the 
highest per capita estimate of sellers with 4.73 sellers per million. This makes intuitive sense 
as Australia’s geographic isolation and relatively high drug prices encourages more of a 
domestic market which sells to Australian customers. Indeed, Australia is rather unique with 
regard to cryptomarket drug trading as studies (Barratt, Ferris,Winstock, 2014; Cunliffe, 
Martin, Decary-Hetu, and Aldridge, 2017; Phelps and Watt, 2014) have revealed a dense 
domestic market with higher than average drug prices.  
A study by Broseus, Rhumorbarbe, Morelato, Staehli, and Rossy (2017) which 
examined the geographical structure of drug trafficking on the Evolution marketplace 
demonstrated that countries within the Europe and Anglosphere accounted for an outsized 
portion of sales and listings on Evolution. To this extent, 64% of drug listings and 30% of 
sales came from the U.S. Importantly, Broseus et al. (2017) also demonstrate a modicum of 
product specialization as niche prescription drugs were shipped primarily from the 
Netherlands (98% of listings), Canada (97%), Spain (96%) or Sweden (94%). While 
Tsuchiya and Hiramoto (2021) also found that cryptomarket transactions more often took 
place in Europe, the US, Canada, and Australia, transactions were more frequent on Monday, 
Tuesday, and Wednesday relative to Saturday and Sunday. This suggests that cryptomarket 
users make drug purchases between Mondays and Wednesdays for personal use on the 
weekend. This coheres with Aldridge and Décary-Hétu (2016), Barratt et al. (2016), and 
Demant et al. (2018) who maintain that cryptomarket drug purchases are recreational in 
nature as opposed to wholesale transactions.  
Demant, Munksgaard, Decary-Hetu, and Aldridge (2018) characterized cryptomarket 
buyer behaviour through product reviews posted on 15 cryptomarkets. The authors found that 
there is an increasing movement toward the localization of cryptomarkets with regard to 
product destinations. Norbutas (2018), using publicly available crawls of the cryptomarket 
Abraxas, found that buyers were more likely to buy from multiple sellers within a single 
country, avoiding purchases from countries which were different. Norbutas (2018) concluded 
that online drug trade networks, similar to terrestrial networks, are “heavily shaped by 
geographic constraints in spite of their ability to provide access for end-users to large 
international supply” (96).  
Cryptomarkets offer a wide variety of illicit goods and services. However, these 
products are generally bought and sold by individuals residing in developed countries across 
the Western hemisphere. As such, cryptomarkets are platforms utilized primarily by educated 
and well-to-do individuals who have a high level of technological savvy relative to the rest of 
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the general population. Moreover, these illicit platforms generally cater to the trade of illicit 
substances like marijuana, cocaine, psychedelics, and prescription drugs. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that newer and more dangerous drugs such as fentanyl are increasingly 
sold on some cryptomarkets. A number of cryptomarkets have, nevertheless, banned the sale 
of this product given the dangers associated with its use. The who, what, and where of 
cryptomarket studies constitute the early years of research on this topic. The scholarly 
research has evolved since then, encompassing topics such as trust, governance, and 
disruption. Indeed, the topics of trust and market disruption will be covered in the 
forthcoming sections. 
Trust and Reputation 
Information concerning the quality of experiential commodities is both scarce and 
unreliable in illicit markets. Moreover, reputations are difficult to establish and state 
protection is a near impossibility unless one renounces their criminal ways and turns state 
witness (Campana and Varase, 2013). Trust is minimal, and betrayal is the standard operating 
procedure. Wright and Decker (1994) and Hamill (2011) observed that betraying one’s 
friends, family, and associates is normal in the criminal underworld. The fragility of trust 
within the criminal underworld may be owed to the unflattering selfishness and proclivity for 
risk-taking which characterizes many criminals (Gambetta, 2009, 30). Indeed, the situational 
constraints with which a criminal must contend (death, arrest, betrayal, etc.) certainly 
encourages thoughts of reneging on contractual obligations and turning tail when 
circumstances dictate. To make matters worse, these contractual obligations are not upheld by 
a principal authority as they would be in licit markets. Nevertheless, trust is the tool which 
allows criminals to cooperate, ultimately permitting the heist, assassination, or arson to move 
forward.  
Gambetta (2000) defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with 
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, 
both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to 
monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action” (217). Von Lampe and 
Johansen (2004) offer a simpler definition, noting that trust is a mechanism for individuals to 
“cope with risk and uncertainty in interactions with others” (103). Trust, then, involves the 
presupposition of future risk. It is a wager as to whether one’s trading partner or accomplice 
will fulfil their stated or expected obligations such that the transaction or activity is 
successful. There are, of course, no guarantees of the fulfilment of these obligations in the 
criminal world. 
It is, moreover, important to consider how one determines whether or not their fellow 
criminal can be trusted. Williamson (1993) maintains that this requires a trustee to 
demonstrate to the truster a temporary suspension of selfish desires for the sake of 
cooperation (458). The trust deficit within the criminal world is particularly problematic for 
trusters. As Gambetta and Bacharach (2001) demonstrate through a game theoretic approach, 
the optimal outcome for a trustee is to cheat (renege) in the event that a truster opts to 
cooperate (endow trust). However, Gambetta (2009) also contends that the iteration of this 
outcome over several rounds would be most detrimental to a trustee. That is, their persistent 
duplicitousness would discourage the truster from cooperating, costing the trustee all future 
business opportunities (38). Under such uncertainties and moral looseness, one can 
understand the fragility and paucity of trust within the criminal world.     
While the criminological literature (Gambetta, 2000; von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; 
Gambetta, 2009; Campana and Varese, 2013) has emphasized the trust deficit within criminal 
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networks of varying size, these observations reflect criminal activities which take place in 
terrestrial markets. One would be correct in assuming that trust dynamics are liable to change 
in cyberspace. Several studies (Holt and Lampke, 2010; Yip, 2011) have indicated that 
market-driven dynamics are present in illicit online markets. Brenner stipulates that 
cybercriminals operate as “free-trading entrepreneurs” when engaging in drug dealing. 
Voluntary economic transactions are the common operational protocol. However, it is 
important to stipulate that transactions between cybercriminals are not predicated on thick 
thrust as set out by Khodyakov (2007) or bonding capital as mentioned by Lo (2010). These 
relationships are instead built on a sort of superficial or thin trust (Khodyakov, 2007) which is 
easily built and destroyed as it is predicated on circumstance rather a deep connection 
between those involved.    
Decary-Hetu and Dupont (2012), in an examination of a botnet forum, found that 
simple indicators often determined how well a vendor was trusted. These generally included 
the number awards received or size of one’s network. In this case, surface-level trust was 
built upon personal characteristics and behaviour as opposed to mutual experiences where a 
deep trust could be developed. However, another study by Dupont, Cote, Savine, and Decary-
Hetu (2016) revealed that “reputation systems within botnet forums are heavily biased 
according to the position of the rater within the system”. That is to say, new forum members 
were less likely to post negative reviews or assessments. The majority of negative feedback 
came from forum staff and administrators. Interestingly, only a tiny fraction of the forum 
membership (2.4%) participated in the vast majority (75%) of “trust exchanges”.  
Trust plays an important role in cryptomarkets. Lacson and Jones (2016) contend that 
the creators of cryptomarkets concentrated their efforts on building cohesion and camaraderie 
among users of various functional stripes. In researching relations between vendors and 
consumers, Van Hout and Bingham maintain that these relationships “were based on levels of 
trust and professionalism” (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013, 387). Consumers and vendors must 
trust one another to communicate the quality of products and the requisite currency to merit 
an exchange. In this case, trust is formulated through each party’s communication of their 
expectations when participating in a voluntary transaction. To this extent, cryptomarket users 
openly share information on the quality of drugs and their value relative to street-level pricing 
on forums. A study conducted by Dasgupta et al. (2013) found that “buyers were able to 
provide a valid estimate of the street price of diverted prescription opioids…and predict the 
relative pharmacologic potency of opioid molecules” (178). Of course, this quality of 
information is not easily available in conventional criminal markets as the lack of trust and 
need for secrecy equates to a lack of reliable information on experiential goods.  
To this extent, the commission of a crime is often dependent on a criminal’s ability to 
obfuscate their interpersonal exchanges. That is, increasing the difficulty of law enforcement 
in detecting their intentions (Gambetta, 2009). Traditionally, this encrypted communication 
among criminals came in the form of face-to-face interactions in noisy clubs and isolated golf 
courses and long-distance communications with disposable mobile phones and secret radio 
frequencies (Gambetta, 2009, 155). Importantly, the application of encryption technology and 
direct messaging systems by cryptomarkets has automated secrecy and privacy. 
Cryptocurrencies and anonymity networks are far more effective at befuddling law 
enforcement than the methods employed by other criminals. As such, cryptomarket users 
need not concern themselves with proactively restricting communication so as to maintain 
secrecy. These processes are automated through the use of routing software and 
cryptocurrencies. This is not to suggest the indomitability of cryptomarket encryption as 
human errors can always be made. Nevertheless, this efficiency in obfuscation simplifies 
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cryptomarkets communication as users can be forthright about their illicit intentions and 
desires. This can involve the establishment of consumer pricing by simply posting prices on a 
vendor page or voicing one’s opinion on the US War of Drugs on a forum. This allows for 
the formation of transparent communicative norms that are practiced in a reduced capacity in 
terrestrial crime settings (Aldridge and Decary-Hetu, 2016a; Martin, 2014a). This bodes well 
for personal promotion and open communication.  
Such fluidity and transparency are not present in the physical underworld given the 
complexity of signals and their failure to fully conceal one’s criminal endeavours. As it 
pertains to complexity, consider the convoluted process of soliciting sex among gay men 
during periods when homosexuality was illegal and/or stigmatized. Gay men created “polari”, 
“a lexicon for secret communications between gays who knew each other as gays but also a 
bait to check whether someone was gay and interested in making contact” (Gambetta, 2009, 
166). Additionally, homosexuals developed the hanky-code which utilized a series of 
coloured handkerchiefs which denoted the specific sexual act one desired (Gambetta, 2009, 
166). In order for polari and the hanky-code to be successful, proponents of these strategies 
must have a working knowledge of their operation and must moreover depend on others 
having similar proficiency. It is entirely possible for communication to be hampered by the 
complexity of these strategies. 
Conversely, let us consider the simplicity of purchasing a hard-to-procure item such 
as uranium or hacked government data on a cryptomarket. I have purposely chosen these 
items as their acquisition is made difficult by dense regulation in conventional criminal 
markets. On a cryptomarket, transactions of this magnitude are actualized by a consumer 
identifying a suitable vendor, selecting the amount of the desired item, and initiating a 
cryptocurrency transfer. In this example, a request for uranium is made to a vendor, the 
vendor ships the uranium to the buyer, and an electronic currency transfer is authorized by a 
cryptomarket administrator once the buyer receives the product. There are no secret 
languages or coloured handkerchiefs. Communication is direct and transparent. 
Secondly, while cryptomarket communication accurately conveys a user’s message, 
communication in the physical underworld is handicapped by the possibility of 
misinterpretation. A successful signal must be disseminated throughout an organization or 
market, overcome variations in meaning, and mitigate the issues of memorization and 
ambiguity (Gambetta, 2009, 171). Given these strict hurdles of success, failed illicit business 
transactions are a constant throughout the underworld. The inadequacies of conventional 
criminal communication are such that even the most organized entities like the Sicilian Mafia 
have difficulty relaying messages accurately (Gambetta, 2009, 173).  
A popular example pertains to a misunderstanding concerning the meaning of silence 
among Italian Mafiosi in the 1960’s (Gambetta, 2009). Salvatore La Barbera’s silence over 
the murder of fellow Mafiosi, Calcedonio Di Pisa, indicated to some that La Barbera had 
indeed murdered Di Pisa. However, La Barbera had not in actuality murdered Di Pisa as his 
silence was merely a reflection of his decision to remain respectful in lieu of the death of a 
fellow gangster. Nevertheless, La Babera’s silence was perceived as guilt, and he was 
assassinated (Gambetta, 2009). His death resulted in an internecine war among the various 
families in Palermo. Such broken lines of communication and the resultant disaster are not 
present in cryptomarkets as users are able to freely communicate their intentions over a 
transparent medium. Simply put, digital encryption has streamlined interpersonal relations in 
criminal markets, simplifying communications and increasing criminal extroversion as one 
need not worry about restricting communication to maintain secrecy.   
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Gambetta (2009) emphasizes that in order to successfully engage with prospective 
customers, sellers must themselves engage in personal promotion, solidifying their identity as 
a supplier and the quality of their products. Given that many illicit goods and services are 
experiential, a specific trademark is required to establish an association between a dealer and 
their product. Heroin dealers, for example, have long utilized delivery bags with unique 
stamps in order to sell to customers (Gambetta, 2009). These stamps delineate the dealer’s 
identity and associated heroin product which they traffic. Similarly, cryptomarket vendors 
possess a customizable seller page which not only distinguishes them from other vendors but 
more importantly allows them to establish direct relations with buyers (Martin, 2014a, 35). 
To this extent, vendors adopt unique usernames to both distinguish themselves from other 
vendors and establish a direct relationship with customers. Some names include “Cannabis 
Connection” and “Dr. Leary”, but may even include popular references like “haizenberg”, 
“MrWhiteInc.”, “Nancy Reagan”, and “ReDEyEsEmporiuM” (Martin, 2014a, 35).   
However, by virtue of how the dark web markets operate, names are transient and 
entities that are trusted today might not exist tomorrow. Vendors will try to build a reputation 
associated with the persona they have created. Reputations are vitally important in facilitating 
criminal engagements as criminals who wish to collaborate often have no prior knowledge or 
experience with each other and need a mantle with which to place their trust (Yip, Webber, 
Shadbolt, 2013, 526). Moreover, given the economic uncertainty and lack of accountability in 
the criminal world, a good reputation is just as if not more valuable in illicit markets than it is 
in licit ones (Gambetta, 2009, 199). Backed by legal and moral assurances, a reputation in a 
licit market may function as a coordination device which allows buyers to discern who the 
most trustworthy vendor is from a list of vendors selling the same products within the same 
price range (Przepiorka and Aksoy, 2017). This is the same in illicit markets. To this extent, 
Leeson (2005) makes the argument that users “need to establish ex ante whether or not the 
outsiders they would like to trade with are ‘cheaters’ or ‘cooperators’” (79).  
Formal institutions which collect information on parties involved in trades may not 
always exist in the criminal world. While not an example of an illicit exchange network, 
Greif (1989) documents the Maghribi traders would organize coalitions in Medieval Europe 
in order to exchange information about their agents’ reputation to mitigated issues relating to 
trust amid long-distance trade. Hillmann and Aven (2011) describe a similar situation in 
Russia around the turn of the nineteenth century whereby the reputation of individuals was 
pivotal to the development of corporate capitalism. It is often the case that reputations are 
established and maintained through a formal system. According to Milgrom et al. (1990), the 
Champagne Fairs in France used bookkeeping and cashless payments as a private 
adjudication system that allowed them to track fraudulent traders and exclude them from 
future fairs. Moreover, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) maintain that credit bureaus emerged in 
the late 19th century, collecting and sharing information about borrowers’ credit histories in 
order to create reputational incentives for repayment.  
Nevertheless, a good reputation is difficult to develop and divulge in the criminal 
world. Reuter (1985) contends that the elevated risk of detection by law enforcement prevents 
for the willing and consistent dissemination of information among dealers, brokers, and 
buyers. That is to say, a consumer’s unfamiliarity with a dealer’s reputation for honesty or a 
lack thereof may be attributed to the general paucity of information circulated in a criminal 
market. This, however, is not necessarily the case when it comes to cryptomarkets.  
On cryptomarkets, vendor reputations are established by consumers who are 
encouraged by administrators to provide publicly available feedback on their experience with 
a vendor. “Customer feedback takes a variety of forms, ranging from detailed comments 
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about shipping times, ‘stealth’ measures and the perceived potency of illicit drugs, to a simple 
5-star rating” (Martin, 2014a, 41). Furthermore, a cryptomarket vendor cannot alter the 
feedback published on their page, whether positive or negative (Martin, 2014a, 42). As such, 
reputations cannot be artificially inflated by self-serving vendors. What’s more, these 
reputations are presumably up-to-date as consumers often upload feedback upon receiving 
their requested product (Hout and Bingham, 2013). Tzanetakis, Kamphausen, Werse, and von 
Laufenberg (2016) argue that customer feedback in cryptomarket creates trust in an otherwise 
uncertain environment. Still, a vendor’s reputation constitutes public knowledge on a 
cryptomarket as it is brazenly displayed on their seller page (Christin, 2013). Vendors with a 
reputation for timely and trustworthy transactions have a strong incentive to behave 
cooperatively (Shapiro, 1983).  
Hardy and Norgaard (2016) use data on cannabis listings from Silk Road to study the 
relationship between reputation and prices. The authors show that “reputation acts as a 
sufficient self-enforcement mechanism that allow transactions to occur” (Hardy and 
Norgaard, 2016, 32). To this extent, vendor reputations constitute a formal institution that 
creates a stable trading environment among those least expected to deal honestly. Janetos and 
Tilly (2017) show that a mature highly-rated cryptomarket vendor charges 20% higher price 
than a mature low-rated vendor. In general, vendors with more reviews charge a higher price 
than sellers with a low number of reviews regardless of rating. However, bad (i.e. low-
ranked) sellers prefer to exit the market than decrease their prices in response to negative 
feedback. This is in line with Batikasa and Kretschmera (2018) who, studying the Agora 
marketplace, found that cryptomarket vendors were more likely to leave the market when 
they received negative feedback from customers.  
Furthermore, a vendor’s transaction history reduces the likelihood of market exit as a 
longer transaction history is correlated with continued market participation. In licit online 
markets, the spectre of negative feedback also looms large. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) 
demonstrate that when an eBay vendor receives their first negative feedback their weekly 
sales growth decreases from +5% to –8%. Relatedly, research on Yelp by Luca (2011) has 
shown that online restaurant reviews impact restaurant demand, especially for independent 
restaurants, a result which has been confirmed for hotels by Hollenbeck (2017). As well, 
Wagner (2016), in a field experiment in a Chilean start-up accelerator, found that negative 
feedback decreases the probability of start-up’s continuation, i.e. increases the probability of 
exiting the market. 
Using longitudinal data from the first Silk Road, Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten 
(2017) examined the benefits of a good reputation. Moreover, the author examined how much 
buyers take into account sellers’ reputations when deciding whom to buy from. The authors 
found that vendors react to changes in their reputation by adjusting the prices of their goods. 
Vendors with a high reputation score would routinely increase the prices of their products as 
their devoted clientele would continue to return to them. The same cannot be said for less 
reputable vendors who decreased their prices to attract prospective buyers. This is 
phenomena was also documented by Shapiro (1983) in offline markets where low-rated 
sellers decreased their prices to compensate potential buyers for the risk they took when 
doing business with them. Interestingly, Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten (2017) also 
reported that higher rated vendors typically remained on the market for a longer period of 
time. This makes intuitive sense as a good reputation breathes longevity in one’s business as 
old customers will constantly return and new customers will join. Indeed, Bhaskar et al. 
(2017) maintains that online black markets manage to alleviate moral hazard problems 
predominantly because negative feedbacks lead to sales reductions. Importantly, vendor 
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reputation is transferable across markets. Norbutas, Ruitera, and Corten (2020), analysing 
vendor migration in three cryptomarkets, found that vendors that have accumulated a high 
cumulative reputation over many successful transactions were better able to migrate to 
another market following closure.  
Importantly, this feedback system is not the only method by which vendors can earn 
the trust of buyers. Cryptomarket vendors will utilize a bevy of tactics to shore up their 
reputation. According to Christin (2013), vendors will, at the very minimum, address 
potential customers using a warm and professional tone. “The tone and content of these 
messages contrast significantly with the communication styles stereotypically associated with 
conventional drug dealers, and are likely to strike a reassuring chord amongst consumers who 
are accustomed to high levels of retail service in other aspects of their lives” (Martin, 2014a, 
37). Vendors may also resort of licit retail techniques like Bitcoin lotteries and holiday sales. 
In fact, 4/20 or “International Pot Day” marked quite a celebratory affair on Silk Road as 
Ross Ulbricht waived all commission fees for marijuana purchases to reduce the overall 
consumer price (Martin, 2014a, 37). Furthermore, a study by Ladegaard (2017) revealed that 
new vendors seeking to cultivate a consumer base would offer low-cost and free samples.  
Quite remarkably, the desire for a positive reputation is such that vendors will 
sometimes engage in corporate mimicry to an extent bordering on the outlandish. Certain 
vendors will employ conscientious market rhetoric, professing their commitment to selling 
products which use “organic” ingredients. In some cases, vendors may even attempt to sway 
consumers by proclaiming that their products had been purchased from poor agrarian farmers 
as opposed to violent drug dealers (Martin, 2014a, 39). Of course, terrestrial drug vendors 
have been found to screen potential customers, incentivizing long-term clients by offering 
credit or discounts (Chalmers & Bradford, 2013; Jacques, Allen, & Wright, 2014). Finally, 
risk-taking appears to be a proven method for establishing a good reputation. According to 
Decary-Hetu (2016), a willingness to ship overseas on the part of vendors was associated 
with higher reputation scores and greater profit. Shipping internationally is generally 
considered a perilous activity as it increases the risk of detection when drugs move across 
international borders (Volery, Mueller, and von Siemens, 2013).  
Cryptomarkets, due in part to their semi-public nature, provide information on 
numerous transactions. However, because these exchanges take place without the benefit of 
face-to-face interactions, it is especially difficult for participants to gauge both the 
trustworthiness of others and the overall quality of products. The problem of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry has been extensively examined by Akerlof (1970). According to 
Akerlof (1970), the risk of market failure increases when buyers are unable to inspect 
products and differentiate their before purchase. As such, repeated experiences with low-
quality sellers decreases buyers’ expectations and willingness to pay for high-quality 
products. What emerges then is a “lemon market” where consumers possess less valid or 
reliable information about the quality of the goods relative to vendors; this is information 
asymmetry. According to Herley and Florenio (2009), the uncertainty created by low-quality 
vendors imposes a tax on every transaction conducted in the market. That is, high-quality 
vendors stand to make less as the presence of low-quality vendors both discourages buyers 
from engaging in transactions and drives down the price of goods and services.  
As with many types of real-world exchange situations, a clear way to establish 
trustworthiness is through transparency and the provision of accurate information. In a 
simulation study of the effects of positive reputation systems in a licit online market, 
Whitmeyer (2000) found that the effects of different types of positive reputation systems 
often depended to a large extent on the proportion of cooperators in the population. That is to 
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say, more cooperators in a market decreases uncertainty and information asymmetry by 
providing accurate information on the quality of vendors. In general, research (Cook and 
Emerson, 1978; Kollock 1999; Yamagishi and Matsuda 2003) into exchange relations in 
social networks demonstrates that uncertainty reduces the likelihood that an actor will form a 
relationship with an exchange partner given the potential for exploitation. This, however, is 
not the case when actors actively trust their prospective trade partners.  
To date, only one study has examined trust networks in cryptomarkets. Duxbury and 
Haynie (2017) examined the local and global network structure of a transactional opioid 
network on the dark web. Using exponential random graph modelling, the authors 
demonstrate that the opioid network was highly localized, segmenting into subgroups where a 
small number of vendors accounted for a large number of transactions. As such, the authors 
concluded that “vendors’ trustworthiness is a better predictor of vendor selection than product 
diversity or affordability, with buyers choosing to conduct repeat transactions with trusted 
vendors” (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017, 23). This produces a unique network structure that is 
characterized by localized subgroups of comparable size. Building off of this study, Duxbury 
and Haynie (2018) also contend that social commerce networks on cryptomarkets are based 
on preferential attachment, where highly desirable vendors attract a large base of customers 
(Diekmann et al., 2014; Stephen and Toubia, 2009). Networks that form through preferential 
attachment generally exhibit a degree scaling property (Barabasi and Albert, 1999). 
Duxbury and Haynie’s (2017, 2018) findings are corroborated by Decary-Hetu and 
Quessy-Dore (2017). Measuring the loyalty of repeat buyers over time, the authors find that, 
on average, buyers make 60% of their purchases from the same cryptomarket vendor. 
Nevertheless, the authors note that “while repeat buyers may want to remain loyal to a vendor 
they are often forced to purchase from other vendors when their main vendor is unable to 
supply them with the products they want” (Decary-Hetu and Quessy-Dore, 2017, 87). 
Though buyers generally purchase from the same vendor, this is not to suggest necessarily 
that all vendors operate on a single market. Using data collected on eight cryptomarkets, 
Broseus et. al (2016) examine market diversification among Canadian vendors. This analysis 
revealed that most of vendors (80%) focused their activities on only one market. 
Furthermore, their presence on several cryptomarkets at the same time decreases when the 
number of cryptomarkets increases.  
As it relates to trust and uncertainty, however, buyers’ decision to repeatedly engage 
with a single cryptomarket vendor is indicative of Coase’s theory of the firm. According to 
Coase (1937), when market transactions are expensive or risky it makes sense to form 
relationships which ultimately culminates in a firm rather than purchase resources on a 
random basis. It makes little sense to transact with anonymous vendor when there is 
considerable uncertainty about the quality of products unless there is no alternative. As 
Casson (2001) suggests, “a firm may be defined as a specialized decision‐making unit, whose 
function is to improve coordination by structuring information flow, and which is normally 
endowed with legal privileges, including indefinite life” (58). In the case of cryptomarkets, 
persistent uncertainty is a stimulus for the formation of transactional subgroups (Duxbury and 
Haynie, 2017; 2018). Indeed, the formation of subgroups is premised on trust between a 
small number of vendors and their respective customers. As buyers will not often do business 
with vendor(s) they have little experience with, they will consistently return to their primary 
vendor(s) in order to conduct further transactions. This naturally equates to an fairly diffuse 
trade network where buyers and individual vendors cluster in silos. Indeed, the formation of 
trust among cryptomarket users ultimately determines the structure and composition of the 
transactional network therein. 
39 
 
Law Enforcement Intervention and Network Disruption 
The Digital Age has certainly simplified a bevy of once complex functions of daily 
life (e.g. communication, transportation, etc.). However, such enthusiasm is not necessarily 
shared by law enforcement as they must now contend with the emergence of new technology-
oriented crimes. Of course, the ungovernability and unpredictability of the Internet has 
created lucrative opportunities for criminals looking for a quick score. Indeed, the 
oversaturation of online criminal markets means that criminal groups are not operating in 
isolation as market competition begins to ramp up. Indeed, a reduction in illicit market shares 
may lead to a reduction in profit among competitors. In short, competition breeds revenue. 
Nevertheless, the success of cryptomarkets is indicative of a digital revolution in crime. This 
section will examine the efforts made by law enforcement to combat and curtail these illicit 
online marketplaces.   
Law enforcement agencies certainly recognize cryptomarkets as a credible threat. 
Consider DEA Special Agent Cromwell’s characterization of darkmarket operators as greedy 
criminals, cowardly hiding behind encryption technology in order to peddle products which 
cause the deaths of 200,000 Americans on a yearly basis (Martin, 2014a, 2014). This is very 
similar to DEA Acting Administrator Michele Leonhart’s statement on Mexico’s La Familia 
Cartel: “this organization, the newest of Mexican cartels, is directly responsible for a vast 
majority of the methamphetamine pouring into our country across our Southwest Border, and 
has had a hand in fueling the cycle of violence that is wracking Mexico today”. While it 
cannot be argued that the scope and influence of cryptomarkets rival that of Mexican drug 
cartels, it is apparent that law enforcement officials are taking these illicit entities seriously. 
Nevertheless, this proactive focus on cryptomarkets is quite remarkable given law 
enforcement’s long documented disinterest in cybercrime. “There is an omnipresent 
undercurrent of social stigma against those who fulfil less dangerous duties in law 
enforcement” (Goodman, 1997, 479). Given the lack of serious violence and associated 
difficulty of detecting and apprehending cybercriminals, cybercrime is not as stringently 
policed as terrestrial crimes. However, it stands to reason that the continued interventions 
against cryptomarkets are an exception to the rule. Indeed, law enforcement interventions 
have created an insalubrious environment for cryptomarkets as several popular firms have 
folded in a short period of time (Martin, 2014a, 65). However, while these initiatives have 
produced victories for law enforcement, costly defeats have also accrued.   
While typically slow in counteracting the emergence of new cyberthreats, law 
enforcement organizations have made several attempts against cryptomarkets in the past 
decade. The first cryptomarket arrest occurred in 2013 in Western Australian. What is 
interesting about this case was that the offender was a local dealer seeking to resell purchased 
product on his own turf (Martin, 2014a, 58). To this extent, Aldridge and Decary-Hetu (2014) 
maintain that these “business to business” transactions represent approximately 31% to 45% 
of Silk Road sales revenue. This is further corroborated by Norbutas (2018) who notes that 
cryptomarket distribution networks are localized whereby vendors and buyers from the same 
countries typically do business with one another. Moreover, while there is no evidence to 
suggest widespread collusion between cryptomarket vendors and terrestrial drug traffickers 
and dealers, law enforcement agencies have certainly considered the influence of 
cryptomarkets in their nation’s domestic drug supply. 
As it pertains to law enforcement intervention in cryptomarkets, however, the 
scholarly literature has exclusively examined the effect of market takedowns and 
infrastructural disruptions. On October 2, 2013, the FBI-led arrest of Ross Ulbricht resulted 
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in the shutdown of Silk Road and the seizure of over USD $33 million in bitcoins. Many Silk 
Road participants migrated to other markets following its closure. In fact, Soska and Christin 
(2015), analysing two years of transactional data, show that within six weeks of Silk Road’s 
shutdown the number of dealers on Black Market Reloaded and Sheep increased by 200% 
and 400%, respectively. Moreover, by late January of 2014, sales volumes on several 
cryptomarkets exceeded what was documented on Silk Road. As such, this takedown cannot 
be described as being successful in the long term.  
 Bhaskar, Linacre, and Machin (2019), examining over 1.5 million drug sales, note 
that sales listings on Sheep market rose from 4,358 on October 17, 2013 to 8,457 by October 
30, 2013. By April 2014, there were a combined 32,000 drug listings on Silk Road 2.0, 
Agora, and Evolution, 128% higher than the original Silk Road. The authors (2019) conclude 
that “there is no evidence that these exits deterred buyers or sellers from online drugs trading, 
as new platforms rapidly replaced those taken down, with the online market for drugs 
continuing to grow.” Within two to three months of shutdown, vendor activity and consumer 
confidence returned to normal, with the overall market reverting to equilibrium. Furthermore, 
Buxton and Bingham (2015) found that, following the Silk Road shutdown, participants 
adopted more secure communication and encryption techniques. This particular finding is 
important as it suggests that the tactics and technologies used by cryptomarket users 
improves with each market closure law enforcement intervention. This equates to a game of 
brinksmanship where law enforcement must continually improve their capabilities in order to 
keep pace with cybercriminals on the dark web. These prospects do not necessarily bode well 
for law enforcement given constrains on resources.  
Based on the available evidence, it can be argued that the closure of the Silk Road 
made policing a more difficult task as opposed to an easier one. This iatrogenic effect is 
readily observable in the myriad of cryptomarkets that emerged following the takedown of 
Silk Road. Martin (2014a) notes that “this is due partly to the fact that cryptomarket trading is 
significantly more decentralised now than it was when Silk Road was operating at its peak” 
(13). By late January 2014, sales volumes on several cryptomarkets exceeded what was 
documented on Silk Road. This explosion in sales and new markets has been hailed by many 
as irrefutable proof of the so-called ‘hydra effect’ (Ormsby, 2014). Indeed, the removal of 
one cryptomarket gives rise to many new ones.  
Following the arrest of Ross Ulbricht, the second major disruption came in November 
2014 when the FBI in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Europol 
initiated Operation Onymous, shut down multiple cryptomarkets and arrested many users 
worldwide (Barratt and Aldridge, 2016). Examining the longitudinal impact of Operation 
Onymous, van Buskirk (2017) observed temporary decreases in vendors and listings, with the 
rate of vendor numbers increasing at constant rate. However, van Buskirk maintains that “as 
of November 2015, the overall number of vendors had not returned to the level seen in 
November 2014, just prior to Operation Onymous”. This finding is challenged by Decary-
Hetu and Giommoni (2017) who measured supply side indicators across five cryptomarkets 
in the 41 weeks that preceded Operation Onymous and the 21 weeks that followed it. The 
authors found that initial decreases in market activity were entirely offset by long term gains. 
That is to say, while the number of listings and vendors decreased in the first several weeks 
following Operation Onymous, they recovered entirely in the following months. In fact, sales 
doubled as early as two months following the intervention. As Bhaskar, Linacre, and Machin 
(2019) maintain, “overall, it is not possible to find evidence of deterrent effects associated 
with either the two law enforcement shutdowns” (230).   
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Comparable to operations against terrestrial drug trafficking organizations, the efforts 
made by law enforcement in curtailing cryptomarkets have yielded less than desired results. 
The criminological literature (Kenney 2007; Gambetta 2009; Malm and Bichler, 2011) has 
documented the divarication of organized crime entities following successful state 
intervention. To this extent, the absence of a monopolistic entity creates a vacuum of 
unappeased demand for which smaller entities will scramble to fill. On a national level, the 
Columbian government’s assault on the Medellin and Cali cartels had thoroughly fragmented 
the drug market to a nearly unmanageable degree. “Following the DEA’s kingpin strategy in 
the 1990s, during which US and Colombian law enforcers effectively decapitated the most 
notorious ‘cartels’, numerous so-called ‘micro-cartels’ emerged in their place” (Kenney, 
2007, 257). On a local level, the NYPD’s arrest of Nicky Barnes in the 1970’s had the 
inadvertent effect of fragmenting the New York heroin market. “In destroying the Barnes 
monopoly, law enforcement practices created . . . an opening in the market that was filled by 
new distributors, who literally wanted to make a name for themselves in order to increase 
their share in a burgeoning market” (Gambetta, 2009, 202). Of course, this “hydraization” is 
also present on the dark web. 
In 2017, coordinated law enforcement operations saw the closure of two large drug 
cryptomarkets: Alphabay and Hansa. However, according to Afilipoaie and Shortis (2018), 
the strategies used in this operation differed from previous interventions as they were 
intended to damage the trust which undergirds business-to-consumer relations rather than 
simply close the marketplace. To elaborate, the FBI closed AlphaBay without posting a 
seizure notice or making a public statement so as to allow users to flock to Hansa, which saw 
an eight-fold increase in users. However, Hansa had been co-opted and secretly ran by the 
Dutch National Police prior to AlphaBay’s closure. U.S and Dutch official, together with 
international partners, then initiated a “knock-and-talk” operation on addresses they had 
secured from the bust (Aldridge, and Barratt, 2020). Users were visited at their homes and 
warned against using cryptomarkets in future. In some cases, arrests were made. It is, 
however, unclear what impact this intervention has had.  
Early research demonstrates that whilst users from Alphabay migrated to Dream 
Market in a similar pattern to previous takedowns, users from Hansa opted instead to change 
their PGP keys or usernames, suggesting they chose security over maintaining their 
marketplace reputations (Van Wegberg and Verburgh, 2018). However, findings from the 
Internet Institute indicate that the overall cryptomarket trade volume returned to pre-bust 
levels within a month of Alphabay’s closure (Dittus, 2017). While this intervention has not 
produced the results perhaps desired by law enforcement, its sophistication relative to earlier 
operations should be viewed as a positive outcome. With each strategy, law enforcement are 
perhaps becoming increasingly knowledgeable as to what works and what does not, adapting 
and adjusting the parameters of future strategies to incorporate lessons from prior 
interventions. However, this is contingent on whether law enforcement dealing with 
cryptomarket are made aware of the measurable impact of their interventions. This raises 
questions about the use an evidence-based calculus when policing cryptomarkets. Are the 
results of past interventions used to determine how future interventions are structured? Based 
on the available evidence, this may not be the case.  
It appears that law enforcement interventions against cryptomarkets have been 
ineffective and perhaps counterproductive. In the aftermath of market closure, sales volumes 
generally returned to comparable pre-closure levels while new markets emerged to take the 
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place of those that were shut down. This is the general pattern. It is important to note that this 
fragmentation is partially due to decentralized exchange networks of cryptomarkets. “In the 
event that a cryptomarket is shut down, the user community is able to persist; users either 
migrate to other sites or, as in the case of Silk Road 1.0, they construct and quickly 
repopulate a replacement website” (Martin, 2014a, 23). This mobility and durability equates 
to a difficult-to-exterminate illicit entity. Though it is perhaps reprehensible to allow the 
unabated operation of organized crime, it is arguably far worse for law enforcement to 
destroy a criminal monopoly as the crime problem is allowed to metastasize at a greater rate.    
It is reasonable to conclude that these interventions have had an iatrogenic effect, 
facilitating the growth of cryptomarket activities to levels greater than pre-intervention 
operation. In short, law enforcement interventions against cryptomarkets have produced short 
terms gains, temporarily disrupting the ease for operation of these illicit platforms and 
deterring vendors and buyers from continued operation. However, in the long term, these law 
enforcement interventions have paradoxically made policing the dark web a more difficult 
task as more cryptomarkets with greater risk reduction competencies have emerged. These 
markets have grown larger, generating more revenue while catering to an increasing number 
of vendors and buyers. Moreover, specialized markets which cater to specific customers have 
both emerged at a greater frequency and have gone further underground, away from the 
prying eyes of law enforcement monitoring the dark web.  
What is particularly telling is that Silk Road has itself undergone several resurrections 
following closures, returning as Silk Road 2.0, Silk Road 3 Reloaded, and the latest iteration 
Silk Road Reloaded. One can only imagine as to what the current dark web environment 
might be like had the Silk Road’s monopoly been kept intact. Indeed, it is not outside the 
realm of possibility that while new cryptomarkets might have emerged to compete with Silk 
Road, the sophistication and profit-maximization of these platforms might have been far 
lower than they are today.  
While it is imminently clear that largescale market closures are not the way forward, 
there is an open question as to what is. Scholars have increasingly focused on the network 
dynamics within cryptomarket transactional networks as a means of understanding their 
structural vulnerabilities. As with studies in this particular subfield, these studies seek to 
identify the structural vulnerabilities in a cryptomarket as well as the strategies which might 
best take advantage of these vulnerabilities. This is a potentially fruitful avenue of research as 
the results might serve to inform strategic decision-making when it comes to cryptomarket 
interventions. Duxbury and Haynie (2018; 2019) have made the most progress in area, 
applying adaptive computer simulations to test the theoretical effect of law enforcement 
interventions on a cryptomarket transactional network. 
Building off their prior work (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017) on the network structure of 
a cryptomarket, Duxbury and Haynie (2018) conducted disruption simulations on the same 
opioid market. In particular, the author’s identified vendor selection patterns using 
exponential random graph models then evaluated the network’s robustness using vertex 
removal simulations. Given that this opioid network was characterized by degree scaling 
properties pursuant to preferential selection of vendors on the part of buyers, the size and 
scope of the market was reduced with the sequential removal of the top vendors therein. To 
this extent, the size of the largest components shrank while the proportion of potential 
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components and number of isolates in the network decreased and increased, respectively, as 
more vendors were removed. This study demonstrates two interrelated principles with regard 
to the network structure of cryptomarkets. First, Duxbury and Haynie (2018) observe that the 
evidence of preferential attachment mechanisms “lends greater support to the influence of 
trust than the effect of product differentiation or affordability” (246). Second, this trust can be 
exploited by interventions seeking to disrupt a cryptomarket’s ease of operation.      
In their second study, Duxbury and Haynie (2019) designed an agent-based 
simulation to assess the network responsiveness of a larger darknet drug market. The authors 
considered three attack strategies: 1) weak link attacks that delete large numbers of weakly 
connected vertices, 2) signal attacks that saturate the network with noisy signals, and 3) 
targeted attacks that delete structurally integral vertices. The authors demonstrated that 
targeted attacks generally succeeded in disrupting the market when adopted at a large scale. 
The authors (Duxbury and Haynie, 2019) conclude that that “these two processes undermine 
long-term network robustness and increase network vulnerability to future attacks”.  
It is important to emphasize that these results should not be accepted dogmatically 
given the nature of adaptive computer simulations. Scholars leveraging adaptive computer 
simulations are merely making educational guesses on the assumed rational behaviour of 
actors in a criminal network. As such, modelling parameters are based on these assumptions. 
Whether cryptomarket actors behave in this manner is another matter altogether. In short, 
while adaptive computer simulations go some way towards identifying structural 
vulnerabilities in cryptomarkets, they should not be accepted as the complete truth. The 
behaviour of licit actors much less criminal actors cannot be perfectly simulated given the 
probabilistic nature of human behaviour. While general patterns in human behaviour are 
observable, strict obedience to these patterns will differ from actor to actor. 
Regardless, the results of these studies are promising for designing effective law 
enforcement strategies to combat cryptomarkets. Adaptive rule-based sequential node 
removal goes some way towards mimicking the operation of a cryptomarket when pressed by 
a targeted intervention. Law enforcement might find use in applying this methodological 
technique when deciding which actors to taken and how the removal of these actors might 
affect the overall structure and operation of the market. However, there is a pressing need for 
more studies which simulate law enforcement interventions on real-world cryptomarket 
transactional networks in order to evaluate the impact of specific targeting strategies. In 
particular, such studies should test the efficacy of individual targeting strategies, determining 
their ability to disrupt the operation of a cryptomarket and how this performance stacks up 
against other targeting strategies. Furthermore, these studies must incorporate some form of 
network adaption to mimic the purported behaviour of actors when the market is disrupted. 
Given that criminal networks are comprised of human actors whose behaviour is liable to 
change in the face of an attack, studies which leverage computer simulations to understand 
the impact of strategic interventions must consider probable adaptation on the part of actors 
within the network. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to consolidate the cryptomarket literature, identifying all 
primary strands of the research to-date. Of course, the relative novelty of cryptomarkets 
means that the scholarly literature on cryptomarkets is still in its infancy. There is, indeed, 
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more work which needs to be done. However, if one were to describe the historical 
transformation of cryptomarket research, it would be useful to segment the literature into 
three distinct phases: 
1) Products, places, and people  
2) Trust and network structure 
3) Network robustness and strategic interventions 
The first phase of cryptoamarket research can be construed as an exploratory phase 
where early cryptomarket researchers sought to understand what products were sold on these 
illicit entities, who bought and sold them, and which countries they were shipped to and from. 
As such, this particular phase of the research attempted to document the basic or perhaps 
superficial elements within cryptomarkets. There was also a greater emphasize on the use of 
descriptive statistics and qualitative methods to understand what these entities were and how 
they operated. The second phase of cryptomarket research pertains to studies examining the 
formation of trust on cryptomarkets and the untangling of the network structure of these illicit 
entities. To this extent, more sophisticated research methods, including social network 
analysis and statistical modelling, were used to determine the processes by which actors on 
cryptomarkets came to trust one another and how this trust is carried over into future 
transactions. There was, moreover, an explicit focus on the rank and position of cryptomarket 
pursuant to their reputation. Finally, the third and current phase of cryptomarket research 
concerns the examination of the robustness of cryptomarket transactional networks as well as 
evaluations of the law enforcement interventions. This research leverages computer 
simulation methods to answer questions about the efficacy of strategic interventions against 
cryptomarkets. Furthermore, these analyses attempted to clarify which tactics and strategies 
worked and which ones were less than successful.  
It is important to stipulate that these phases are not mutually exclusive as descriptive 
research on cryptomarkets still persists today. Moreover, earlier phases of the research have 
not ceased as there are still a number of research questions which must still be answered. For 
example, the proliferation of synthetic opioids has generated studies on the use of 
cryptomarkets in trafficking these substances. What is evident from this historical 
transformation is the ever-increasing level of methodological sophistication featured in 
studies. This is perhaps reflective of the depth and quality of the research questions being 
asked. The proposition of ever-ambitious research questions and objectives requires the use 
of increasingly sophisticated research methods. It is, however, an open question as to where 
the research will go in the coming years. Moreover, there are both slight and substantial gaps 
in the scholarly literature which must be filled.  
In this regard, there are several pressing questions which must be asked and topics 
which must be examined by cryptomarket scholars in order for the literature to progress. 
While data which links buyer and vendors together via unique identifiers is relatively scarce, 
there is still a pressing need for research which examines the network structure and 
robustness of cryptomarkets. Indeed, studies by Duxbury and Haynie (2017) and Norbutas 
(2018) must be replicated for us to determine generalizability of their findings. Furthermore, 
more studies which measure the structural robustness of cryptomarket transactional networks 
and the associated efficacy of strategic interventions are required. Indeed, the research has 
documented the operational elements of these entities but must now veer into more practical 
matters. This involves determining the strategies and tactics which might best disrupt the ease 
of operation of these illicit entities.  
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To this extent, cryptomarket research is bereft of experimentation of any kind. This 
pertains to testing and tracking the efficacy of interventions in real time via control and 
treatment groups. While the logistics of such research is understandably complex, it is a 
necessary step forward in the domain of evidence-based cryptomarket research. Current 
research examining strategic interventions rely on adaptive computer simulations. While this 
is certainly useful in matters of theorization, carefully designed experiments are a step up, 
providing actionable intelligence on the effectiveness of strategic interventions against 
cryptomarkets.  
Furthermore, while administrators such as Ross Ulbricht have been arrested, it is 
unclear who exactly establishes cryptomarkets and, more importantly, what their motivations 
are. Current research has examined the demographics and motivation of buyers but has yet to 
do the same for those who operate these illicit entities. Moreover, it is unclear how 
cryptomarket administrators recruit moderators. As well, researchers have yet to examine in 
detail how cryptomarkets have innovated in response to law enforcement interventions, how 
fast these adaptations were made, and how effective they have been. This particular set of 
question deals with the innovative nature of cryptomarkets, an area which may aid law 
enforcement in understanding the potential outcomes of future interventions. Furthermore, it 
is unclear what role, if any, cryptomarkets play in the proliferation of new illicit drug trends. 
This is related to the increasing use of fentanyl and other dangerous synthetic opioids. 
Cryptomarkets represent a fascinating area of study for researchers interested in the 
intersection of cybercrime and network science. In the following chapters, I endeavour to 
examine three topics in greater detail: the network structure and formation of trust on 
cryptomarkets, consumer satisfaction and information asymmetry, and the efficacy of 


















Chapter 2: Trust under Uncertainty: How Network Structure and Vendor Selection 
Inform Trust Formation on Cryptomarkets 
While advances in digital communication have yielded unprecedented opportunities 
for commerce and social engagement, it has also created new opportunities for crime and 
deviance. Indeed, cybercrime is one such area where stable increases in the complexity and 
sophistication of crime is readily observable. Moreover, given the immaterial nature of 
computer-enabled offenses, those looking to collaborate need not gather in a physical 
location. Rather, prospective cybercriminals can collaborate from the comfort of their own 
homes, jointly hacking government websites (Lusthaus, 2018) or discussing the latest 
techniques for committing offenses without being detected much less apprehended (Decary-
Hetu and Dupont, 2013). In short, cybercriminals are taking advantage of technological 
advancements for the purpose of collaborating in committing crimes (Lusthaus, 2018).   
This is particularly the case for illicit online marketplaces hosted on the dark web. 
These cryptomarkets, as they are called, function as brokerage platforms, connecting capable 
vendors and willing buyers looking to truck, barter, and trade in a variety of illicit goods and 
services. Owing to their relative success and continued growth, these platforms mimic the 
structure, operation, and financial risk competencies of licit platforms such as eBay and 
Amazon. In other words, they provide the necessary structure and order that is often missing 
in terrestrial criminal markets. Nevertheless, the communal nature of cryptomarkets raises 
questions about the behaviour of the actors therein. Indeed, there are open questions about 
how buyers identify and select vendors, how these transactional relationships change over 
time, and how this ultimately affects the network structure of the market. Understanding the 
transactional network of cryptomarkets is necessary if we are to answer these questions. 
Moreover, intelligence on the network structure of a cryptomarket may provide crucial 
insight into the vulnerabilities therein. This possesses practical implications for law 
enforcement organizations attempting to disrupt the ease of operation of these illicit entities 
(Bright et al., 2017).  
Following work done by Duxbury and Haynie (2017) and Norbutas (2018), this study 
examines the network structure of Abraxas, a cryptomarket in operation between 2014 and 
2015. It will, furthermore, identify the market-level metrics that predict for vendor selection 
as well as the developmental trajectory of vendor performance. Together, these results 
provide further insight into how trust among buyers and vendors determines the structure of 
cryptomarkets.  
Following Papachristos (2009; 2014) and Duxbury and Haynie (2017), I employ 
social network analysis to both construct and analyse this transactional network. Over the 
past two decades, an increasing number of studies have leveraged social network analysis 
(SNA) to understand the inner workings of various covert networks (Holt, Strumsky, 
Smirnova, & Kilger, 2012; Kenney, 2007; Morselli, 2009; Malm & Bichler, 2011; Natarajan, 
2006; Wood, 2017). I also apply community detection analysis to determine the underlying 
subgroup structure of this cryptomarket. Finally, I employ statistical modelling and trajectory 
modelling to determine which factors which predict for vendor trustworthiness and the 
developmental trajectory of trusted vendors. As such, this study seeks to replicate social 
network analyses conducted by Duxbury and Haynie (2017) and Norbutas (2018) while 
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offering novel contributions relating to the predictors and developmental trajectory of vendor 
trustworthiness.  
This combination of descriptive network analysis, community detection analysis, and 
statistical and trajectory modelling allows for a thorough examination of trust formation and 
network structure on the Abraxas cryptomarket. Fundamentally, this study seeks to test the 
generalizability of findings made by Duxbury and Haynie (2017) but seeks also to improve 
upon this work by examining additional explanatory factors and the longitudinal performance 
of vendors. In general, this research seeks to disentangle trust dynamics on a dark web 
market, undercovering the processes by which trust is created and maintained and how this 
ultimately affects the network structure of the market.  
Literature Review 
Trust in the Criminal World 
Within criminal enterprises and associations, trust is a fundamental but difficult-to-
establish operational tool. Trust, in other words, is a fragile component within criminal 
undertakings involving more than one actor. This is primarily due to the uncertainty 
associated with anti-social and deviant behaviour. Indeed, the situational constraints with 
which a criminal must contend (death, arrest, betrayal, etc.) often encourages these actors to 
renege on stated or perceived obligations. Moreover, there is generally no principal authority 
which can uphold contractual obligations and punish dissenters in illicit environments as 
would be done in licit settings. Though organized crime groups such as the Italian mafia 
(Gambetta, 2000; Catino, 2014; von Lampe, 2016) often engage in some form of governance 
over the entities it presides over, this is a relative rarity in the criminal world. Still, trust is a 
coordination tool, allowing criminals to cooperate and strive toward a common objective.     
 How is trust defined within a crime context? Many scholars have offered a definition. 
Gambetta (2000) defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which 
an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both 
before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor 
it) and in a context in which it affects his own action” (217). Von Lampe and Johansen 
(2004) note that trust is a mechanism for individuals to “cope with risk and uncertainty in 
interactions with others” (103). Dumouchel (2005) defines trust as “an expectation 
concerning another agent's action that is relevant to the decision to act” (421). For these 
scholars, trust involves the presupposition of future risk. It, thus, requires an actor to 
ascertain, to the best of their ability, the interests and predilections of the those whom they 
intend to engage with. This involves determining how a trustee might behave in a particular 
situation. To this extent, Gambetta (1988) notes that to bestow one’s trust in another actor 
requires an active consideration of the subjective probability that this agent may betray you or 
fail to uphold their part of the contract in some capacity.  
However, trust is difficult to establish in the criminal world as it requires the 
suspension of selfish desires on the part of self-interested actors (Williamson, 1993). This 
amounts to a trust deficit in the criminal world; an outcome which most affects those seeking 
to place trust in others. As Gambetta and Bacharach (2001) demonstrate through a game 
theoretic approach, the optimal outcome for a trustee is to cheat (renege) in the event that a 
48 
 
truster opts to cooperate (endow trust). However, Gambetta (2009) also contends that the 
iteration of this outcome over several rounds would be most detrimental to a trustee. That is, 
their persistent duplicitousness would discourage the truster from cooperating, costing the 
trustee all future business opportunities (38). In this regard, trust involves knowing whether 
those whom you engage with are sincere in their intention to cooperate or are merely feigning 
their cooperation and instead playing an altogether different game. This trust deficit is further 
compounded by the fact that long-term criminal partnerships require a high level of trust. As 
such, if trust cannot be consistently maintained, these partnerships will be abrupt and 
sporadic.  
Still, it is important to stipulate that cooperation in the criminal world can occur 
without trust. In events typified by a negative-sum outcome (both actors stand to lose), the 
establishment of trust is not required. In these situations, agents will act out of mutual self-
interest as failure to do so may likely result in sanctions against all agents involved. As such, 
an agent need not explicitly bestow their trust in another agent much less engage in 
presuppositions of future risk as it is self-evident that the opposing agent is acting out of 
interests which coheres with one’s own interests. However, such a schema is built upon two 
requisite elements: 1) all agents are aware of their own interests and 2) all agents can confirm 
that their interests align with the interests of other agents. While the first element is perhaps 
easy to establish as it requires knowing which outcomes one desires, the second element may 
prove problematic to establish as an agent cannot always discern the outcomes which are 
desired by other agents.  However, this is not to suggest that trust is absent in these particular 
situations as it manifests in a different form. While an agent may not trust a prospective 
partner, he or she can trust their intentions.  
While the criminological literature (Gambetta, 2000; von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; 
Gambetta, 2009; Campana and Varese, 2013) has emphasized the trust deficit within criminal 
networks of varying size, these observations reflect criminal activities which take place in 
terrestrial markets. One would be correct in assuming that trust dynamics are liable to change 
in cyberspace. Several studies (Holt and Lampke 2010, Yip 2011) have indicated that market-
driven dynamics are present in illicit online markets. That is, illicit online exchanges are 
treated more like voluntary economic transactions than they are mere illicit transactions. 
Decary-Hetu and Dupont (2013), in an examination of a botnet forum, found that simple 
indicators like the number of awards received, number of days spent on the forum, or the size 
of one’s network often determined how well a vendor was trusted. In this case, surface-level 
trust was built upon personal characteristics and behaviour as opposed to mutual experiences 
where a deep trust could be developed.  
Trust and Reputation on Cryptomarkets 
Relative to terrestrial markets, cryptomarkets are bastions of collegiality and 
cooperation. While this is not to suggest that duplicity and deception are absent from these 
platforms, cryptomarket participants are generally more trusting of one another than are 
participants on illicit terrestrial markets. Van Hout and Bingham maintain that the 
relationships of cryptomarket participants were “based on levels of trust and professionalism” 
(Van Hout & Bingham, 2013, 387). This is due primarily to the manner in which information 
is shared on cryptomarkets. To this extent, vendors openly share information on the quality of 
the goods and services they sell whereas buyers provide publicly accessible feedback on their 
experience with these vendors. As such, the quality of a good or service and the 
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trustworthiness of a vendor can be more easily discerned on cryptomarkets than in offline 
markets. In fact, a study conducted by Dasgupta et al. (2013) found that buyers were able to 
“provide a valid estimate of the street price of diverted prescription opioids…and predict the 
relative pharmacologic potency of opioid molecules” (178).   
On cryptomarkets, vendor reputations are created by repeated transactions with 
buyers who rate their experience with a specific vendor. This is based primarily on a 
numerical feedback score (e.g. 0 to 5 stars) but also includes written feedback which offers 
greater detail on the transaction. A cryptomarket vendor cannot alter the feedback published 
on their page, whether positive or negative (Martin, 2014a, 42). As such, reputations cannot 
be artificially inflated by self-serving vendors as they are organically created by transactions 
with buyers. Tzanetakis, Kamphausen, Werse, and von Laufenberg (2016) argue that 
customer feedback in cryptomarkets creates trust in an environment which is often bereft of 
it. Indeed, the illegal drug trade is often without assurances of the actions and intentions of 
one’s prospective trading partner(s). To this extent, a vendor’s reputation constitutes public 
knowledge on these platforms as prospective buyers can access it by simply visiting a 
vendor’s page and reading the vendor’s overall reputation score as well as the comments left 
by past buyers.  
Hardy and Norgaard (2016) use data on cannabis listings from Silk Road to study the 
relationship between reputation and prices. The authors show that “reputation acts as a 
sufficient self-enforcement mechanism that allow transactions to occur” (Hardy and 
Norgaard, 2016, 32). To this extent, vendor reputations constitute a formal institution that 
creates a stable trading environment among those least expected to deal honestly. Janetos and 
Tilly (2017) show that a mature highly-rated cryptomarket vendor charges 20% higher price 
than a mature low-rated vendor. In general, vendors with more reviews charge a higher price 
than sellers with a low number of reviews regardless of rating. However, bad (i.e. low-
ranked) sellers prefer to exit the market than decrease their prices in response to negative 
feedback. This is in line with Batikasa and Kretschmera (2018) who, studying the Agora 
marketplace, found that cryptomarket vendors are more likely to exit following negative 
feedback.  
Duxbury and Haynie (2017) examined the local and global network structure of a 
transactional opioid network on the dark web. The found that the cryptomarket transactional 
network was diffuse and highly localized, with many buyers doing business with a small 
number of vendors. As such, the transactional network consisted of numerous subgroups 
based around several popular and prosperous vendors. These localized subgroups were of 
comparable size. With regard to trust, the authors concluded that “vendors’ trustworthiness is 
a better predictor of vendor selection than product diversity or affordability, with buyers 
choosing to conduct repeat transactions with trusted vendors” (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017, 
23). Building off of this study, Duxbury and Haynie (2018) also contend that social 
commerce networks on cryptomarkets are based on preferential attachment, where highly 
desirable vendors attract a large base of customers (Diekmann et al., 2014; Stephen and 
Toubia, 2009). The structure of these networks is premised on a degree scaling property 
where a small number of nodes share ties with many other nodes within the network 
(Barabasi and Albert, 1999). As such, based on these findings, cryptomarket transactional 
networks are governed by a degree scaling property.  
Norbutas (2018), examining the transactional network of the Abraxas cryptomarket, 
made similar findings to Duxbury and Haynie (2017). In particular, the author found that the 
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Abraxas transactional network exhibited low network density, with a small number of 
vendors accounting for the majority of transactions. Using exponential random graph 
modelling, Norbutas (2018) also demonstrated that Abraxas’ transactional network was 
highly localized, segmenting based on geographical considerations. As such, the author 
concluded that the structure of Abraxas’ transactional network was governed by geographical 
boundaries where vendors generally shipped to buyers from the same country. This is in 
contravention of the popular belief that cryptomarkets are multi-national entities where 
transactions occur between actors from different parts of the world. In contrast, 
cryptomarkets may instead solidify domestic trading, keeping illicit products within the 
borders of a nation.     
Research Questions 
This paper seeks to answer four research questions: 
1. What is the network structure of Abraxas? 
2. What is the composition of transactional communities within the network? 
3. What market-level metrics and/or vendor characteristics predict for vendor 
trustworthiness (i.e. success (completed transactions), popularity (unique buyers), and 
affluence (revenue))? 
4. What is the developmental trajectory of vendors’ success, popularity, and affluence 
during their tenure on Abraxas?  
 Given our understanding of the value of trust in cryptomarkets, it is perhaps natural to 
ponder about the contexts in which transactions occur. Indeed, we have yet to fully 
understand the network structure of cryptomarkets and how this may be associated with 
decision-making processes under conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore, what is not well 
understood are the variables which predict for the selection of cryptomarket vendors by 
buyers. Indeed, the issue of preferential selection among buyers is especially curious in light 
of the problem of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). According to Akerlof (1970), the 
risk of market failure increases when buyers are unable to inspect products before purchase. 
What emerges then is a “lemon market” where consumers’ lack of valid or reliable 
information about the quality of a good or service sold imposes a tax on every transaction 
conducted on the market (Herley and Florencio, 2009). 
The first research question seeks to determine the global structure of Abraxas’ 
transactional network. While Duxbury and Haynie (2017) have examined this particular 
phenomenon in another cryptomarket, dark web researchers are generally uncertain about 
how vendors and buyers orient themselves within the transactional network they inhabit. 
Certainly, it is the case that vendor reputations serve to distinguish high-quality vendors from 
low-quality vendors, but there may other unexamined factors. Moreover, it is unclear how 
trust affects the overall network structure of a cryptomarket. As Barratt and Aldridge (2016) 
highlight, research into the network structure of cryptomarkets can provide insight into 
hidden transactional dynamics that stabilize these illicit online marketplaces. As such, this 
first question seeks to build off of Duxbury and Haynie’s (2017) research, examining the 
network structure of a second cryptomarket. In short, I seek to test the generalizability of 
Duxbury and Haynie’s (2017) findings by applying their methods to another cryptomarket 
transactional network. It is also important to state that Norbutas (2018) has done similar work 
on the Abraxas cryptomarket. However, this study will offer a more in depth look at the 
structure of Abraxas’ global transactional network. 
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A logical follow-up to the first research question, the second research question seeks 
to understand the characteristics and composition of identifiable communities within 
Abraxas. Analyses by Duxbury and Haynie (2017) demonstrate that cryptomarket users 
orient themselves into subgroups whereby single vendors transact with many buyers. As 
such, the cryptomarket transactional network is reminiscent of small islands that are product 
and country specific. Importantly, no other study has applied community detection to a 
cryptomarket transactional network. As such, more research is required on this particular 
area. Community detection analysis will aid in further understanding the network topology of 
cryptomarkets. As with the first research question, this question seeks to test the 
generalizability of Duxbury and Haynie’s (2017) findings on another market.  
The third research question seeks to identify the characteristics that best predict for 
vendor selection. While the current research (Decary-Hetu and Quessy-Dore, 2016) can tell 
us which vendors are popular, it has yet to tell us why this is the case. Understanding how 
buyers select vendors is critical for understanding how the network structure of a 
cryptomarket comes to be. This question deals primarily with trust. In this case, I am 
attempting to quantify which market-level metrics predict for vendor selection across three 
proxy variables for trust. Following Gambetta (2000), trust, for the purposes of this paper, is 
defined as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action”. As such, the proposed 
market-level metrics may serve as indicators (or game theoretical tools) by which buyers 
assess whether or not a vendor will uphold their end of an established transactional 
agreement. This study contributes to the literature by measuring 14 predictors across three 
different conceptualizations of vendor trustworthiness. This qualifies as the most extensive 
undertaking to date.   
This fourth research question seeks to understand the developmental trajectory of 
cryptomarket vendors, assessing whether the most trustworthy vendors remain prosperous as 
the market expands. In this regard, what is not well understood among cryptomarket scholars 
is the extent to which vendors operating on these platforms remain at their current station and 
how they might grow or decline as they continue to operate on a market. This question offers 
insight into how market growth is affected by vendor growth and vice versa. If it is the case 
that a small number of trusted vendors are responsible for the majority of activity on a 
cryptomarket, it stands to reason that the continued operation and growth of this market is 
contingent on the performance of a core group of vendors. The bequeathment of trust upon 
vendors by buyers is thus a fundamental element by which a market is permitted to exist. 
This will serve as an entirely new contribution to the scholarly literature on cryptomarkets.   
Data 
Here I use a buyer-seller dataset from the Abraxas cryptomarket (Branwen et al., 
2015). Apart from the anonymous cryptomarket analysed by Duxbury and Haynie (2017; 
2019), this is the only marketplace where unique identifiers are available for buyers. 
Importantly, Abraxas was previously used by Norbutas (2018) in an examination of the 
geographical distribution of transactions. For my purposes, I construct a two-mode buyer-
seller trade network with information on 5434 trades of illicit goods and services between 
269 sellers and 2794 buyers, over a period of 7 months in 2014–2015. 
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 As Norbutas (2018, 93) indicates, the dataset collected by independent researcher 
Gwern Branwen (Branwen et al., 2015) contains information on multiple cryptomarkets and 
is known to suffer from incompleteness. To specify, the entirety of the Abraxas marketplace 
might not have been captured in daily scrapes conducted by Branwen. To this extent, 
Norbutas (2018) compared the number of crawled item pages in these data to the actual 
number of items displayed in the home page of Abraxas at each date and found clear 
inconsistencies. More generally, Norbutas reported that “the average percentage of collected 
items across all of Branwen’s crawls is 92.4%, ranging from 26% to 100% depending on the 
crawl” (2018, 93). Furthermore, many of the scaped webpages are broken, meaning that the 
full extent of market transactions could not be recorded. This is a clear limitation as only a 
portion of the Abraxas cryptomarket could be examined. To this extent, this is not a complete 
transactional network as all transactions were not scrapped or reocorded. Following Norbutas 
(2018), I aggregated information across all daily crawls of item pages. As a result, duplicate 
transactions were identified and removed. The aggregated data contains 269 unique sellers, 
2794 unique buyers, and 5434 total transactions. 
In order to construct a two-mode transactional network of exchanges between 
individual buyers and sellers, each collected feedback message needed to be attributed to a 
particular buyer. In general, feedback serves as documentable proof that a transaction has 
occurred. “Customer feedback takes a variety of forms, ranging from detailed comments 
about shipping times, ‘stealth’ measures and the perceived potency of illicit drugs, to a simple 
5-star rating” (Martin, 2014a, 41). Importantly, while all cryptomarkets are feedback-based, 
they may differ on policies regarding the mandatory nature of buyer feedback. That is to say, 
some cryptomarkets require buyers to leave feedback after every transaction while others do 
not. Abraxas falls into the former category, with all transactions conducted over the market’s 
operational period being documented via buyer feedback.  
While feedback data would ordinarily pose a problem in many network-based 
cryptomarket datasets due to partial or completely anonymized buyer nicknames, Abraxas 
contained unique buyer profile identifiers for each feedback message, which was located in 
the HTML code of item pages. I used these buyer identifiers to aggregate feedback messages 
left by each buyer account. Following the removal of duplicates, this permitted for the 
creation of a two-mode transactional network for vendors and buyers operating on Abraxas 
between January 15th, 2015 and July 4th, 2015.  
While I was able to identify purchases made by individual buyer accounts, the data 
did not include buyers’ country of residence. Although I cannot observe buyers’ geographic 
location directly, inferences about geographic clustering in the marketplace can be drawn 
based on buyers’ selection of sellers located in particular countries. All transactions were 
organized into a variety of categories for analysis. These include a general category for all 
item types, a subcategory which disaggregated the items into more precise categories, and a 
secondary sub-category which provided more granular information on each item. Each item 
was hand coded. As it relates to pricing, all transactions were converted from bitcoin to USD 
based on a moving U.S. exchange rate. While this method might, in theory, produce less 
accurate pricing data given the volatility of cryptocurrencies, the listing prices also change as 
a result. As such, setting a fixed exchange rate, as opposed to a moving one, would not 




Given its simplicity, transparency, and accessibility, descriptive statistics were used to 
summarize the 5434 transactions. This is done to understand both the nature and composition 
of illicit transactions on Abraxas. In general, descriptive statistics provide a clear and concise 
summary of the data. Importantly, social network analysis was also conducted to examine the 
network structure of Abraxas. In particular, I employ four analytic strategies: descriptive 
network analysis, community detection analysis, statistical modelling, and trajectory 
modelling. All network statistics, modelling, and visualizations were conducted in R and 
Microsoft Excel. 
Descriptive Network Analysis 
Given the use of social network analysis, standard network measures will be used to 
summarize the network structure of Abraxas at a cursory level. Importantly, I establish the 
presence of tie between two actors based on whether or not a feedback has been left from a 
transaction. The presence of feedback is documentable evidence that a transaction has 
occurred. Bichler, Malm, and Cooper (2017) correctly assert that researchers must clearly 
explain how they generated the networks for social network analysis. From the 5434 illicit 
transactions, a two-mode network featuring vendors and buyers was created. Only 
transactions with both a known vendor and buyer were used to construct this network. 
Vendors were identified based on their unique vendor name while buyers were identified 
based on their HTML code. As such, the transactional network consisted of 5434 transactions 
between 269 unique vendors and 2794 unique buyers. A link exists between actors if they 
were involved in a transaction together (McGloin and Kirk, 2011). 
Here, I use four network measures: network density, in and out-degree centralization, 
and eccentricity. Density measures the interconnectedness of a network. To elaborate, this 
measurement divides the total number of ties between actors by the total number of ties 
which might be possible. There measurement is reflected by a coefficient which ranges 
between 0 and 1. As it relates to this data, a score close to 1 indicates that buyers do business 
with many vendors given the interconnectedness of the network. In contrast, density scores 
closer to 0 indicate that buyers transact with a small number of vendors and that the network 
is diffuse.  
 “Centralization measures how much influence a few actors exert over the network 
structure” (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017, 23). As it relates to this study, centralization tells us 
how vendors (outdegree centralization) or buyers (indegree centralization) influence network 
structure of the Abraxas transactional network. Centralization is determined by calculating 
the degree centrality of each node. “The sum of the differences between the actor with the 
highest centrality score and all other actors in the network is then divided by the largest 
possible sum of differences retrieved from a theoretical matrix of the same size” (Duxbury 
and Haynie, 2018, 929). This results in a value ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating a greater central tendency in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Finally, 
eccentricity measures the maximum distance of one node to any other node in the network. 
As such, the eccentricity of a node in a connected network is the maximum distance between 
that specific node and all other nodes in the network.  
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Each of these measurements were selected as means of determining both 
interconnectedness of the global network structure of Abraxas as well as the importance of 
individual nodes within the network. Other measurements such as closeness and betweenness 
centrality could have been applied but these measurements not have proved as insightful 
given the strict classification of each node as either a buyer or vendor.  
Community Detection Analysis 
While standard network measures provide insight into the aggregate features of a 
network, they do little in the way of unearthing underlying structural features within a 
network. This, however, can be achieved through community detection analysis. 
“Community detection refers to the procedure of identifying groups of interacting vertices 
(i.e., nodes) in a network depending upon their structural properties” (Yang et al., 2013, 15). 
In short, community detection algorithms will parse nodes into distinct communities based on 
the number of ties they have with other nodes within the network. Though exceptions exist, 
networks generally consist of actors who engage more regularly with some actors than they 
do others.  
Here, I employ the walktrap community detection algorithm (Pons and Latapy, 2005; 
Newman, 2003; 2006) to determine the subgroup structure of the Abraxas transactional 
network. As Pons and Latapy (2005) describe, “the walktrap algorithm identifies multiple 
potential community structures based on a random series of walks (steps). Each step 
partitions the graph into two separate communities, merging communities in which the 
distance between the two communities is small enough” (6). The walktrap approach is ideal 
for large, directed networks such as Abraxas. The modularity score Q will be used to 
determine the goodness of fit of the community structure produced by the walktrap 
community detection algorithm. A community is typically construed as a contingent of nodes 
in a network that are densely connected to one another than they are to other nodes in the 
network. “Modularity is a chance-corrected statistic ranging from -0.5 to 1. It is defined as 
the fraction of ties that fall within the given groups minus the expected such fraction if ties 
were distributed at random” (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, and Lefebvre, 2008, 43).  
According to Duxbury and Haynie (2018), modularity is calculated as: 
𝑄 = ∑(𝑒𝑏𝑑  − 𝑎𝑏
2) 
“where e is the fraction of ties connecting community b and community d, and a is the 
fraction of ties connected to community b” (930). The higher the modularity score the more 
segmented a network is. Moreover, values greater than 0.3 indicate a significant community 
structure.  
Variables and Model Estimations 
To answer the third research question, three regression models were designed. In all 
models, the same explanatory and control variables were used with one exception. In the 
model which evaluated cumulative revenue generated, cumulative purchase price was not 
included as an explanatory variable as it was also the dependent variable.  
To measure vendor trustworthiness, three proxy variables were created: success, 
popularity, and affluence. As trust is manifested in a variety of ways, each of these dependent 
variables reflects a key element of trust. Success is operationalized as the total number of 
transactions completed by a vendor (i.e. the number of sales made). The number of sales a 
55 
 
vendor makes reflects the consistent quality of their service. As an ongoing pact between the 
truster and the trustee, trust is created and maintained through consistent professionalism on 
the part of both parties (Gambetta, 2003; Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten, 2017). As such, 
the more sales a vendor makes (with new and returning buyers), the more it is assumed that a 
vendor is trusted by buyers who have made an initial purchase and may return for subsequent 
purchases. Popularity is operationalized as the total number of unique buyers a vendor has 
done business with. The size of a vendor’s clientele list is indicative of a more broad-based 
form of trust. Affluence is operationalized as the total profit a vendor has made throughout 
their tenure on Abraxas. This is calculated by adding the purchase price (measured in USD) 
of each transaction a vendor has successfully completed. Trust, in this case, is established 
through financial gain where reputable vendors stand to profit from the confidence buyers 
have in their services. Together, these dependent variables offer three distinct, though 
interrelated, proxies for trust. Moreover, three regression models permit for a cross-
comparison of each explanatory variable’s ability to explain the variance in vendor 
trustworthiness.  
14 explanatory variables were designed (see table 1). Each reflects a measurable 
concept discussed within the scholarly literature regarding cryptomarket vendors (Christin, 
2013; Decary-Hetu, 2016; Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten, 2017; Norbutas, Ruitera, and 
Corten; 2020). These explanatory variables are broken down into six concepts: reputation, 
affordability, product diversity, openness, risk-taking, and accessibility. Each of these 
concepts, in one form or another, help to explain vendor favourability. 
Pursuant to the concept of reputation, the first explanatory variable is the cumulative 
reputation score. Following Decary-Hetu and Quessy-Dore (2017), the cumulative reputation 
score is calculated by adding the ratings of all recorded transactions a vendor has completed. 
Affordability reflects the costliness of a vendor. As with sellers in licit markets, 
cryptomarkets vendors must price their items at a reasonable rate so as to encourage buyers to 
do business with them. Affordability is operationalized through two variables, cumulative 
purchase price and average purchase price. As an aside, the cost of the product at the point of 
purchase is a more accurate estimate than the price as listed by the vendor. Nevertheless, the 
cumulative purchase price is calculated by summing all purchase prices for every transaction 
a vendor completes. The average purchase price is merely the average price a vendor sells a 
product at the point of purchase.  
Product diversity reflects the variety of unique items a vendor is able to offer their 
buyers. This explanatory variable will implicitly contrast the profitability of product 
specialization with the profitability of product diversification. Indeed, the role of 
specialization and diversification in explaining vendor trustworthiness is yet to be 
understood. The concept of product diversity is operationalized through three variables, the 
number of unique product listings, the number of product categories, and the number of 
product subcategories. Each of these variables is calculated by summing up the total number 
of unique items or item categories within each respective category. Reflecting the concept of 
information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970), openness reflects the extent to which vendors 
disclose product information within a listing. To clarify, each listing contains a section where 
vendors can provide as much or as little information on the product being sold. Openness is 
operationalized through the cumulative number of words variable. This reflects the number of 
words provided by the vendor in the description section of the listing. The cumulative 
number of words was calculated by summing all words in the listing for every transaction a 
vendor completes.  
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Shipping internationally is generally considered a perilous activity as it increases the 
risk of detection when drugs move across international borders. Indeed, Branwen (2015) 
found that as of May 2015, 62% of cryptomarket vendors that had been arrested were 
apprehended in connection to international shipments. As such, risk-taking reflects a vendor’s 
willingness to ship overseas. Risk-taking is operationalized through a cumulative risk score. 
As each transaction contains the locations a vendor is willing to ship to, a risk score was 
allocated to each transaction. However, to reduce the number of control variables, shipping 
locations were first pooled and set into four dummy variables to account for the different 
shipping categories. Risk scores were then given to each category; Unknown or N/A = 
missing, Domestic Only = 1 (low risk), Continental/Regional = 2 (medium risk), and 
Worldwide = 3 (high risk). The cumulative risk score was calculated by summing all risk 
scores for every transaction a vendor completes. 
The final explanatory variable, accessibility, is tied to risk-taking as it refers to the 
locations that a vendor is willing to ship to. The more locations a vendor is willing to ship to, 
the less exclusive and more accessible their services are to a larger clientele base. Unlike risk-
taking, the shipped to locations variable is categorical. However, as with risk-taking, shipping 
locations were pooled into four dummy variables to account for the different shipping 
categories. These include Domestic Only, Continental/Regional, Worldwide with Exceptions, 
and Worldwide. Importantly, Domestic Only was set as the reference category.  
Trajectory Modelling 
 Finally, I employ k-means longitudinal modelling to determine the developmental 
trajectory of vendors operating on Abraxas. Like, group-based trajectory modelling (GBTM) 
(Nagin and Land, 1993), k-means longitudinal examines homogenous trajectories by 
grouping data into distinct subgroups. A hill-climbing algorithm, k-means belongs to the 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis 
Variable Name Mean or Total SD Median Range 
Dependent Variables     
Number of Transactions 20.2 38.95 7 1-330 
Number of Unique Buyers 14.64 23.24 6 1-179 
Cumulative Revenue 
Generated 
2210.10 5931.95 473.25 0.23-68812.96 
     
Reputation, Price, and Risk     
Cumulative Reputation 98.76 191.46 35 0-1628 
Average Purchase Price 105.33 165.72 66.98 0.23-2025.04 
Cumulative Risk Score 42.9 92.41 11 1-929 
     
Items and Information     
Unique Items Listings 5.49 7.42 3 1-58 
Unique Item Categories 1.1 0.46 1 1-5 
Unique Item Subcategories 1.12 0.38 1 1-4 
Number of words in item 
description 
2773 7468.18 592 0-73267 
     
Location Shipped From     
Domestic only 1700 (31.3%) - - - 
Regional/Continental 893 (16.4%) - - - 
Worldwide 2374 (43.7%) - - - 




Expectation-Maximization class. As such, the algorithm assigns data points to a specific 
cluster at the outset then recomputes each cluster to ensure that each data point moves closer 
to the cluster to which it best fits (Genolini and Falissard, 2010). As such, “expectation” 
involves a determination of the centre of each cluster while “maximization” consists of 
assigning each observation to the nearest cluster. These two phases are repeated until no 
further changes occur in the clusters. 
All trajectory models were constructed in R using the KmL package (Genolini et al., 
2010). Importantly, to overcome the issue of knowing a priori the exact number of clusters 
(or in this case trajectories) for which to group my data, I employ the Calinski Criterion to 
determine the optimal number of trajectory groups for each proxy variable. According to 
Andresen, Curman, and Linning (2016), “the Calinski Criterion is a relative metric that 
compares the different group solutions” (434). Importantly, a trajectory model was designed 
for each of the aforementioned proxy variables for vendor trustworthiness (e.g. success 
(completed transactions), popularity (unique buyers), and affluence (revenue)). 
Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents a complete array of descriptive statistics for the Abraxas 
marketplace. In terms of the most popular drugs, Abraxas is relatively similar to other 
cryptomarkets, such as Silk Road 1 (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016a; Christin, 2012) or 
Agora (Van Buskirk et al., 2016). Of the listing categories, drug and digital goods account for 
92.9% (5050) and 5.9% (321) of all products sold, respectively. However, when these 
categories are parsed further, we can see that cannabis (34.21%), stimulants (19.38%), 
ecstasy (13.8%), opioids (10.8%), and psychedelics (6.75%) account for the top five products 
sold. This pattern can be observed in the value of transactions with cannabis, stimulants, 
ecstasy, opioids, and psychedelics accounting for $198,745.16, $149,078.46, $95,949.28, 
$94,480.70, and $19,952,46 of the revenue generated on Abraxas, respectively. All told, this 
cryptomarket generated $594,517.50 over the period of study, making it a small profit-
generator relative to Silk Road 1, Evolution, Alphabay, Hansa, or Wall Street. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on the Abraxas Cryptomarket 
Descriptive Statistics Mean (SD) or Total Range 
Vendor Reputation   
Cumulative Reputation 98.76 (191.46) 0-1628 
Average Reputation 4.85 (0.54) 0-5 
Cumulative Positive Reputation 97.43 (189.7) 0-1625 
Cumulative Negative Reputation 1.327 (4.67) 0-59 
   
Ratings   
0 1.4% (74) - 
1 0.4% (23) - 
2 0.2% (10) - 
3 0.5% (26) - 
4 1.1% (59) - 
5 96.5% (5242) - 
   
Listing Categories   
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Drugs 92.9% (5050) - 
Digital Goods 5.9% (321) - 
Services 0.4% (21) - 
Drug Paraphernalia 0.3% (17) - 
Other 0.3% (14) - 
Custom Listing 0.2% (11) - 
   
Listing Subcategories   
Cannabis 34.21% (1859) - 
Stimulants 19.38% (1053) - 
Ecstasy 13.8% ()750 - 
Opioids 10.8% (587) - 
Psychedelics 6.75% (367) - 
Benzos 3.7% (201) - 
N/A 2.72% (148) - 
Prescription 2.19% (119) - 
Dissociatives 1.25% (68) - 
Information 1.03% (56) - 
E-Books 0.98% (53) - 
Erotica 0.9% (49) - 
Fraud 0.59% (32) - 
Steroids 0.35% (19) - 
RCs 0.22% (12) - 
Data 0.2% (11) - 
Drugs (Cyber) 0.17% (9) - 
Hacking 0.15% (8) - 
Money 0.11% (6) - 
Weapons 0.11% (6) - 
Electronics 0.09% (5) - 
IDs and Passports 0.07% (4) - 
Other 0.06% (3) - 
Software 0.06% (3) - 
Miscellaneous 0.04% (2) - 
Security 0.04% (2) - 
Drugs Paraphernalia 0.02% (1) - 
Services 0.02% (1) - 
   
Purchase Price (in USD)   
All Purchases 109.41 (173.51) 0.23-2800.03 
<$1 2.2% (121) - 
$1-$4.99 3.3% (178) - 
$5-$9.99 3.1% (168) - 
$10-$19.99 8.7% (472) - 
$20-$49.99 24.7% (1344) - 
$50-$99.99 28.2% (1532) - 
$100-$199.99 16.3% (884) - 
$200-$499.99 10.8% (589) - 
$500-$999.99 1.9% (201) - 
>$1000 0.8% (44) - 
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Locations Shipped From   
Australia 8.74% (475) - 
Belgium 0.83% (45) - 
Belize 0.02% (1) - 
Bulgaria 0.64% (35) - 
Canada 0.61% (33) - 
China 0.02% (1) - 
Colombia 0.02% (1) - 
Czech Republic 0.09% (5) - 
Denmark 0.81% (44) - 
Europe/EU 7.19% (391) - 
France 0.74% (40) - 
Germany 25.10% (1364) - 
Hungary 0.06% (3) - 
India 0.18% (10) - 
Italy 0.99% (54) - 
Mexico 0.02% (1) - 
Netherlands 9.22% (501) - 
Norway 0.29% (16) - 
Poland 0.11% (6) - 
South Africa 0.2% (11) - 
Spain 2.37% (129) - 
Switzerland 0.39% (21) - 
UK 13.78% (749) - 
United States 19.34% (1051) - 
Unknown or N/A 8.23% (447) - 
   
Locations Shipped To   
Australia 8.19% (445) - 
Europe 15.73% (855) - 
Europe and US 0.07% (4) - 
Europe except Italy 0.18% (10) - 
Europe except UK 0.48% (26) - 
Germany 1.23% (67) - 
Switzerland 0.13% (7) - 
UK 4.42% (240) - 
United States 17.32% (941) - 
US and Canada 0.04% (2) - 
Worldwide 36.53% (1985) - 
Worldwide with exceptions 7.16% (389) - 
Unknown or N/A 8.60% (463) - 
 
As it relates to pricing, 28.2%, 24.7%, and 16.3% of products sold for prices within 
the ranges of $50-$99.99, $20-$49.99, and $100-$199.99, respectively. This suggests that 
Abraxas buyers did not typically spend an exorbitant amount on products. Rather, the bulk of 
items that were purchased were moderately priced. Nevertheless, there were 44 purchases 
than exceeded $1000. Pursuant to the earlier pattern, these were purchases of cannabis (18), 
opioids (11), ecstasy (8), and stimulants (7). As it relates to transaction ratings, the average 
rating was 4.85, with 96.5% of transactions being rated as a 5. While this could mean that the 
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vast majority of buyers are highly satisfied with the services rendered by vendors, it may also 
mean that the Abraxas rating system is subject to the Pollyanna principle where there exists a 
positivity bias. In terms of locations shipped from, Germany, the United States, the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Australia are the top five shipping nations, accounting for 25.1%, 19.34%, 
13.78%, 9.22%, and 8.74% of nations shipped from, respectively. Furthermore, the world, the 
U.S., and Europe accounted for 36.52%, 17.32%, and 17.73% of locations shipped to, 
respectively. Importantly, this demonstrates vendors’ willingness to ship indiscriminately to 
all locations.  
The Network Structure of Abraxas 
The Abraxas transactional network is comprised of 2794 unique actors spread across 
5434 transactions, with 269 unique vendors and 2525 unique buyers. There are, moreover, 
3935 unique dyadic pairings. Furthermore, there are no isolates within the network as each 
buyer was connected to a vendor. Importantly, it was not possible to identify which buyers 
simultaneously operated as vendors as the unique URL tags for buyers could not be matched 
to unique vendor IDs. For this reason, it was not possible to calculate reciprocity or 














Table 3: Network characteristics  
Network Characteristics Mean (SD) or Total Range 
Unique Actors/Nodes 2794 - 
Unique Vendors 269 - 
Unique Buyers 2525 - 
Isolates 0 - 
Total Unique Edges  3935 - 
Density 0.0007 - 
Indegree 2.15 (2.2) 1-34 
Outdegree  20.2 (39) 1-330 
Figure 1: Abraxas Transactional Network 
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Indegree Centralization 0.01 - 
Outdegree Centralization 0.12 - 
Eccentricity (All) 11.23 (1.9) 1-16 
Eccentricity (Vendors) 10.32 (3.38) 1-15 
Eccentricity (Buyers) 11.33 (1.64) 1-16 
 
 
The Abraxas transactional network is diffuse with a network density of 0.0007. As 
such, only 0.07% of all possible transactions occurred. Comparatively, Duxbury and 
Haynie’s (2017) cryptomarket transactional network had a density of 0.002.  Furthermore, the 
full network consists of 29 components, with one component containing 97.6% (2726) of all 
nodes within the network (see table 4). The remaining connected components consisted of 19 
dyads, 7 triads, and single assortments of components of various sizes. These results suggest 
that buyers tend to purchase from a small number of vendors over time, which leads to the 
formation of a large group of sparsely connected users with very few isolated buyer-seller 
cliques. To this extent, nodes within the Abraxas transactional network, based on the 
eccentricity measurement, have a maximum distance of 11.23 from one another, on average. 
Comparable mean values can also be observed for vendors (10.32) and buyers (11.33). 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Network Components 
Component Size Frequency Percentage Node Total Percentage 
2 19 66% 38 1.4% 
3 7 24% 21 0.8% 
4 1 3% 4 0.1% 
5 1 3% 5 0.2% 
1000+ 1 3% 2726 97.6% 
Total 29 100% 2794 100% 
 
Given the low network density of Abraxas, buyers did not engage with multiple 
vendors, doing business only with one or two with whom they trusted or were comfortable 
with. Indeed, 34.1% (860) of buyers purchased from two vendors exclusively while 67.5% 
(1702) of buyers purchased from one vendor exclusively (see table 5). As we can see, buyers 
prefer to do business with a small contingent of vendors as opposed to a variety. This 
particular preference leads to a market imbalance where a small number of vendors 
accounted for the majority of transactions. This can also be gleaned from the distribution of 
out and in-degree centrality where buyers did business with 2.15 vendors, on average, while 
vendors had 20.2 buyers, on average (see table 6). These findings reflect those made by 































 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-14 15-19 20+ Total 
1 1350 249 59 18 15 3 1 3 0 3 1 0 1702 
2 0 313 107 45 15 11 7 2 3 5 0 0 508 
3 0 0 79 50 17 11 5 4 2 3 0 0 171 
4 0 0 0 36 21 7 11 0 4 3 0 0 82 
5 0 0 0 0 9 5 5 3 3 5 0 0 30 
6 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 4 3 0 1 3 21 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
11+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 Total 1350 562 245 149 77 40 36 17 16 23 4 6 2525 
 Table 5: Frequency of Unique Vendors Purchased from by Number of Transactions 
 
However, a clearer rendering of the distribution of the in and out-degree centrality can 
be observed in table 6. Indeed, a majority of buyers (53.47%) transacted with only one 
vendor. A such, while transactions on Abraxas are not necessarily between a single buyer and 
vendor (i.e. there are 19 dyads), buyers generally prefer to do business with one vendor. 
Moreover, 22.6% of buyers transacted with two vendors. This selectivity is, understandably, 
not present among vendors where 84.4% have more than one buyer. Indeed, vendors will do 
business with a variety of buyers.   
 






1 42 (15.6%) 1350 (53.47%) 
2 30 (11.2%) 562 (22.26%) 
3 21 (7.8%) 245 (9.7%) 
4 19 (7.1%) 149 (5.9%) 
5 8 (3%) 77 (3.05%) 
6 11 (4.1%) 40 (1.58%) 
7 7 (2.6%) 36 (1.43%) 
8 10 (3.7%) 17 (0.67%) 
9 7 (2.6%) 16 (0.63%) 
10-14 27 (10%) 23 (0.91%) 
15-19 18 (6.7%) 4 (0.16%) 
20-29 15 (5.6%) 5 (0.2%) 
30-49 25 (9.3%) 1 (0.04%) 
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50-99 22 (8.2%) - 
100+ 7 (2.6%) - 
Total 269 (100%) 2525 (100%) 
 
 
Abraxas possesses an out-degree centralization of 0.12. Again, this is indicative of the 
fact that the majority of buyers typically did business with only a small number of very 
influential vendors. Nevertheless, some buyers were more enthusiastic in their purchasing 
habits than others. Whereas the average buyer made purchases from just two vendors, the 
most enthusiastic buyers have made purchases from over 30 vendors (range: 1-34). As it 
pertains to the indegree centralization of Abraxas (0.001), most buyers did not purchase very 
often. It is difficult to determine why this is as a buyer might have a myriad of reasons for 
their particular purchasing pattern. It is possible that these buyers migrated to another 
cryptomarket or stopped operating on the dark web altogether given the risks associated with 
doing so. 
Interestingly, while a small number of vendors accounted for the majority of sales, the 
vendors outside of this power few had a difficult time earning a living on Abraxas. This can 
perhaps be attributed to the role of trust and reputation whereby the vendors with the best 
reputations continued to make sales, further increasing the barriers to entry for new vendors. 
To this extent, the average cumulative reputation score of a vendor is 98.76 with a standard 
deviation of 191.46. Moreover, these scores ranged from 0 to 1628. This is telling as the most 
reputable vendors attracted the most buyers, relying on their history of reputable service as a 
major selling point. This can be gleaned from the community analysis below.    
Community Detection Analysis 
Community detection analysis reveals key characteristics that provide insight into the 
underlying structure of the Abraxas transactional network. Abraxas possessed a total of 158 
unique communities which were formed around the most popular vendors. Moreover, the 
community detection analysis returned a modularity score of 0.72, a relatively hight Q value. 
This indicates that this network was heavily segmented in many communities. The largest 
community possessed 390 members, whereas the smallest 111 communities had fewer than 
10 (see table 7). To this extent, 35 and 20 communities were dyads and triads, respectively. 
Indeed, the leading 20 communities accounted for 63% (1763) of all actors and 71.9% (3909) 
of all transactions. Moreover, the average community had 1.7 vendors and 15.98 buyers. In 





















Table 7: Community Network Characteristics  
Network Characteristics Mean (SD) Range 
Community Size 17.7 (44.7) 2-390 
Community Density 0.26 (0.19) 0.01-1 
Edges  26.96 (85.81) 1-810 
Within community Transactions 34.39 (103.03) 1-921 
Average Cumulative Vendor 
Reputation 
66.09 (87.97) 1-550 
Avg. Outdeg (Vendor) 10.33 (12.72) 1-85 
Avg. Indeg (Buyer) 1.29 (0.31) 1-2.17 
Numbers of Vendors 1.7 (2.87) 1-29 
Number of Buyers  15.98 (42.03) 1-373 
 
 
As it relates to the composition of the communities, those with the most members had 
the highest average vendor reputation scores (see table 8). These communities also possessed 
the largest number of vendors. These communities are responsible for the lion’s share of 
transactions made on Abraxas as a large number of buyers gravitated to a small number of 
trusted vendors. However, this is likely a function of the size of these communities as larger 
communities are comprised of more active members. In this regard, Abraxas can be 
characterized as a set of transactional islands that are based around several highly popular 
vendors who attract a large contingent of buyers. On average, the vendor-to-buyer ratio in 
these communities is 1:19, ranging from 1:6.5 to 1:57. Indeed, three communities are wholly 
dominated by a single vendor. Not surprisingly, as the size of the community increases, the 
network density of the community increases.  
 
Figure 2: Abraxas Transactional Network by Community 
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390 0.01 810 921 266.06 17 373 
337 0.01 574 748 126.69 29 308 
139 0.02 331 373 153.58 12 127 
129 0.01 202 247 135.78 9 120 
96 0.02 151 210 166.33 6 90 
91 0.02 149 176 109.5 8 83 
82 0.02 117 196 294.67 3 79 
58 0.03 97 105 510 1 57 
53 0.03 71 111 550 1 52 
52 0.02 66 89 109.75 4 48 
52 0.02 65 99 246 2 50 
44 0.04 85 97 121.25 4 40 
38 0.04 55 71 106.67 3 35 
38 0.06 80 95 237 2 36 
38 0.03 45 55 251 1 37 
32 0.04 36 52 82 3 29 
32 0.05 53 62 102.67 3 29 
32 0.04 40 64 156.5 2 30 
30 0.05 40 58 72.25 4 26 
30 0.05 41 74 119 3 27 
 
Furthermore, these communities appear to be country and product-specific (see table 
9). Indeed, communities, on average, had 96.7% of the items traded shipped from a single 
country. Moreover, these items belonged to the same item category with an average rate of 
97.6%. As such, these transactional communities within Abraxas are locational and restricted 
to an item type. For example, a community may trade predominately in drug paraphernalia 
which ships exclusively from Canada. This suggests that trust, as it manifests on Abraxas, 
may be tied not only to a vendor’s reputation but to the country they ship from and the 
product(s) they sell. This reflects vendor preference. This runs counter to narratives (Barratt 
and Aldridge, 2016) which suggest that cryptomarkets function as a globalized transactional 
network. As Norbutas (2018) indicated, the structure of Abraxas’ transactional network is 
highly localized. However, these findings document this trend in greater detail. 
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390 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 93.16% 2.71% 1.95% 1.74% 0.33% 0.11% - 
337 0% 85.45% 0% 14.55% 0% 0% 36.10% 28.74% 6.42% 5.88% 5.35% 4.95% 3.07% 
139 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 92.76% 6.97% 0.27% - - - - 
129 0.40% 0.27% 0% 99.33% 0% 0% 96.36% 3.24% 0.40% - - - - 
96 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 68.10% 23.33% 5.71% 1.90% 0.95% - - 
91 1.72% 0% 0% 98.28% 0% 0% 99.43% 0.57% - - - - - 
82 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
58 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
53 0.80% 6.97% 0.27% 90.08% 0% 1.88% 100% - - - - - - 
52 0.11% 1.95% 0% 97.94% 0% 0% 96.63% 3.37% - - - - - 
52 0% 0% 0% 95.77% 0% 4.23% 83.84% 13.13% 1.01% 1.01% 1.01% - - 
44 1.02% 0% 0% 98.98% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
38 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 92.96% 4.23% 2.82% - - - - 
38 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
38 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
32 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
32 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% - - - - - - 
32 0% 0% 0% 96.91% 3.09% 0% 79.69% 18.75% 1.56% - - - - 
30 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 65.52% 22.41% 12.07% - - - - 







Regression Results and Power Few Distributions 
Table 10 presents the results of the multiple linear regression models for vendor 
success, popularity, and affluence. In all three models, the cumulative reputation score was 
positive and highly statistically significant. Indeed, it appears that vendor reputation is a key 
predictor for trust across all three proxy variables. This finding aligns with those found in 
other studies (Decary-Hetu, 2016; Decary-Hetu and Quessy-Dore, 2017; Duxbury and 
Haynie’s, 2017), albeit on a larger scale. Additionally, it appears that cumulative risk is also a 
statistically significant predictor across all three models. However, the coefficient estimate, 
while positive for both the number of transactions and number of unique buyers, was 
negative for cumulative revenue generated. This is a rather curious development which 
cannot be easily explained without dense qualitative data. As it pertains to the number of 
transactions and the number of unique buyers, however, this result makes intuitive sense. 
Indeed, the “no risk, no reward” adage holds true on Abraxas. A willingness to incur the risks 
that comes with shipping overseas, and in particular worldwide, increases the number of 
transactions a vendor can complete and the size of their clientele base. Thus, a vendor’s 
success and popularity are amplified if he or she is willing and able to tap into a larger 
market. One might assume a logical carryover to revenue generated, but the model indicates 
otherwise.  
 
Table 10: Results of Regression Models 
 
Number of Transactions 
(Success) 




Variable name Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept -0.79** 0.27 -0.33 1.03 2389.86*** 657.76 
Cumulative Reputation 0.1949*** 0.0016 0.077*** 0.006 37.86*** 3.04 
Average Purchase Price -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.001 5.58*** 1.17 
Cumulative Purchase 
Price 
0.0001** 0.00002 -0.0001 0.0001 - - 
Cumulative Risk Score 0.02*** 0.003 0.059*** 0.011 -35.52*** 7.099 
       
Items and Information       
Unique Items Listings -0.079** 0.026 0.33*** 0.098 -41.97 64.01 
Item Categories 0.67* 0.29 1.298 1.098 -3777.36*** 675.32 
Item Subcategories 0.38*** 0.11 0.831* 0.404 314.88 263.70 
Number of words in 
item description 
0.00004* 0.00002 0.0001 0.0001 0.18*** 0.044 
       
Shipped to locations       
Continent/Region 0.118 0.2625 0.79 0.991 539.78 646.98 
Worldwide -0.228 0.1986 0.0022 0.75 592.76 488.63 
AIC 832.8 - 1496.88 - 4737.46 - 
BIC 878.5 - 1542.66 - 4779.71 - 
AIC = Akaike Information Criteria; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria  





Nevertheless, each model differs in what particular estimates explain the variance in 
vendor success, popularity, and affluence. As it pertains to the success of a vendor, the 
cumulative purchase price, item categories, and item subcategories are also positive 
predictors. While the effect of cumulative purchase price on a vendor’s success is negligible, 
the more categorical and sub-categorical items they can offer customers increases their 
likelihood of success. As it pertains to vendor popularity, unique item listings and 
subcategories are also positive predictors. This makes intuitive sense as the more diverse a 
vendor’s product portfolio is, the more likely he or she is to attract a larger cohort of buyers 
with differing purchase interests. Finally, the average purchase price and number of words in 
the item description are the only positive predictors of vendor affluence. This makes sense on 
some level as the higher the average price of a product, the more revenue a vendor stands to 
generate. Moreover, given this degree of exorbitant pricing, a vendor must assure the buyer 
that the product they are purchasing is of the highest quality. Hence, product descriptions will 
contain more words, reducing information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970).  
 Figure 3 presents the power law distributions of vendor success, popularity and 
affluence. Abraxas is subject to a power law where a small number of vendors account for the 
majority of transactions, unique buyers, and revenue generated. To this extent, 9.3% of 
vendors accounted for 50% of completed transactions, 10% of vendors accounted for 47% of 
unique buyers, and 5.2% of vendors accounted for 50.1% of revenue generated. Indeed, 
Abraxas, much a like many natural (Zipf, 1949; Simon, 1955; Eck et al., 2007) and 
criminological phenomenon (Sherman, 2007), is subject to the whims of a power few. This 
high level of preferential attachment points to the importance of trust in the structure of 





























Figure 3: Power Law Distributions of Vendors by Transactions, Buyers, 
and Revenue





Table 11 presents the results of the k-means trajectory models. This table shows the 
three proxy variables, the number of trajectories in each model, the level of each trajectory 
relative to the specific variable, its base crime count in January (the month of the first 
transaction), the trend, and the percentage of vendors within each trajectory group. These 
trends are defined by regression analyses of the vendors over time within each trajectory 
group. A trajectory is stable if the slope parameter is betweeen -0.2 and 0.2, decreasing if 
below -0.2, and increasing if above 0.2 (Curman et al., 2017).  
Based on the Calinski Criterion score, I identified an optimal k-means partition of 
four groups for models measuring success, popularity, and affluence. Importantly, the first 
trajectory in each model was comprised of more than 80% of all vendors on Abraxas. This 
indicates that the overwhelming majority of vendors failed to conduct many transactions, 
engage with many vendors, or generate substantial revenue during their tenure on the market. 
In other words, most vendors were inconsequential in driving market activity on Abraxas, 
failing to generate growth. Similarly, the second trajectories in each model revealed that 
moderately successful, popular, and affluent vendors, based on the trend of the trajectories, 
grew stably across each these categories but did not ultimately become highly successful, 
popular, and/or affluent vendors. These vendors did not break into the upper echelon of high-
performing vendors on the market. Finally, based on the third and fourth trajectories in each 
model, the most successful, popular, and affluent vendors continued to trend in this direction 
until the closure of Abraxas. These vendors grew to extreme prominence within the market 
and remained dominant throughout their tenure on the market.  
 
 
 Figure 4 plots the trajectories of each model over Abraxas’ operational timeline. Each 
line represents the result of the regression, showing average values. In each model, 
trajectories three and four exhibit large increases as a small number of vendors became the 
most successful, popular, and affluent in a relatively short period of time. Curiously, these 
vendors were relatively inactive in the first two months, springing to prominence in April and 









1 Low 0 Increasing 83.3% 
2 Moderate 0.07 Increasing 15.6% 
3 High 0 Increasing 0.7% 





1 Low 0 Increasing 82.2% 
2 Moderate 0.07 Increasing 16% 
3 High 0 Increasing 1.1% 





1 Low 0.3 Increasing 90.3% 
2 Moderate 1.4 Increasing 8.6% 
3 High 0 Increasing 0.7% 




growing exponentially in the months following. A similar pattern can be gleaned from both 
the revenue and affluence models. To elaborate, trajectory 4 in the success model had an 
average of 0 transactions in the months of January and February and 3 in March, but rose to 
41, 108, and 129 in April, May, and June, respectively. Similarly, trajectory 4 in the revenue 
model had an average cumulative revenue of $0 USD in January and February, but rocketed 
to $17,865.2, $30,276.7, and $18024.6 in April, May, and June, respectively. Finally, 
trajectory 4 of the popularity model had, on average, 0 unique buyers in January and 
February, but increased to 68, 80.5 and 60.5 in April, May, and June, respectively. Curiously, 
nearly all trajectories in each model begin to decline following May. While market 



























Figure 4: K-means trajectories, a number of transactions (success), b number 





The analyses of the Abraxas cryptomarket reveals a large and diffuse network where 
the majority of buyers purchase from a small cohort of vendors. This can be gleaned from the 
distribution of out and in-degree centrality where buyers did business with 2.15 vendors, on 
average, and vendors had 20.2 buyers, on average. To this extent, Abraxas is dominated by a 
power few of vendors that account for the majority of completed transactions, unique 
vendors, and revenue generated. This has important implications with regard to the 
development of trust in a cryptomarket as vendors who are able to create a reputation for 
trustworthy behaviour are most likely to succeed. Furthermore, this reputation carries over 
into future transactions where new buyers will do business with most trusted vendors. This 
can be gleaned from the results of the trajectory models where vendors with low and 
moderate levels of success, popularity, and affluence fail to move up while vendors high in 
each of these categories grow exponentially in a short period of time. Much of these findings 
cohere with those made by Duxbury and Haynie (2017) and Norbutas (2018). As such, these 
studies together shed light on the structure and trust dynamics which undergird the 
transactional network of cryptomarkets.   
Trust, Reputation, and Network Structure on Abraxas  
The network structure of an illicit market is often indicative of underlying trust 
dynamics (Morselli et al, 2007; Wood, 2017). Moreover, the allocation of trust within an 
illicit market is a paradoxical development given the high level of uncertainty therein 
(Kollock 1999; Yamagishi and Matsuda 2003). Relatively unexamined in the cryptomarket 
literature, trust dynamics are a pivotal feature which undergird market dynamics and 
structure. Though several studies (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017; Lacson and Jones, 2016; 
Janetos and Tilly, 2017) have examined and speculated on how trust is allocated in 
cryptomarkets, this dynamic might be better understood from the vantage point of a 
transactional network where vendor-buyer relations can be effectively quantified over an 
extended period of time. Moreover, this can be buttressed by statistical and trajectory models. 
Based my findings, reputation, and to an extent, risk taking, are constituent factors 
which determines the network structure of Abraxas. Indeed, the power few analysis and in-
degree centrality distribution suggests that a small number of vendors generate much of the 
market activity while buyers are inclined to do business with only these vendors. As such, the 
global network structure is a by-product of initial and repeated transactions between buyers 
and vendors. This is, moreover, meted out in the local network structure of this cryptomarket. 
Indeed, each vendor and their respective buyers constitute an individual community within 
Abraxas. These communities were also locational and product-specific, suggesting the 
importance of geographic distance and niche markets in moulding the network structure. To 
this extent, on average, 96.7% of the items traded within a community were shipped from a 
single country. Furthermore, these items belonged to the same item category with an average 
rate of 97.6%.  
As such, the transactional communities within Abraxas are locational and restricted to 
a product type. This is contrary to narratives (Barratt and Aldridge, 2016) which suggest that 
cryptomarkets function as a globalized trade network where buyers and vendors from 




manifests on Abraxas, may be tied not only to a vendor’s reputation but to the country they 
ship from and the product(s) they sell. However, this may reflect buyer preferences than it 
does vendor trustworthiness. Indeed, buyers may prefer transacting with vendors who sell a 
specific product and ship from a specific country due to personal preference or convenience. 
This is particularly important as it is often forgotten that illicit transactions are also premised 
on the specific desires of buyers rather than merely the trust they put in vendors. While this 
chapter has focused primarily on trust dynamics, this cannot be removed from buyer 
preferences.   
How is Trust Allocated on Abraxas?  
 Importantly, there is a suffusion or concentration of trust, on the part of buyers, in a 
small number of vendors. As such, while the data cannot tell us whether or not trust is a finite 
commodity within Abraxas, there is evidence to suggest that it is subject to a pareto 
distribution. Nevertheless, buyers rely on information about sellers’ past behaviour when 
choosing a seller. This information is based on feedback voluntarily provided by previous 
customers. Sellers who enter the market and have not yet established a record of good 
conduct can build their reputation by giving price discounts to buyers. With an increasing 
number of positive ratings, they can thus compensate for their initial investment by 
demanding a premium for their good reputation.  
To this extent, trust, an artefact of the established feedback and reputation system, 
functions as a coordination tool on Abraxas. A buyer’s feedback signals their trust, or lack 
thereof, in a vendor. This information can then be viewed by future buyers looking to 
determine the trustworthiness of that vendor. Akerlof (1970) was among the first to point out 
that markets run the risk of failure if buyers are unable to inspect products pre-purchase and 
remain uncertain as to the products’ quality. Buyers having bad experiences with low-quality 
sellers decreases their quality expectations and thus their willingness to pay what high-quality 
products cost. Shapiro (1983) suggested that in order to overcome the trade-impeding 
information gap between buyers and sellers, high-quality sellers must invest in reputation 
when entering the market.  
Based on the results of the regression models, vendor reputations function as a brand 
name, indicating to a buyer the trustworthiness and quality of a vendor. For Akerlof (1970), 
the deleterious effects of a lemon market can be mitigated if a buyer is able to identify the 
quality of merchandise. On Abraxas, reputations serve as this all-important tool for 
identifying the quality of merchandise and, to an extent, counteract uncertainty within a 
highly volatile environment. In this case, current and future buyers will then refuse to make 
future purchases from a low-quality vendor.  
In short, reputation scores predict consumer behaviour. It is worth noting that while 
reputation scores reflect a seller’s performance and reliability in general; it is conceivable that 
even high quality or reputable sellers could occasionally mislead buyers by exaggerating the 
quality or mislabelling a product. With that being said, a buyer might feel more anxious when 
considering a vendor who has a less established reputation because the vast majority of that 
vendor’s reputation will hinge upon a small number of completed transactions. This is the 
opposite for vendors with many completed transactions, as we have seen. As such, it may 




mitigating information asymmetry and alleviating a buyer’s concerns. That is, buyers may be 
looking for a certain amount of data on a vendor’s transactional history in order to make a 
purchasing decision. This is particularly important as it gives us some idea about how 
information asymmetry is mitigated in cryptomarkets like Abraxas. Whether positive or 
negative, the more feedback a vendor receives the more of a known entity they become. As a 
result, the network structure of Abraxas may be a by-product of this dynamic.   
Finally, based on the results of the trajectory models, a small number of vendors 
become highly successful, popular, and affluent in a relative short period of time. This is 
perhaps an artifact of how trust in created and distributed across a cryptomarket. As 
previously mentioned, while we cannot determine if trust is a finite commodity on 
cryptomarkets, it is unevenly distributed in a small number of vendors who reap the rewards. 
Moreover, this trust or lack thereof carries forward. In this case, it seems likely that trust on 
Abraxas is predicated on a “winner-take-all” schema where select vendors who are able to 
attain the trust of buyers come to dominate the market throughout its operation. Functionally, 
the majority of vendors who cannot establish rapport with buyers will not engage in many 
transactions much less generate much revenue. As such, once trust is allocated to specific 
vendors, it is difficult for new vendors to unseat them. In this sense, trust can be viewed as 
moat, functioning as a competitive advantage that separates power few vendors from the rest 
of those on the market.   
Furthermore, what these trajectory models demonstrate is that the top vendors on 
Abraxas were not present or active at the inception of the market, but nevertheless came to 
dominate the market once they began engaging with buyers. This is perhaps reflective of a 
transactional cascade of sorts. Indeed, once specific vendors begin to operate on a market, 
completing transactions with new buyers, their activity quickly escalates, accounting for a 
large proportion of market activity in a fairly short period of time. It is, nevertheless, unclear 
whether these specific vendors were top-performing sellers on other markets that migrated to 
Abraxas or if they were based primarily on this market. As such, it cannot be determined if 
their success was organically developed on Abraxas or transferred from another market. In 
contrast, the vendors in the first trajectories did not see much growth across each proxy 
variable across time. Moreover, these vendors were present at the inception of Abraxas, 
making a small number of transactions in January. This indicates that a first mover principle 
is not present on Abraxas where early entrants to the market come to dominate market 
activity down the line.   
Conclusion 
 Trust is a constitutive element of any network which trucks, barters, and trades in 
goods and services, regardless of their legality. In the case of cryptomarkets like Abraxas and 
the one examined by Duxbury and Haynie (2017), the network topology of these illicit 
entities are predicated on the trust buyers choose to put in the vendors they do business with. 
Importantly, while trust allows these transactional networks to operate in a fairly smooth 
manner, it may also serve to disrupt the networks’ ease of operation. In this case, trust is an 
exploitable element within the Abraxas transactional network. Were law enforcement to 
design a strategy to disrupt trade on Abraxas, they would perhaps be inclined to target the 




who were responsible for driving market activity on Abraxas. As a consequence, it is also 
likely the case that the removal of these actors would bring market activity to a halt or at the 
very least slow it by some degree. 
In this regard, the practical implications of this study are evident. For law 
enforcement to effectively curtail these illicit entities, they should first begin by attempting to 
understand the underlying trust dynamics therein. This involves identifying the vendors that 
are most responsible for market activity. From here, a law enforcement organization might 
create a list of suitable targets for apprehension. This strategy aims to destabilize a criminal 
network by targeting the most trusted actors. The removal of these actors would theoretically 
starve a transactional network of its most pivotal economic assets, forcing buyers to switch to 
an unfamiliar vendor or drop out of the market altogether. 
While this particular strategy makes intuitive sense based on the findings of this 
study, what is not well understood are the negative ramifications of targeted interventions. 
How would the removal of a trustworthy vendor affect the overall level of trust on the 
market? How might we measure this? Would buyers select another vendor on that market to 
do business with or would they migrate to a new market altogether? These are questions 
which should be examined in future studies examining the network structure of 
cryptomarkets. In general, cryptomarket scholars are uncertain about the impact of targeted 
removals. As such, scholars might run experiments on targeted interventions, testing the 



















Chapter 3: Consumer Satisfaction and Information Asymmetry on a Dark Web 
Cryptomarket: A Text Mining Approach 
For licit businesses, online reviews represent a standard metric by which consumer 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction are measured. Be it tourism, hospitality, or dining, numerous 
industries are subject to the reviews, recommendations, and opinions of their customers. This 
is defined as “all the informal communication directed at customers through Internet-based 
technology that is related to the usage or characteristics of special products and services or 
their providers” (Litvin et al., 2008, 201). Electronic word of mouth possesses a wider reach 
and facilitates faster transactions relative to other mediums where reviews might be 
disseminated. According to Cantallops and Salvi (2014), electronic word of mouth is more 
effective at driving consumer demand. Importantly, these expressions of experience introduce 
vital information into a market, reducing information asymmetry and allowing consumers to 
make more informed purchasing decisions (Akerlof, 1970). Indeed, for a market to operate 
with some level of cohesion, information must be readily accessible to those participating in 
the market.  
Terrestrial criminal markets are plagued by information asymmetry. Indeed, customer 
satisfaction is often too difficult to measure and disseminate due to the need for secrecy and 
anonymity within these environments (Gambetta, 2000). However, dark web cryptomarkets 
represent a unique permutation which bucks this trend. Aided by anonymizing technology, 
cryptomarkets allow buyers to share their experience with a vendor through ratings and 
written reviews. This combination of quantitative and qualitative review systems is assumed 
to reduce information asymmetry. However, dark web scholars know very little about the 
intricacies of consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction as well as the resultant reduction of 
information asymmetry on dark web cryptomarkets.   
This study seeks to identify and compare the determinants of customer satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction among buyers on the Abraxas cryptomarket. It, moreover, examines the 
lexical predictors of vendor ratings. The overall objective of this study is to determine 
whether the sentiment structure of qualitative reviews differs between five-star and non-five-
star ratings and how this might affect information asymmetry. This study’s secondary 
objective is to determine the value of “early finalization” in assisting buyers in their decision-
making process. I employ a combination of text mining, sentiment analysis, and machine 
learning (e.g. logistic lasso regression) to identify and classify written reviews produced by 
buyers on Abraxas. Over the past 15 years, there has been an increase in the joint use of text 
mining and machine learning approaches. This combination of the aforementioned 
methodological techniques serves as a novel approach to a topic that has not been examined 
by cryptomarket researchers. 
Literature Review 




 The concept of consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction has been extensively covered 
in research examining marketing and consumer behaviour (Chow and Zhang, 2008; Pizam 
and Ellis, 1999). Moreover, service quality has been identified as one major proxy for 
measuring consumer satisfaction (Bharwani & Jauhari, 2013; Torres & Kline, 2013). To this 
extent, research by Pizam and Ellis (1999), Ekinci, Dawes, and Massey (2008), and Prentice 
(2013) has demonstrated that tangible and intangible factors of service quality are heavily 
tied to how consumers rate their experience with a good or service provider. Within the 
context of the hotel industry, Berenzina, Bilgihan, Cobanoglu, and Okumus (2015) state, “the 
intangible elements are service related such as assurance, customer service and empathy 
whereas tangible elements are related to the physical facilities of the hotel such as appearance 
of hotel personnel and cleanliness of the room” (15). As such, intangible factors relate to 
sentimental appeals whereas tangible factors are physical characteristics. Indeed, consumer 
satisfaction can be achieved, maintained, and lost based on a variety of metrics relating to the 
performance of a business. Some measurements in combination may sour a customer’s 
experience while single measurements are equally likely to do so (Wilkins, Merrilees, and 
Herington, 2007).   
 The application of text mining to marketing applications is rather novel. Nevertheless, 
several studies have successfully employed this methodological technique to uncover hidden 
trends in textual feedback data. At a base level, Lee and Bradlow (2011) used text mining to 
examine the structure of a market based on the attributes customers had mentioned in product 
reviews. Ghose et al. (2011) leveraged crowdsourcing and text mining to estimate hotel 
demands while Archak et al. (2011) discerned patterns between the sale of electronics and the 
attributes listed by customers that has purchased them. Similarly, Decker and Trusov (2010) 
estimated consumer preferences for specific products based on the attributes they had left in 
their online reviews. Unsurprisingly, satisfaction with a product is correlated with its quality. 
However, text mining has also been applied to both measure box office performance and 
predict the stock performance of firms. In Eliashberg et al.’s (2007) study, the authors 
examined the verbiage and sentiment of movie scripts to predict their box office performance. 
Furthermore, Seshadi and Tellis (2012) found that “chatter” among investors, measured by 
the magnitude, sentiment, and rating of product reviews, determined the stock price of several 
companies.  
Investigating the main themes motivating guests to evaluate hotels on Web 2.0, 
Barreda and Bilgihan (2013) determined that the cleanliness of a hotel was a primary concern 
of guests and often determined their level of satisfaction. Moreover, guests were more likely 
to produce a positively worded review for a hotel if it was located within a short distance to 
other venues such as shopping malls, restaurants, and airports. Finally, Pekar and Ou (2008), 
utilizing sentiment analysis to evaluate hotel reviews posted on “epinions.com”, found that 
the quality of the amenities such as food, room service, and price offered by the hotel 
determined the satisfaction of guests. Gan, Ferns, Yu, and Jin (2017) maintain that “star 
ratings in consumer-generated online reviews play an essential role in building consumer 




online reviews often determines the overall level of satisfaction that is expressed on the part 
consumers for a business.  
Based on a study by Zhang et al. (2010), there is a positive association between the 
number of online reviews received by a restaurant and its online popularity. Thus, it may the 
case that consumers tend to follow the predominant opinions of the groups or that the volume 
of reviews is reflective of the overall number of customers. This would indicate that a 
restaurant is of high quality if it is frequented by many patrons. In order words, its popularity 
may reflect its quality. In support of the former contention, Park, Lee, and Han (2007), 
demonstrate that consumers associated large volumes of reviews with favourable opinions of 
a product. Indeed, popularity is based on a principle of accumulated advantage where popular 
products become more popular. In contrast, Godes and Silva (2012) reported that negative 
reviews increased as the overall number of reviews increased. This makes intuitive sense as 
the more exposure to the public a good or service receives the more likely it is to receive 
negative reviews.  
Cryptomarkets and Consumer Satisfaction 
As with Clearnet markets, cryptomarkets employ an evaluation system where 
purchases are ranked with visible comments from each buyer (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 
2001; van der Heide, Johnson, and Vang, 2013). That is, vendor reputations are established 
by consumers who are encouraged by administrators to provide publicly available feedback 
on their experience with a vendor. Nevertheless, while the literature on the relationship 
between vendor success and buyer ratings on cryptomarkets is extensive, there is distinct lack 
of research on qualitive customer feedback. All major studies have examined consumer 
satisfaction based on the reputation score of vendors, ratings left by buyers, or discussions on 
forums. 
Hardy and Norgaard (2016) use data from Silk Road to study the relationship between 
reputation and prices and show that investment in reputation provides a premium to 
entrepreneurs. This is in line with Bhaskar et al. (2017) who demonstrate that online black 
markets manage to alleviate moral hazards predominantly because negative feedback led to 
sales reductions. In short, providing buyers with the opportunity to both air their grievances 
and praise vendors with whom they approve of helps the overall health of a dark market. 
Finally, Armona (2017) measured the impact of informal communication (through forum 
discussions) in anonymous marketplaces and found evidence that as the number of messages 
grows product demand is growing. 
Janetos and Tilly (2017) show that a mature, highly rated cryptomarket vendor 
charges 20% higher price than a mature low-rated vendor. In general, vendors with more 
reviews charge a higher price than sellers with a low number of reviews regardless of rating. 
As such, it is speculated that vendors with a longer and more successful transactional history 
are more likely to cash in on this history. In other words, reputable vendors are able to 
exercise their brand to make a larger profit on future transactions relative to vendors without 
a history of success exchanges. However, bad (i.e. low-ranked) sellers prefer to exit the 
market than decrease their prices in response to negative feedback.  
This is similar to Batikasa and Kretschmera (2018) who, studying the Agora 




feedback. As such, it appears that receiving negative feedback early on in a vendor’s tenure 
can reduce their chances of continued operation on a market. Negative feedback stands out 
more when it is not situated among positive feedback. Once a vendor is marked early as 
untrustworthy is it difficult to change this as buyers will not take the risk of doing business 
with a vendor without a proven track record for reputable economic transactions. 
Furthermore, a vendor’s accumulated transaction experience on the platform negatively 
moderates market exit as a longer transactional history is correlated with continued market 
participation.  
Finally, Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten (2017) use longitudinal data from Silk 
Road to determine to the extent to which buyers take into account sellers’ reputations when 
making purchasing decisions. The authors conclude that “vendors react to changes in their 
reputation by adjusting the prices of their goods, with well-reputed vendors reaping market 
benefits by increasing prices” (Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten, 2017, 39). The authors also 
found that vendors with higher ratings were more successful in selling goods. Again, the 
successful cryptomarket vendors are able leverage their reputation to create more transactions 
at higher prices in the future. 
Research Questions 
This paper seeks to answer three research questions: 
1. Based on written reviews, what are the determinants of consumer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction among buyers on Abraxas?  
2. Does the sentiment structure of positive and negative reviews differ? If so, to what 
extent? 
3. What words best predict five and non-five ratings among buyers? 
Identical to licit online markets, cryptomarkets utilize written reviews and ratings. 
However, cryptomarket research identifying the determinants of customer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction is non-existent. This is the basis for the first research question. While previous 
studies (Christin, 2013; Decary-Hetu, 2016; Przepiorka, Norbutas, and Corten, 2017; 
Norbutas, Ruitera, and Corten; 2020) have examined the impact of dark market rating 
systems on the vendor success and profitability, none have examined this phenomenon using 
textual data. To clarify, while cryptomarket researchers know which vendors are reputable 
based on aggregate ratings and total transactions, they are generally uncertain as to why this 
is. To this extent, the literature is bereft of studies which examine the factors which make a 
vendor desirable from the perspective of buyers. As such, we are generally uncertain about 
the specific determinants of consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction among cryptomarket 
buyers.  
The second research question seeks to understand whether the sentiment structure of 
the written reviews match the associated rating produced by buyers. Presumably, the verbiage 
used in written reviews will differ as a reflection of the rating score given, with higher ratings 
reflecting more positive sentiments in written reviews and lower ratings reflecting more 
negative sentiments. However, this is still unknown among dark web researchers. 
Importantly, this question seeks to disentangle the Pollyanna effect which has been observed 




this extent, I seek to identify lexical dissimilarities in all rating categories based on the 
sentiment in written reviews. More generally, this research question seeks to shed light on the 
verbiage and tone of written reviews on cryptomarkets and how they compare to ratings.  
 A logical follow-up to the second research question, the third research question seeks 
to determine the lexical predictors of five and non-five-star vendor ratings. That is to say, this 
question seeks to determine if vendor ratings can be predicted from the words used in written 
reviews. This outlines the value of written reviews in providing prospective buyers with 
accurate information about vendors. On the backend, this particular question addresses the 
phenomenon of information asymmetry whereby information regarding the quality of 
products and reputation of vendors is not equally distributed to all participants in a market. 
Indeed, the value of feedback lies in its ability to accurately convey the experience of a buyer 
with a vendor such that future buyers are able to use it to their benefit when transacting with 
the same vendor. In short, the written feedback must go some way towards justifying the 
rating that was given for a transaction with a vendor.  
Data 
Here I use a dataset of transactions from the Abraxas cryptomarket (Branwen et al., 
2015). These data contain various pieces of information from each transaction, including item 
title, item description, vendor name, shipping details, item reviews, items sold, transaction 
details, and ratings. Importantly, a customer only becomes visible once they have left a 
feedback following a purchase. Therefore, all active buyers were observed following their 
first purchase. Each recorded transaction is accompanied by feedback provided by a buyer. 
This includes item title, item description, shipping details, and, most importantly, written 
reviews produced by buyers. Each review is accompanied by the date on which it was made, 
the original price for which the item was bought, and a 0 to 5-star rating. The dataset 
contained 5434 illicit transactions between 269 sellers and 2794 buyers, over a period of 7 
months in 2014–2015. Importantly, of the 5434 transactions, 4998 (92%) had a written 
review. These written reviews come in the form of English, French, and German textual data.  
Listed on a vendor’s webpage, written reviews on cryptomarkets serve as 
documentable proof that a transaction has occurred. “Customer feedback takes a variety of 
forms, ranging from detailed comments about shipping times, ‘stealth’ measures and the 
perceived potency of illicit drugs, to a simple 5-star rating” (Martin, 2014a, 41). Buyers on 
Abraxas are permitted to make edits to their feedback. Buyers typically provide initial 
feedback to indicate that the product has been purchased but will return to offer their full 
input once they have received and tested the product. “These comments indicate the identity 
of the product that was sold, the price of the sale, and the purchaser’s evaluation score of the 
sale for all vendors’ active listings” (Christin, 2013, 102).  
Importantly, cryptomarket vendors, like those on Abraxas, cannot alter the feedback 
published on their page, whether positive or negative (Martin, 2014a, 42). As such, 
reputations cannot be artificially inflated by self-serving vendors. What’s more, these 
reputations are presumably up-to-date as consumers often upload feedback upon receiving 




Laufenberg (2016) argue that customer feedback in cryptomarkets mitigates some of the risk 
associated with illicit drug trading.  
While all cryptomarkets are feedback-based, they may differ on policies regarding the 
mandatory nature of buyer feedback. That is to say, some cryptomarkets require buyers to 
leave feedback after every transaction while others do not. Abraxas falls into the former 
category, with all transactions conducted over the market’s operational period being 
documented via buyer feedback. While feedback data would ordinarily pose a problem in 
many network-based cryptomarket datasets due to partial or completely anonymized buyer 
nicknames, Abraxas contained unique buyer profile identifiers for each feedback message, 
which was located in the HTML code of item pages. I used these buyer identifiers to 
aggregate feedback messages left by each buyer account.  
Methods 
The Utility of Texting Mining  
 A relatively recent technological development, Mikroyannidis and Theodoulidis 
(2006) define text mining as the act of “processing a collection of documents, or corpus, in 
which documents are converted into structured data, such that each document is described 
using a set of features called concepts to provide a holistic perspective of textual and non-
textual information” (45). More generally, text mining allows for the automatic analysis of 
large amounts of qualitative data, a previously arduous task. Given that this study analyses 
4998 customer reviews, traditional qualitative research approaches such as grounded theory 
or content analysis were inadequate. Text mining represented the most viable methodological 
option as these tasks can be achieved via computation.  
In general, text mining can be separated into linguistic and non-linguistic approaches. 
According to Taboada et al. (2011), “linguistic techniques consider the natural language 
characteristics of the text in documents (e.g., syntax, grammar)” (101). In contrast, Ur-
Rahman and Harding (2011) define “non-linguistic techniques view documents as a series of 
characters, words, sentences, and paragraphs” (78). Given the descriptive focus of this study, 
non-linguistic text mining approaches will be employed to calculate the frequency and 
proximity of words. In particular, non-linguistic text mining allows for a term frequency-
based matrix to represent the data while reducing key information loss (Ur-Rahman and 
Harding, 2011). More importantly, it will employ three analytic strategies: descriptive text 
analysis, sentiment analysis, and textual feature extraction. All analyses and visualizations 
were conducted in R. 
Variable Operationalization and Data Pre-processing 
Intuitively, positive written reviews reflect customer satisfaction while negative 
reviews reflect dissatisfaction. Based on Venkatesh and Goyal’s (2010) expectation-
disconfirmation model, consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction are reflective of 
congruences between a customer’s expectation of the product and their actual perception 




evaluating a good or service. As such, consumer satisfaction, for the purpose of this study, is 
defined as an event in which the consumer’s perception of the good or service purchased 
matches or has exceeded their expectation of the good or service prior to purchase. In 
contrast, customer dissatisfaction is an event in which the customer’s perception of the good 
or service upon purchase falls below their expectation prior to purchase. Compared to 
qualitative feedback, numerical ratings are much simpler to gauge. The higher the rating the 
more the customer was satisfied with the transaction. This is not imminently clear with 
written reviews as customer satisfaction or dissatisfaction can only be gauged once the 
review is read in its entirely and compared against other reviews.  
As Abraxas’ rating system ranges from 0 and 5, this study operationalizes negative 
reviews as any rating below 5. As such, dissatisfied buyers are those who have rated their 
experience as anything below 5. Logic dictates that a positive rating is operationalized as a 5. 
But why select this specific dichotomy? Cryptomarket rating systems are seemingly subject 
to the Pollyanna principle or a positivity bias where buyers are more likely to remember 
positive experiences with vendors when producing their ratings than they are negative 
experiences (Decary-Hetu and Quessy-Dore, 2017). As such, the overwhelming majority of 
vendor ratings across a number of cryptomarkets are 5’s (Decary-Hetu, 2016). While several 
studies (Christin, 2013; Norbutas, and Corten, 2017; Norbutas, Ruitera, and Corten; 2020) 
have reported a high level of quality among dark market vendors, it is unlikely that the vast 
majority of cryptomarket transactions are perfect as stipulated by a rating of 5. As 5 ratings 
are the rule and not the exception, any rating below a 5 is considered an anomaly. Thus, 
ratings below 5 are designated as negative while ratings of 5 are designated as positive.   
Importantly, text mining necessitates a series of pre-processing procedures. For this 
study, data pre-processing consisted of tokenization, filtering, and stemming. More 
specifically, the textual data were cleaned by removing punctuation, special characters, digits, 
and uniform resource locator links. Tokenization was then conducted. Tokenization is the 
process reducing words into pieces of information called tokens. The objective of 
tokenization is the identification of meaningful keywords. Next, all stop-words were removed 
from the corpus. Stop-words are functional fillers which do not carry any information. 
According to Liua and Tan (2017), “prepositions (such as ‘from’, ‘to’, ‘after’, etc.), articles 
(such as ‘a’, ‘an’ and ‘the’) and pronouns (such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘she’, ‘he’, etc.) can be treated 
as stop-words” (56).  
Next, word stemming is conducted. Word stemming involves breaking words down to 
their roots (Liau and Tan, 2017). These data were then converted to a corpus. From here, 
these data were converted into a structured format from which analyses can be conducted. 
Finally, a vectorspace model is created. This step is required for feature extraction. “Each 
document is represented as a vector (v) in the (t) dimensional space if we have a set of (d) 
documents (i.e. written reviews) and a set of (t) terms” (Elagamy, Stanier, and Sharp, 2018). 
The feature extraction stage produces a two-dimensional matrix (vector space). I then 
produced a TF/IDF (term frequency–inverse document frequency) value for each feature. The 




Descriptive Text Analysis 
Descriptive text analysis is a fairly standard text mining procedure. Simple term 
frequencies are conducted to identify the words used by Abraxas buyers to describe their 
experience. This is done for the entire corpus as well as for fives and non-fives. The 
frequency and distribution of specific terms across the corpus provides insight into the nature 
of cryptomarket activity. While an examination of word frequency will often reveal words 
that are expected, there is always the possibility of discovering usual words that offer more 
insight into cryptomarket transactions. I also utilize hierarchical cluster analysis to identify 
the optimal number of word clusters within the word cluster. In particular, I employ 
agglomerative clustering to fuse individual words into groups by measuring the distance 
between term vectors. This particular method was employed due to its simplicity and ease of 
use for textual data.  
Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis takes a table of i individuals (rows) and j 
variables (columns) and converts it into a distance matrix. “The analysis starts with each 
individual in a single cluster and then combines individuals progressively into larger clusters 
until a final stage where all individuals are merged into a single group” (Desagulier, 2019). A 
tree-like dendrogram is then used to graphically represent this stepwise process. A 
dendrogram is a tree-like visualization based on frequency distance of words. Importantly, to 
reduce the sheer number of redundant terms, I set the sparsity threshold of the term document 
matrix to 95%. As the sparse parameter is a number between 0 and 1, setting a sparse 
parameter of 95% only includes words with 95% or fewer zeros (appear only once). As most 
corpora are likely to have 0.95 or more zeros, setting a dendrogram based on a sparsity of 
95% is methodologically prudent. This removes words that are found in only 5% of the data. 
In addition to hierarchical cluster analysis, I employ word associations. Similar to the 
statistical concept of correlation, word association measures the frequency in which words 
co-occur (Correia, Teodora, and Lobo, 2018).  
Sentiment Analysis  
 I conduct sentiment scoring or polarity calculations on the written reviews. Sentiment 
analysis is the process of determining the positive, negative, or neutral sentiment in textual 
data. This, moreover, comes in the form of a score. In business, companies use sentiment 
analysis “to develop their strategies, to understand customers’ feelings towards products or 
brand how people respond to their campaigns or product launches, and why consumers od not 
buy some products” (D’Andrea et al., 2015, 27). The “qdap” package in R provides a polarity 
function which is accurate and uses basic arithmetic for scoring. This dictionary ranges from 
-1 to 1, with -1 and 1 reflecting negative and positive sentiment, respectively. This package 
features an extensive sentiment library of adjectives and phrases that were hand-scored by 
human coders.  
Sentiment analysis will be done separately for five and non-five ratings in order to 
determine whether or not the sentiment of supposedly positive and negative reviews align 




finalized early and those that are not. In short, I seek to determine if the early finalization is 
correlated with a positive transactional experience on the part of vendors. In summation, 
sentiment analysis offers some idea about the usefulness of written reviews as a means of 
mitigating information asymmetry (e.g. quality of the information). As sentiment scoring 
measures the positive or negative intent in a buyer’s tone, future buyers are able to quickly 
discern the experience of past buyers relative to the rating they provided on a transaction. The 
more detail a buyer provides in their feedback the more information a prospective buyer has 
on the quality and trustworthiness of a vendor.  
Feature Extraction: Logistic Lasso Regression  
Though exploratory text analysis offers descriptive insights into buyer reviews, it does 
little with regard to classification and prediction. Feature extraction is based on dimensional 
reduction where large datasets are made into smaller, manageable dataset through which 
more suitable statistical techniques can be performed. In this article, I use the written review 
text as predictor variables to classify whether a written review will be positive or negative 
(i.e. satisfied or dissatisfied). Classification is a type of machine learning exercise which 
predicts the most probable label Y for an instance X. In this case, feature extraction is used to 
understand what lexical elements (e.g. words) predict for customer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction. To this effect, I will be using a supervised machine learning technique: 
logistic lasso regression.   
Determining which textual predictors are associated with an outcome is not a simple 
task. In linear regression, one attempts to model a dependent variable using the best straight 
line fit to a set of predictor variables. Moreover, when selecting the variables for a linear 
model, one generally looks at individual p-values. Given that many lexical features are 
superfluous and the outcome variable is binary (satisfied/dissatisfied or five/non-five), a 
linear regression cannot be used. Instead, a logistic lasso regression will be used.  
According to Park and Casella (2008), “One can think of logistic regression as the 
equivalent of linear regression for a classification problem. It is a regression analysis where 
the response variable is binary, meaning that it can only assume 0 (dissatisfied) or 1 
(satisfied) values. The explanatory variables can be either discrete or continuous.” The Least 
Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator or LASSO is a regularization method in statistical 
modelling that is used when the data is noisy and outcome variable is binary. The LASSO 
method puts a constraint on the sum of the absolute values of the model parameters. This 
method applies a shrinking (regularization) process where it penalizes the coefficients of the 
regression variables shrinking some of them to zero. Traditionally, one might engage in 
feature selection by manually evaluating the p-values of coefficients and removing those that 
are not statistically significant. This, however, can be a laborious process if there are swaths 
of coefficients. LASSO automatically selects significant coefficients by shrinking 
unimportant predictors to zero.  
The effect of the penalty term is to set certain coefficients exactly to zero. During the 




shrinking process are selected to be part of the model. The goal of this process is to minimize 
the prediction error. In order to assess how well the model can be generalized to my dataset, I 
utilize k-fold cross-validation (Hastie et al., 2009) where the data are portioned into four 
subsets of approximately equal size and one of the subsets becomes the validation set. The 
remaining three subsets are used as training data. Abiding by suggestions from Pereira, Basto, 
and da Silva (2015), this procedure is repeated 10 times, each time with a different validation 
set, and the optimum value of λ is estimated such that the cross-validated log-likelihood is 
maximized (Goeman, 2010).  
Finally, the logistic lasso regression will also provide odds ratios for all predictors. An 
odds ratio is a measure of association between an exposure and an outcome. “When a logistic 
regression is calculated, the regression coefficient (𝛽1) is the estimated increase in the log 
odds of the outcome per unit increase in the value of the exposure” (Szumilas, 2010, 227). In 
other words, the exponential function of the regression coefficient is the odds ratio associated 
with a one-unit increase in the exposure. These will be used to understand the influence of 
various words in buyer satisfaction and dissatisfaction on Abraxas.  
Regardless, there is one glaring limitation of these feature extraction processes: class 
imbalance in binary classification. As there are a total of 175 non-five ratings relative to 4683 
five ratings, these binary classification models will be trained on a very small number of 
dissatisfied customer reviews. However, class imbalance is in fact a fairly common 
classification problem in machine learning. While there is no perfect solution to this 
limitation, using a penalized model like lasso logistic regression imposes additional costs on 
the model for making a classification mistake on the minority class during training. While a 
lasso logistic regression by no mean solves the problem of class imbalance, it serves to 
reduce its impact.  
Findings 
 Following the exclusion of Abraxas transactions without feedback data and removal 
of non-English feedback, 4858 total transactions remained. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for all product types by customer ratings. As is imminently clear, Abraxas feedback 
is governed by the Pollyanna principle where 96% (4683) of all purchases received a rating 
of five. However, this positivity bias is not limited to product type as all categories have a 
mean rating above four. Moreover, given relatively similar average ratings for transactions 
that have been finalized early (4.83) and those that have not (4.9), early finalization does not 
necessarily imply greater consumer satisfaction. This perhaps suggests that early finalization 
is premised on expedience than it is on customer satisfaction as buyers presumably trust a 
vendor and wish to receive their purchase sooner. Nevertheless, it would seem from the 








Table 2 presents the word and character counts for Abraxas feedback by product type, 
rating, and purchase price. Indeed, it does not appear that the length and detail of consumer 
feedback differs significantly based on the type of product purchased and the amount the 
product was purchased for. However, there are noticeable derivations within these two 
categories. While feedback for custom listings, drugs, and services have, on average, 11.09, 
9.81, and 9.05 words, respectively, feedback for digital goods, drug paraphernalia, and other 
products have an average 5.15, 6.88, and 6 words, respectively. Though it is difficult to know 
why the length of feedback for these products differ, it may be that the experiential nature of 
these products and services lends themselves to differing feedback content. For example, 
while a buyer purchasing a hacking guide describes the transaction as “nice tutorial :)”, 
another buyer purchasing marijuana describes the transaction as “Trusted Vendor, was a little 
overweight. Not AAA Weed but very good.” Indeed, the fact that drug transactions are 
predicated on the weight and quality of the product while digital good transactions pertain to 
the simple functioning of the product, the length and detail of the feedbacks will differ. 
Therefore, the type of product purchased seems to pre-empt the length of the feedback 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (ratings by product type and finalize early) 













All (4858) 4.89 0.67 5 0-5 67 22 10 24 52 4683 
Custom Listing (11) 4.09 2.02 5 0-5 2 0 0 0 0 9 
Digital Goods (253) 4.91 0.58 5 0-5 2 1 3 0 3 245 
Drug Paraphernalia (16) 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 16 
Drugs (4548) 4.89 0.68 5 0-5 63 21 8 24 49 4383 
Services (19) 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Other (11) 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 11 
Finalize Early 4.83 0.83 5 0-5 24 9 2 11 8 1076 





As it pertains to purchase price, it seems that the lower the purchase price the shorter 
the feedback. Indeed, the cheapest purchase price categories, <$1, $1-$4.99, and $5-$9.99, 
have less words per feedback relative to the other purchase categories which contain a similar 
number of words per feedback (ranging from 9.1 words to 11.83 words). This indicates that 
buyers who make expensive purchases are generally more expressive than buyers who makes 
inexpensive purchases. This is perhaps due to the quality of the product where buyers are 
more inclined to describe the product in detail. Moreover, this is particularly useful for 
prospective buyers looking to make similar expensive purchases. Indeed, the more 
information that is provided on expensive products the less information asymmetry buyers 
need to contend with when making the decision to purchase.   
Importantly, there is a substantial difference in both the average word and character 
count between five-rated transactions and those with non-five ratings. Indeed, feedback for 
Table 2: Word and character statistics 










Product Type     
All (4858) 9.55 (8.89) 1-99 48.16 (41.45) 1-412 
Custom Listing (11) 11.09 (7.18) 3-28 63 (38.9) 16-148 
Digital Goods (253) 5.15 (7.07) 1-48 25.75 (32.35) 1-214 
Drug Paraphernalia (16) 6.88 (5.06) 1-19 37.62 (27.22) 6-103 
Drugs (4548) 9.81 (8.92) 1-99 49.48 (41.57) 1-412 
Services (19) 9.05 (12.05) 1-46 42.16 (51.15) 4-209 
Other (11) 6 (4.84) 2-18 30.64 (21.95) 9-69 
     
Ratings/FE     
0 (67) 19 (14.52) 1-50 92.24 (66.64) 4-248 
1 (22) 19.59 (13.87) 1-49 91.45 (59.01) 5-214 
2 (10) 19.4 (17.21) 4-51 86.7 (75.43) 19-209 
3 (24) 19.46 (14.98) 1-66 97.71 (72.05) 8-329 
4 (52) 18.98 (15.4) 1-69 87.17 (68.83) 7-294 
5 (4683) 9.19 (8.39) 1-99 46.56 (39.29) 1-412 
Finalize Early (1130) 9.1 (8.54) 1-99 45 (39.1) 1-412 
No Finalize Early (3728) 19.59 (13.89) 1-49 91.45 (59.01) 5-214 
     
Purchase Price (in USD)     
<$1 (98) 6.77 (9.32) 1-48 32.12 (39.74) 2-208 
$1-$4.99 (143) 6.49 (7.98) 1-46 32.43 (38.82) 1-233 
$5-$9.99 (137)  7.18 (7.38) 1-50 35.66 (32) 3-200 
$10-$19.99 (418) 10 (9.46) 1-51 49.66 (43.67) 1-254 
$20-$49.99 (1205) 9.1 (8.34) 1-99 45.88 (38.96) 1-412 
$50-$99.99 (1373) 9.91 (8.82) 1-68 50.23 (41.29) 2-329 
$100-$199.99 (795) 9.66 (8.96) 1-69 49.26 (42.17) 1-294 
$200-$499.99 (548) 10.58 (9.47) 1-68 53.16 (43.86) 2-310 
$500-$999.99 (99) 11.83 (10.77) 1-64 59.76 (48.7) 4-268 





five-rated transactions possess nearly 10 less words on average than non-five-rated 
feedbacks. What this might suggest is that buyers that have not rated their transaction as a 
five are more inclined to go into detail as to why this was the case. As non-five transactions 
are rare on Abraxas, the resultant feedback goes beyond merely praising the vendor and/or 
product. Finally, I observe large differences in the average word and character count between 
transactions that have been finalized early and those that have not. To this extent, transactions 
that have been finalized early receive approximately 10 and 46 less words and characters than 
transactions that have not been finalized early, respectively.  
Descriptive Text Analysis 
 Based on simple frequency analyses (see Figures 1(b) and 1(c)), there are some 
glaring similarities and differences between the words used to describe five-rated and non- 
five-rated transactions. To this extent, “finalize” and “early” are the two most popular words 
among non-five-rated feedback and the second and third most popular words among five-
rated feedback. However, it is also evident that the tone of words differs between these two 
groups. Indeed, it appears that many of the most frequently used words within the five-rated 
corpus possess a positive connotation: “good”, “great”, “fast”, “stealth”, “thanks”, “quality”, 
“trust”, “best”, “top”, and “nice”. In contrast, words in the non-five-rating corpus are negative 
or value-neutral: “update”, “scam”, “product”, “nothing”, “never”, “still”, and “waiting”. 
This suggests inherent lexical dissimilarities between five and non-five feedback. Moreover, 
it is evident that buyers that have rated their transaction as a five are more satisfied with the 















Figure 1(a): Word frequencies  
top 20 (all) 
Figure 1(b): Word frequencies  
top 20 (<5’s) 
Figure 1(c): Word frequencies  




Abraxas feedback is subject to Zipf’s law where 1% of words occurred 47.3% of the 
time (see Figure 2). Moreover, 20% of all words were used in 94% of all instances. This 
discrete pareto distribution is not an altogether surprising as the same pattern occurs in 
aggregated conversations in the English language. As it relates to cryptomarket feedback, 
buyers will typically use the same words to describe their experience with a vendor. While 
this does necessarily mean that buyers are not very expressive, it likely means that a small 
number of words suffice in describing a buyer’s experience. This can be gleaned from table 2 














These observations are further present when these corpora are disaggregated to 
control for product type and ratings (see Table 3). With the exception of digital goods, 
“finalize” and “early” are among the top five most popular words within each product-based 
corpus. More generally, the words used in each product-based corpus are seemingly positive, 
suggesting that buyers were satisfied with the products purchased. While “finalize” and 
“early” are also present in ratings-based corpus (with the exception of 4-rated transactions), 
there are noticeable differences in the connotation of the words used. Indeed, higher ratings 
contained more positive words while lower ratings did not. In particular, “scam” was the 
third-most used word among transactions that were rated zero. Though used only three times, 
“bad” was a frequently occurring word among two-rated transactions. In contrast, “good” and 




















Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) present cluster dendrograms for all corpora. The key to 
interpreting a dendrogram is to focus on the height at which any two objects are joined 
together. Moreover, the heights of joined words reflect the distance between the clusters. 
Among non-five-rated transactions, “finalize” and “early” are again connected. However, 
“nothing” and “shipping” are a predominant pairing, suggesting that dissatisfied buyers base 
their dissatisfaction around not receiving the promised good or service. Furthermore, “scam” 
is associated with this cluster, again suggesting that buyers perceive the absence of a 
purchased item upon delivery as a con. “Good” and “product” also form a pair suggesting 
that some of these buyers, despite not rating the transaction as a five, still found some utility 
in the transaction. As it relates to the cluster dendrogram for five-rated transactions (see 
Figure 3(c)), “finalize” and “early” are again a predominant pairing. Moreover, “fast” and 
“shipping”, “fast” and “delivery”, “fast” and “stealth” are pairings associated with “great”. 










Table 3: Word frequency top 5 by product type and rating 
Variable Name 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Product Type      
Custom Listing Early (6) Finalize (6) Best (3) Day (3) Good (3) 
Digital Goods Good (47) Thanks (44) Fast (43) Vendor (41) Great (39) 
Drug Paraphernalia Great (5) Early (4) Finalize (4) Good (3) Service (3) 
Drugs Finalize (1171) Early (1167) Good (1127) Vendor (1073) Great (843) 
Services Early (4) Finalize (4) Great (4) Day (3) Order (3) 
Other Early (3) Finalize (3) Day (2) Described (2) Easy (2) 
      
Ratings      
0 (67) Early (31) Finalize (28) Scam (27) Order (20) Update (19) 
1 (22) Order (15) Early (10) Finalize (10) Vendor (10) Day (8) 
2 (10) Bad (3) Day (3) Early (3) Finalize (3) Order (3) 
3 (24) Early (17) Finalize (15) Update (14) Arrived (12) Good (9) 
4 (52) Order (19) Day (18)  Good (17) Arrived (16) Product (12) 
5 (4683) Good (1149) Finalize (1123) Early (1118) Vendor (1089) Great (885) 
Finalize Early Early (1184) Finalize (1180) Update (429) Vendor (364) Arrived (238) 
No Finalize Early Good (1033) Great (791) Vendor (761) Fast (751) Product (631) 
Figure 3(a): Cluster 
dendrogram (all) 
Figure 3(b): Cluster 
dendrogram (<5’s) 





 These trends are further present when examining word associations for the five most 
frequently used words among five and non-five-rated transactions (see Tables 4(a) and 4(b)). 
In both corpora, “finalize” and “early”, while highly associated with one another, also co-
occurring with “trust”, “hope”, and “confidence”. Unsurprisingly, buyers put a significant 
amount of trust in vendors when deciding to forgo the use of Abraxas’ escrow system and 
finalize their purchases early. Nevertheless, there are differences in word association in these 
corpora. Notably, five-rated words associations are characterized by trust, satisfaction, and 
praise for the vendor, product, and process. For example, “good” is associated with “stealth”, 
“price”, “communication”, and “product” while “great” is similarly associated with 
“product”, “stealth”, “communication”, “shipping”, and “vendor”. In contrast, non-five word 
associations are generally value-neutral but are negative when the transaction is described. As 





Table 4(a): Word Associations (5’s) 
Word 
Rank 
Good (1182) Finalize (1191) Early (1188) Vendor (1125) Great (893) 
1 Stealth (0.19) Early (0.99) Finalize (0.99) Trust (0.41) Product (0.2) 









4 Look (0.13) Arrived (0.2) Arrived (0.2) Great (0.12) Shipping (0.13) 
5 Fast (0.12) Upon (0.15) Upon (0.15) Finalize (0.11) Service (0.12) 
6 Product (0.11) Confidence (0.13) Confidence (0.13) Early (0.11) Vendor (0.12) 
7 Stuff (0.11) Vendor (0.11) BTW (0.12) Professional (0.1) - 
8 - Later (0.1) Received (0.11) - - 
9 - Received (0.1) Vendor (0.11) - - 
10 - Hope (0.1) Hope (0.1) - - 
Table 4(b): Word Associations (<5’s) 
Word 
Rank 
Early (70) Finalize (68) Order (61) Arrived (51) Day (46) 
1 Finalize (0.96) Early (0.96) Maybe (0.36) Update (0.46) Ago (0.41) 
2 Update (0.46) Update (0.47) Decent (0.34) Finalize (0.3) Marked (0.41) 
3 BTW (0.41) Arrived (0.3) Theft (0.31) Upper (0.25) Rewording (0.37) 
4 Yet (0.37) Answer (0.28) Risk (0.31) Quantum (0.25) Pay (0.37) 
5 Answer (0.36) Ganja (0.28) Mistake (0.31) Big (0.25) Meds (0.37) 
6 Soon (0.26) Baggy (0.28) Spain (0.31) Technical (0.25) Choice (0.37) 
7 Doesnt (0.26) Trust (0.27) Hostile (0.31) Contact (0.25) Accurate (0.37) 
8 Ganja (0.26) Must (0.2) Digits (0.31) Easy (0.25) Weight (0.37) 
9 Arrived (0.25) Cant (0.2) Defiant (0.31) Early (0.25) Later (0.34) 




Sentiment Analysis (Ratings) 
 Based on the sentiment analysis, there is a clear difference between the five-rated and 
non-five-rated corpora (see Table 5). To this extent, the five-rated corpus has a positive 
average polarity of 0.6 while the non-five-rated corpus is negative with an average polarity of 
-0.01. Intuitively, the average polarity of the combined is 0.58, suggesting that the addition of 
the non-five-rated transactions slightly lowers the overall sentiment score. Importantly, the 
non-five-rated corpus is only slightly negative, verging on an average polarity which is 
neutral. This suggests that buyers, while dissatisfied, will not harshly criticize vendors or vent 
their frustrations when providing feedback to the rest of the market. This distribution of 















Figure 5 presents the most frequently occurring high-sentiment words in each corpus; 
five-rated transactions are in green while non-five-rated transactions are in red. This figure 
contrasts the words used in either category. As is evident, five-rated transactions possess a 
higher frequency of positive words than non-five-rated transactions. These words include 
“awesome”, “always”, “fantastic”, “confidence”, and “love”. To this extent, words in the 
non-five corpus are generally negative but verging on value-neutrality. These include 
“avoid”, “frustrating”, “incorrectly”, seized”, and “caught”. These particular words indicate 
Table 5: Distribution of sentiment polarity (ratings) 







All 4858 45103 0.58 0.56 1.03 
5 4683 41849 0.6 0.56 1.08 
<5 175 3254 -0.01 0.41 -0.01 
Figure 4(a): Sentiment 
polarity (all) 
Figure 4(b): Sentiment 
polarity (<5’s) 





that buyers were generally dissatisfied with a transaction due to it not arriving or not arriving 
as it was advertised. These particular buyers suggested that prospective or future buyers 
“avoid” doing business with this vendor. This offers some evidence as to the provision of 
suggestive feedback from dissatisfied buyers. In this case, these buyers are advising future 















Sentiment Analysis (Finalize Early) 
While the average rating did not differ between transactions that were finalized early 
and those that were not, the sentiment analysis reveals a clear difference between these 
transaction types (see table 6 and figures 6(a) and 6(b)). To this extent, the finalize early 
corpus had a lower average polarity (0.31) than the non-finalize early corpus (0.66). This 
suggests that those who finalized early were less likely to use positive verbiage in their 
feedback relative to those who did not finalize early. This is particularly surprising as buyers 
were generally less positive about transactions they had finalized early. What this might 
suggest is that the expectation of buyers who finalized early were not met.  
This is reflective of Venkatesh and Goyal’s (2010) expectation-disconfirmation model 
where consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction are based on congruences between a 
customer’s expectation of the product and their actual perception once the product has been 
received. To this extent, given that buyers had finalized early, it is possible that their 
expectations of the product were inflated relative to buyers that did not finalize early. Indeed, 
it is likely that these buyers bought into the hype of the product based on the vendor’s 
reputation and the number of prior transactions they had made. As such, once the product was 
received their inflated expectations did not match up the actual quality of the product. This is 




not observed among buyers that did not finalize early as their expectations were perhaps more 


















Feature Extraction  
Figure 7 presents the error as a function of lambda of the logistic lasso regression. The 
plot has the mean square error on the y-axis and the natural log of λ on the x-axis. The plot 
shows that the log of the optimal value of lambda is 3.28, with the minimum lambda value of 
0.0005 and maximum of 0.014. Importantly, the optimal lambda indicates the accuracy of the 
model, with a higher value equating to a more accurate the model. In this case, the model is 
relatively accurate, with most of the data being fit. Variables with positive coefficients are 
more likely to be associated with a rating of five while variables while negative coefficients 
are associated with a non-five rating. As such, “fast”, “great”, “thank”, “good”, and “vendor” 
predict a five rating while “product”, “finalize”, and “early” are more likely to be associated 
with a non-five rating (see Table 7).  
Table 6: Distribution of sentiment polarity (finalize early) 







FE 1130 12183 0.31 0.41 0.75 
No FE 3728 32920 0.66 0.58 1.15 
Figure 6(a): Sentiment 
polarity (FE) 
Figure 6(b): Sentiment 



















The odds ratios are interpreted as follows: a transaction which has “fast” in the 
feedback is 4.17 times more likely to be rated a five compared to a purchase review that does 
not. Therefore, the odds of a five rating are 130% and 115% greater when the words “great” 
and “thank” are found in the feedback than when they are not. In contrast, the presence of 
“product”, “finalize”, and “early” in buyer feedback increases the odds of a non-five rating by 












Table 7: Logistic lasso coefficients and odds ratios 
Variable Coefficients Odds Ratios 
Intercept 3.06542 21.4434 
Fast 1.42956 4.17687 
Great 0.83294 2.30007 
Thank 0.76685 2.15298 
Good 0.01742 1.01757 
Vendor 0.00872 1.00876 
Product -0.0214 0.97886 
Finalize -0.0311 0.96937 
Early -0.3159 0.72917 





 Based on the descriptive text analysis, “finalize” and “early” are the most frequently 
occurring words regardless of product type, rating, and price. This indicates that buyers put a 
fair amount of trust in vendors before the transaction is completed (i.e. receiving the product 
they have purchased). The full extent of early finalization will be later discussed. 
Nevertheless, based on the cluster dendrograms and word associations, buyers that have rated 
their transaction a five often reported the stealth and speed of the delivered product as reasons 
for their satisfaction. In contrast, buyers that did not rate their transaction a five maintained 
that the vendor had scammed them, reporting that the package had not arrived or was empty. 
However, the cluster dendrogram did also reveal that some non-five-rated transactions were 
“good”. More generally, however, feedback from these buyers were predominantly neutral, 
containing words such as “still”, “shipping”, “day”, “update”, and “order”.  
This is corroborated by the results of the sentiment analysis. Indeed, while five-rated 
transactions possessed a positive average polarity, non-five-rated transactions were only 
marginally negative, verging on neutrality. To this extent, Abraxas buyers do not often 
harshly criticize vendors and products they are dissatisfied with. In contrast, the sentiment 
analysis reveals a clear difference between transactions that were finalized early that those 
that were not. To this extent, the finalize early corpus had a lower average polarity (0.31) 
than the non-finalize early corpus (0.66). This suggest that those who finalized early were 
less likely to use positive verbiage in their feedback relative to those who did not finalize 
early. Finally, the logistic lasso regression revealed that words such as “fast”, “great”, 
“thank”, “stealth”, and “good” predicted for a five rating. As such, the presence of these 
words in a feedback were associated with a five rating by a buyer. This demonstrates further 
congruity between a buyer’s word choice and the rating they rendered.       
Finalize Early and Consumer Satisfaction 
On cryptomarkets, there are two methods for fund exchange: 1) holding monies in 
escrow until product delivery and 2) finalizing early, forgoing escrow and transferring the 
funds upon purchase (Martin, 2013). As we can see on Abraxas, finalize early is often used, 
constituting 23.3% (1130) of all transactions in the dataset. The extensive use of finalize early 
tells us a great deal about trust on cryptomarkets. While finalizing early does not always 
equate to a five-rated transaction as 46 transactions that were finalized early were below five, 
it does reveal quite a bit about the nature of trust on Abraxas. To this extent, the decision to 
do business with a vendor on the part of buyers is governed not by a blind trust but an 
informed one. Indeed, buyers seemingly depend on vendor reputation when making the 
decision to finalize early. They are presumably using the information on a vendor’s previous 
transactions as a yardstick for trust, taking a risk by forgoing escrow based on the information 
available to them. This, moreover, reveals a great deal about information asymmetry on 
cryptomarkets.  
Nevertheless, while finalizing early is seemingly correlated with trust, it is not 
necessarily correlated with consumer satisfaction. Indeed, it appears, on one hand, that the 
average rating between transactions that were finalized early and those that were not did not 
differ very much. On the other hand, the sentiment analysis revealed that buyers that did not 




The suggestion here is that trust and consumer satisfaction are not necessarily correlated on 
Abraxas as while a buyer might trust a vendor enough to finalize their transaction they still 
may not be satisfied with the transactions once it is completed. 
From this, it is evident that information asymmetry is not overcome on Abraxas. 
While buyers may subscribe to market-level information on who is trustworthy, ultimately 
finalizing their transaction early, this does not always equate to customer satisfaction. Indeed, 
as with licit markets, there is no guarantee of consumer satisfaction. Although the rating and 
feedback systems on Abraxas reduce information asymmetry a fair amount, this market, like 
any illicit market, is subject to the exigencies of uneven information flows. While a buyer can 
be confident that transacting with a reputable vendor will be a pleasant experience, there is no 
guarantee that the transaction will be as such.  
This raises questions about why buyers might choose to finalize early in the first 
place. If a pleasant experience is not guarantee, what factors would necessarily encourage a 
buyer to trust a vendor? Moreover, while it is understandable that a buyer who has done 
business with a vendor on previous occasions might finalize a transaction early, it is unclear 
why a buyer with no previous history with a vendor might choose to do so. Based on these 
findings, it is likely that buyers are choosing to rely on the shared experiences of other buyers 
who have engaged with a vendor, using the established reputation of vendor to make the 
decision to finalize early. As such, assumed reductions in information asymmetry pursuant to 
the public availability of buyer feedback might encourage prospective buyers to not only do 
business with a vendor but finalize early.  
However, we cannot rule out social convention or pressure as possible explanations 
for why buyers might choose to finalize early when engaging with a vendor that they have 
little history with. In short, because many buyers on Abraxas choose to finalize early, this 
might encourage other buyers to do so. Finalizing early, then, might be viewed by 
prospective buyers as a transactional convention given its popularity. It may also be the case 
that the inherent trustworthiness of a vendor might endear them to current and future buyers 
who would engage in early finalization despite the risks associated with this action. 
Regardless, it is not possible to determine why buyers choose to finalize early without 
explicit data on this topic. Future qualitative research on cryptomarket buyers might 
endeavour to query buyers on their reasons for finalizing early.     
Information Asymmetry on Cryptomarkets 
From both the sentiment analysis and lexical predictors of five-rated transactions, it 
does appear that the sentiment structure of qualitative reviews differs between five-star and 
non-five-star ratings. However, this does not necessarily mean that buyers who did not rate 
their transaction a five felt negatively about the transaction. While zero and one-rated 
transactions were harshly criticized by buyers due to their disappointment with the product 
(i.e. the product did not arrive or was not as advertised), two, three, and four-rated 
transactions typically received value-neutral feedback. This suggests that consumer 
satisfaction on Abraxas is not subject to a particularly strenuous or hard-to-achieve standard. 




advertised by the vendor. To this extent, it was not surprising to see that words such as “fast”, 
“great”, “thank”, “stealth”, and “good” were associated with a five rating.      
Many markets, criminal and licit, are often plagued by information asymmetry 
whereby knowledge about goods and services are not uniform between buyers and sellers. 
This can lead to a market for lemons where consumers possess less valid or reliable 
information about the quality of the goods relative to vendors. According to Herley and 
Florenio (2009), the uncertainty created by low-quality vendors imposes a tax on every 
transaction conducted in the market. That is, high-quality vendors stand to make less as the 
presence of low-quality vendors both discourages buyers from engaging in transactions and 
drives down the price of goods and services. This general uncertainty created by the presence 
of bad faith vendors imposes a tax on every transaction conducted in the market.  
According to Thomaz et al. (2020), “cryptomarkets consists of two tiers of players: 
knowledgeable experts with more information, and newcomers who not only have less 
information but also do not know how to weigh sources of information and reputational cues 
properly”. This creates a fascinating situation where these naïve players abide by the rules 
established by knowledgeable players while the knowledgeable players put little to no trust in 
others. Moreover, these knowledgeable actors benefit from new market entrants who are 
otherwise naïve to the conditions of the market. A market will disintegrate in the absence of 
trust, but trust must be first predicated on the spread of information on who is trustworthy. In 
essence, trust is predicated on information. Indeed, buyers on Abraxas, whether naïve or 
competent, must accumulate enough evidence to convince themselves of the likelihood of a 
positive outcome: that they are likely to get what they paid for, and not get their money stolen 
or be arrested for their activities. As such, entire narratives are created around the 
trustworthiness of specific vendors.  
To this extent, finalizing early and the Pollyanna principle are possible features of 
healthy information flows on Abraxas; a lack of information asymmetry. To this extent, the 
predominance of five-rated transactions is possibly due to the singling out of trustworthy and 
reputable vendors though a natural process of selection and elimination. As such, information 
on a vendor is created by past buyers who either applaud or chastise their respective 
transaction with said vendor. Indeed, a prospective buyer’s knowledge and desire to transact 
with a vendor is based on what prior buyers have suggested. We can think of this as an 
information cascade whereby buyers’ preference for a particular vendor is compounded 
across multiple transactions. 
As demonstrated, this information cascade produces an arbitrary pareto distribution 
where a small number of reputable vendors account for a majority of transactions. Thus, the 
decision to finalize early by Abraxas buyers may stem from these information cascades 
where a trusted few are held in high regard. Once an information cascade is underway it is 
difficult to stop or reverse. Practically speaking, this means that reputable buyers will 
continue to remain reputable in the eyes of buyers while disreputable buyers will also remain 
as such. This description is corroborated by findings made by Janetos and Tilly (2017) as 
well as Batikasa and Kretschmera (2018). In short, both studies demonstrate that the length of 




transactional history is correlated with continued market participation. Once a vendor is 
marked early as trustworthy or untrustworthy, they will likely remain as such over their 
tenure on the market.  
Functionally, these information cascades serve to minimize information asymmetry 
on Abraxas as buyers are made aware of which vendors are reputable. In contravention to 
information asymmetry, this level of certainty created by the presence of reputable vendors 
would not impose a tax on every transaction conducted on the market. Buyers and vendors 
are able to transact in a fairly transparent and collegial manner. For buyers, they are perhaps 
less likely to be afflicted by the fear of fraud or duplicity on the part of vendors. As such, in 
cryptomarkets like Abraxas, buyers are more likely to have a pleasant experience compared 
to terrestrial markets where less checks and balance that mitigate fraudulent vendor activity 
exist. This might perhaps explain the presence of the Pollyanna principle on Abraxas where 
the majority of transactions receive a 5-star rating. Indeed, buyers are simply reporting on 
their pleasant experiences on cryptomarkets relative to less pleasant experiences on terrestrial 
markets as opposed to inflating their scores given the abundance of 5-star ratings on the 
market.   
Conclusion 
  As a theoretical matter, this study demonstrates the validity of collective or social 
learning on cryptomarkets. Indeed, the use of reputation systems on these platforms facilitates 
the spread of knowledge. This would ordinarily be difficult if first-hand experiences were not 
properly catalogued and made available to those on the markets. As such, prospective 
Abraxas buyers can observe the feedback of previous buyers and update their beliefs on the 
quality of a vendor. Of course, the value of a consumer feedback is often contingent on the 
volume and consistency of feedback. While several successful transactions may be a stroke of 
luck, a long history of successful transactions is a good indicator of reliable business 
practices and high-quality products.  
This is the first such study to examine the lexical predictors of customer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction on cryptomarkets using text mining. As such, future research should seek to 
replicate these analyses on other cryptomarkets to test the generalizability of these findings. 
There are, moreover, a bevy of methodological approaches that might be pursued in these 
future studies. These include exploring associations between buyer sentiment and vendor 
ratings using modified pre-processing techniques, applying sentiment analysis to product 
categories, and applying techniques such as random forest to predict emergent trends in 








Chapter 4: Testing the Efficacy of Six Simulated Targeting Strategies on a Dark Web 
Cryptomarket 
 Emerging threats from cyberspace have engendered proactive efforts from law 
enforcement to curtail and counteract these malicious actors and organizations. These 
strategies and tactics will differ in their operational parameters and functional objectives. 
Some interventions may seek to stem the flow of new actors while others aim to thoroughly 
dismantle the structure of a criminal organization in its entirety (Morselli, 2009). Regardless 
of the nuances of the intervention, one fundamental question remains: how effective was it? 
This question of what works and what does not has not been extensively applied to the study 
of cryptomarkets.  
 A relatively new criminal phenomenon (Martin, 2013a), cryptomarkets are illicit 
online marketplaces which facilitate the truck, barter, and trade of various and sundry illicit 
goods and services among buyers and vendors. While governments and law enforcement 
agencies worldwide have made numerous attempts at disrupting the ease of operation of these 
illicit entities they have metastasized, adopting new methods for both securitizing their 
continued operation and expanding their scope and influence (Shortis, Aldridge, and Barratt, 
2020). As such, it is unclear whether these interventions have had a pronounced impact on 
the cryptomarket ecosystem. Nevertheless, a growing number of studies (Malm & Bichler, 
2011; Natarajan, 2006; Wood, 2017) have provided empirical evidence on the utility of social 
network analysis in understanding the structural composition of criminal organizations. 
Moreover, cryptomarket scholars (Duxbury and Haynie, 2018; 2020) have begun testing the 
efficacy of strategic interventions.  
 While traditional methods of targeting criminal networks have prioritized the 
identification and removal of “kingpins”, Morselli (2009) contends that “the fluidity and 
flexibility of the structure of certain illicit networks makes them resilient to traditional law 
enforcement strategies”. Crucially, Duxbury and Haynie (2020) note that prior research (Holt, 
Strumsky, Smirnova, & Kilger, 2012; Kenney, 2007; Morselli, 2009; Malm & Bichler, 2011; 
Natarajan, 2006; Wood, 2017) which has used social network analysis to measure the 
structure and actors within a criminal network have failed to apply supplementary simulation 
methods that isolate probable vulnerabilities in the criminal network. In short, these studies 
have not accounted for probable network adaptation following intervention. This can be 
applied to generate informed strategies that are better able to disrupt the operation of criminal 
networks (Duxbury and Haynie, 2019). Thus, studies which leverage computer simulations to 
understand the impact of strategic interventions must consider probable adaptation on the part 
of actors within the network.  
Utilizing sequential node deletion, this study examines the efficacy of six different 
targeting strategies (lead k, eccentricity, total revenue generated, cumulative reputation score, 
listing amount, and random targeting) in disrupting the ease of operation of a dark web 
cryptomarket. To this extent, five outcome variables (number of isolates, number of 
components, average number of nodes in components, average geodesic distance, and 
number of nodes in the largest component) are used to measure the performance of each 
targeting strategy. This study will set parameters to govern the purported behaviour of actors 
when nodes are removed. As such, the transactional network’s overall behaviour can be 





 When dealing with criminals, law enforcement officials are constantly playing a game 
of cat and mouse where adaptations made by criminals force law enforcement to make 
counter-adaptations. This iterated game is particularly prominent within cyberspace where 
innovation and progress are the norm (Wall, 2001). Nevertheless, this should and does not 
stop law enforcement from testing new strategies for disrupting criminal activity and 
destabilizing criminal networks. Williams (2007) and Thraxter (2010) content that law 
enforcement, while often slow in responding to emergent cyberthreats, have increased their 
efforts to curtail these burgeoning threats. This is no different for cryptomarkets. According 
to Martin (2014a), law enforcement organizations worldwide have undertaken a number of 
interventions to destabalize these illicit online marketplaces, including market infiltration and 
digital forensics, vendor arrests, mail scanning, and market takedown.  
Of course, the principal dilemma facing law enforcement agencies tasked with 
combating cryptomarkets is where to target scarce resources. This is further complicated by 
the exigencies of the highly volatile cryptomarket environment. Indeed, the short lifecycle of 
these illicit marketplaces (Christin, 2013; Christin, 2015) makes the investigation of these 
entities particularly difficult as a market may cease to exist before the investigation is 
completed. Furthermore, constantly improving security and encryption protocols compounds 
the difficulty of adequately policing these entities. According to van Buskirk et al. (2014), 
“administrators are heeding the lessons of prior market closures and are taking extra steps to 
fortify their sites against external penetration” (54). In short, the task of disrupting the ease of 
operation of cryptomarkets grows increasingly difficult while the resources required for such 
undertakings remain scarce.    
However, criminologists (McGloin & Rowan, 2015; Shaw & McCay, 1942; Warr, 
2002) have increasingly observed that a large portion of criminal activity is group-based. 
Indeed, criminals often do not act alone but are instead imbedded in a network of similarly 
motivated actors. To this extent, researchers have increasingly relied on social network theory 
and methods to understand the structure, operation, and vulnerabilities of criminal entities of 
varying size (Kennedy, 2008; McGloin, 2005; Papachristos, 2009, 2011, 2014). Indeed, a 
myopic focus on single individuals on the part of law enforcement is unlikely to bear fruit 
when combatting an association of actors. To this extent, a growing area of research 
examines how criminal networks respond to disruption (Duijn et al., 2014; Malm and Bichler, 
2011; Morselli, 2009).  
Consider research by Krebs (2002) which documented the structural properties of the 
9/11 terrorist attack. According to the author, the criminal network’s extreme diffusion made 
it particularly resilient to disruption. Indeed, any single actor could only incriminate a 
maximum of four other members of the network if identified and arrested. In contrast, Wood 
(2017), examining the structure of an international heroin trafficking network, found that the 
removal of 20% of all actors had a considerable disruptive effect on the network.   
Topological Features of Criminal Networks 
For the resilience and behaviour of a criminal network to be understood, researchers 
have turned to examining a network’s topology (Duxbury and Haynie, 2018). Indeed, the 
structure of network will often determine how it responds to law enforcement intervention. 
Importantly, the topology of a criminal network is often unique and is organized based on 
differences in security concerns and constraints on the efficient mobilization of resources 
(Raab and Milward, 2003). No two criminal networks are the same. According to research 




structure where high-profile distributors insulate themselves from the brunt of the network 
activity by connecting to only a few actors. This ensures a certain level of protection as 
constant exposure to other actors and elements within the network increases the likelihood of 
arrest.  
This is not the same for all networks. Alternatively, research by Diekmann et al. 
(2014) and Stephen and Toubia (2009) on social commerce networks revealed that these 
networks are premised on preferential attachment. As such, these networks possess scale-free 
properties where a small number of desirable, trusted actors retain a large proportion of 
customers within the market. Such power law dynamics are not particularly reliable in the 
criminal context as scale-free criminal networks are more vulnerable to crippling targeted 
interventions given the presence of highly connected vertices (Albert et al., 2004). In fact, 
research (Raab and Milward, 2003) suggests that criminal networks will often veer away 
from highly centralized topologies to ensure greater structural robustness when confronted 
with interventions against them.  
However, this aversion to scale-free properties is not universal across all criminal 
networks as some network topologies will naturally abide by power law dynamics. Indeed, 
preferential attachment is unavoidable in environments where trust is scarce and difficult to 
establish. Past research demonstrates that skewed degree distributions are also a characteristic 
feature of criminal networks. Among cannabis cultivators, Duijn et al. (2014) demonstrate a 
pronounced power law distribution where a small number of actors produced and traded a 
disproportionate amount of cannabis. In a similar study of a drug trafficking network, 
Natarajan (2006) discovered a small number of disproportionately high degree traffickers 
among a large contingent of actors with low degrees. This is similar to Varese (2010) whose 
examination of a Russia Mafia group in Italy revealed a heavy-tailed degree distribution. As 
such, Varese concluded that the group was hierarchically structured and polycentric. While 
Krebs (2002) demonstrated that the 9/11 terror cell was a diffuse network, this is not the case 
for all terrorism networks. The degree distribution can vary considerably in a terrorism 
network. For example, Morselli et al. (2007) and Qin et al. (2005) found truncated power law 
distributions in the terrorism networks they examined. 
According to Newman (2002), the removal of a highly connected vertex often 
fractures the network into numerous distinct components. This is reflective of degree-mixing 
patterns which characterize scale-free networks (Newman, 2003). To elaborate, Alm and 
Mack (2017) content that networks where high-k actors are connected to low-k actors (degree 
mixing or disassortative mixing) are more susceptible to the disruptive impact of key vertex 
removal relative to networks where degree mixing does not occur (assortative mixing). Wood 
(2017) documented disassortative mixing in several drug distribution networks, corroborating 
Kennedy’s (2008) contention that many real-world drug markets are highly susceptible to law 
enforcement intervention. As it relates to cryptomarkets, Barratt et al. (2016a; 2016b), 
originally speculated that these online markets were subject to low disassortative mixing as 
many buyers reported experimenting with new products and vendors. Moreover, there is 
relatively less risk in purchasing goods and services through online markets.   
Simulated Interventions on Criminal Networks 
 Given the inherent difficulties associated with the procurement and cleanliness of 
criminal network datasets, studies on simulated law enforcement interventions are scarce 
relative to studies documenting the structure of criminal networks. Regardless, much can be 




networks. One such study by Keegan et al. (2010) contrasted the structural robustness of a 
drug trafficking network with a proxy gaming network. Applying k-based sequential node 
removal to each network, the authors observed that removing the top 5% of nodes based on 
degree centrality dismantled both networks whereas the random removal of 5% of nodes 
failed to yield a comparable result. In short, Keegan et al. (2010) demonstrated the disruptive 
impact of k-degree removals in both licit and illicit networks. In contrast, Xu and Chen 
(2003) used a simulation methodology to examine terrorist, methamphetamine trafficking, 
and gang networks. The authors concluded that the targeting of hubs and brokers was 
ineffective in disrupting the network’s ease of operation. In contrast, strategies which 
prioritized the targeting of brokers proved more effective as these specific actors were 
responsible for keeping the network together. Together, these studies demonstrate that 
differences in the topology of a criminal network will yield different vulnerabilities which 
require different strategic interventions. Indeed, one targeting strategy will not be equally 
effective on all networks whose structural compositions differ.  
 Applying computer simulations to evaluate the impact of law enforcement 
interventions on two drug trafficking networks, Bright, Greenhill, and Levenkova (2010) 
focused on the removal of hubs. As with previous studies, the researchers found that the 
removal of key actors by law enforcement can create a relatively speedy structural collapse. 
Furthermore, Bright, Greenhill, Britz, Ritter, and Morselli (2017), investigating the 
effectiveness of six law enforcement intervention strategies against a drug market against 
three outcome measures, found that the removal of actors with betweenness centrality was the 
most effective strategy. This was followed by removing actors who made the most money. 
 Examining four criminal networks with varying network structures, Duxbury and 
Haynie (2019) applied agent-based modelling to evaluate how criminal networks respond to 
disruptions. The authors made two important conclusions. First, “isolated law enforcement 
disruptions maybe unsuccessful at reducing future levels of crime in efficiency-oriented 
networks” (Duxbury and Haynie, 2019, 335). Second, disruption tends to yield time-
persistent damage to a network which prioritized security. This suggests that future law 
enforcement interventions should attack security-oriented criminal networks.  
As it pertains to cryptomarkets, Duxbury and Haynie (2018), building off their prior 
research (Duxbury and Haynie, 2017) on transactional networks on the dark web, conducted 
disruption simulations on an opioid market. Their results demonstrated that the removal of 
high centrality actors in repeat transactions yielded a decrease in the size of the largest 
network components. However, isolated groups and potential components increased in size. 
According to the authors (Durbury and Haynie, 2018), “these results suggest that targeting 
any available combination of high-profile distributors may be an alternative strategy to 
leading distributor removal when leading distributors are difficult to isolate or identify” 
(245). Consistent with research in drug distribution networks (Carley, 1995; Duijn et al., 
2014; Morselli et al., 2009; Wood, 2017), the authors found that removing the most prolific 
vendors in sequential order fragmented the network in relatively little time.  
The same authors (Duxbury and Haynie, 2020) conducted a second study which 
applied computer simulations to test the responsiveness of a dark web drug network. The 
researchers found that “while targeted attacks were effective when conducted at a large-scale, 
weak link and signal attacks deter more potential drug transactions and buyers when only a 




generally more effective as actors grow more cautious about forging ties when the network is 
attacked. Under these conditions, network robustness is undermined in the long term.  
Research Questions 
Building off research from Duxbury and Haynie (2018; 2020), this paper seeks to 
answer three research questions: 
1. Of the six proposed disruption strategies, which offers the greatest initial amount 
of damage to the Abraxas transactional network?  
2. Of the first 100 nodes that are removed per each disruption strategy, does their 
impact carry-over across all outcome measures? 
3. What do these strategies tell us about the efficacy of dark web disruption 
strategies?   
Given the dearth of research on this topic, scholars and law enforcement are generally 
uncertain about the measurable impact of cryptomarket disruption strategies. The 
effectiveness of cryptomarket intervention strategies is an area where knowledge is lacking 
(Shortis, Aldridge, and Barratt, 2020). While Duxbury and Haynie (2020) have applied 
sequential node removal to one cryptomarket, it is unclear how generalizable these findings 
are. As criminal networks are adaptive and dynamic, different disruption strategies are likely 
to yield different results. When it comes to cryptomarkets, it is unclear which strategies work, 
and which ones do not. The first and second research questions will address this important 
gap in the scholarly literature, comparing and contrasting the effectiveness of six different 
disruption strategies across five impact measurements. As such, the explicit focus of this 
chapter is not on the structural robustness of cryptomarket transactional networks, but on the 
efficacy of strategic interventions which might be tried against these networks.  
This expands on Duxbury and Haynie’s (2020) study which leveraged three 
intervention strategies (high k vendors, low k buyers, and vendor rating) across three impact 
measurements (number of ties, numbers of transactions, and network density). To this extent, 
the objective is to determine which strategies are most effective across single outcome 
measures and across all measures. In addition, this represents a novel opportunity to identify 
inherent differences in each strategic intervention. Indeed, it may be the case that while each 
strategy possesses a different targeting objective, they may target the same actors within the 
network. As a result, these interventions, while purported to be strategically distinct, are 
functionally similarly if not identical.   
The third research question seeks to leverage the findings of the first and second 
research questions to speculate on the overall efficacy of law enforcement interventions. The 
structure of a criminal network naturally lends itself to the generation of disruption strategies. 
In short, this question strives to evaluate how different criminal network disruption strategies 
might affect the immediate and long-term impact of dark web criminal networks. Network 
activity in the aftermath of disruption provides insight into how criminal organizations 
behave in unstable environments. Social network theory and analysis is ideally suited to 
understanding how disruption efforts affect crime groups’ behaviour, coordination, and time 
of recovery. Moreover, the combined use of social network analysis and computer 
simulations overcome the well-known methodological and data collection problems 
associated with examining dark networks (Bright and Delaney, 2013; Bright, Koskinen, & 
Malm, 2018; Morselli, 2009; Wood, 2017). Thus, in addition to making theoretical 
advancements in understanding organized crime and informing criminal intelligence, this 




computational methods and social network analysis in understanding criminological 
phenomena. 
Data 
 As with previous chapters, I again use a buyer-seller dataset from the Abraxas 
cryptomarket (Branwen et al., 2015). Apart from the anonymous cryptomarket analysed by 
Duxbury and Haynie (2017; 2019), this is the only marketplace where unique identifiers are 
available for buyers. From the 5434 illicit transactions, a single two-mode network featuring 
vendors and buyers was created. Vendors were identified based on their unique vendor name 
while buyers were identified based on their HTML code. As such, the transactional network 
consisted of 5434 pairs, with 269 unique vendors and 2794 unique buyers. This analysis used 
directed ties.  
Table 1 present the descriptive network statistics of Abraxas’ transactional network. 
First, the network is diffuse with a network density of 0.0007. As such, only 0.07% of all 
possible transactions occurred. Furthermore, the full network consists of 29 components, with 
one component containing 97.6% (2726) of all nodes within the network. The remaining 
connected components consisted of 19 dyads, 7 triads, and single assortments of components 
of various sizes. As expected, there are no isolates as a transaction must involve both a buyer 
and a vendor. Nodes within the Abraxas transactional network, based on the eccentricity 
measurement, have a maximum distance of 11.23 from one another, on average. Comparable 
mean values can also be observed for vendors (10.32) and buyers (11.33). 
 
Table 1: Network characteristics 
Network Characteristics Mean (SD) or Total Range 
Unique Actors/Nodes 2794 - 
Unique Vendors 269 - 
Unique Buyers 2525 - 
Isolates 0 - 
Total Unique Edges 3935 - 
Density 0.0007 - 
Indegree 2.15 (2.2) 1-34 
Outdegree 20.2 (39) 1-330 
Indegree Centralization 0.01 - 
Outdegree Centralization 0.12 - 
Eccentricity (All) 11.23 (1.9) 1-16 
Eccentricity (Vendors) 10.32 (3.38) 1-15 
Eccentricity (Buyers) 11.33 (1.64) 1-16 
 
Methods 
By virtue of their orientation in a network, the behaviour of each individual node is 
dependent on the behaviour of every other node within the network (Bright et al., 2017). 
Simply because two nodes are unconnected does not necessarily mean that they do not affect 
one another in some capacity. Indeed, downstream effects are plausible (Newman, 2003) as 
the removal or inclusion of new nodes changes the dynamic of a network, and by extension, 




are comprised of individual actors whose mutual relationships strengthen or dissipate when 
internal and external stimuli are added to the network. Thus, criminal networks are not static 
entities. The structure of a network may change based on the behaviour of the actors within it. 
This fact cannot be ignored when examining the efficacy of interventions on criminal 
networks.  
Simulation of Interventions Against Criminal Networks 
 Research into the disruption of criminal networks has posited several methods of 
reducing the ease of operation of these networks. In curbing the network activity of a drug 
market, Kennedy (2008) advocates for a “focus deterrence” strategy which simultaneously 
removes multiple influential criminals in a single stroke. This is done to reduce the likelihood 
of a resultant power vacuum by removing the actors most responsible for activity within a 
network. This method of targeting the most influential actors is challenged by methods which 
maintain that network disruption is best achieved by targeting brokers within the network 
(Burt, 2000). These brokers bridge structural gaps in a network, connecting segments of a 
network via the maintenance of pathways. This is particularly important for strategies 
targeting gangs as greater disruptive impact may be achieved if actors spanning local network 
clusters are targeted for removal. Indeed, this strategy posits the targeting of connectors as 
opposed to distributors.  
Based on numerous studies examining real and hypothetical law enforcement 
interventions (Morselli, 2009; Wood, 2017; Alm and Mack, 2017; Duxbury and Haynie, 
2020), the most common method of testing the structural robustness of a network is to 
“remove vertices in descending order of magnitude and to measure the proportion of network 
features as a function of the actor’s removal” (Duxbury and Haynie, 2018, 245). Importantly, 
this paper does not endeavour to measure the structural robustness of Abraxas, but rather the 
efficacy of proposed strategic interventions which target the actors therein. Nevertheless, this 
method can also be applied to measure the efficacy of strategic interventions. 
Furthermore, this study deviates from other studies (Haynie, 2018; 2020) measuring 
cryptomaket intervention as it places each targeting strategy into one of two categories for 
disrupting criminal network. Based on previous research (Bright et al., 2017), strategies for 
criminal network disruption can be divided into two categories: the network approach and the 
human capital approach. The network approach focuses on individual actors that occupy 
strategic positions within criminal networks (Sparrow, 1991; Klerks, 2001; Schwartz and 
Rouselle, 2009). These predominantly revolve around common centrality measurements such 
as degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and eccentricity. Originating in economics, 
human capital encompasses “the competencies, knowledge, social and personality attributes, 
including creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic 
value” (Duijin, Kashirin, and Sloot, 2014, 4236). As it pertains to illegal markets, human 
capital is assembled and integrated in the form of trust.  
I employ sequential node deletion pursuant to six law enforcement strategies: lead k 
(degree centrality), eccentricity, unique items bought/sold, cumulative reputation score, total 
purchase price, and random targeting. Mirroring Bright et. al (2017), each strategy is 
premised on the hypothesized aims of law enforcement agencies and fall under either a social 
or human capital approach. Each targeting strategy begins with the full 2794 actors within the 
network then deletes one node at a time based on the strategic objective of the intervention. 




measures. This simulation strategy was selected due to its successful use by Bright et al. 
(2017) and Gilbert & Troitzsch (2005). The six targeting strategies are as follows: 
1. Random targeting: targets are selected at random regardless of their role in the 
market. This targeting strategy possesses no overt strategic objective. It is premised 
on opportunistic intervention. 
Interventions that Target Only Network Capital  
2. Degree centrality targeting: lead k actors are removed in descending order. Within 
Abraxas, these are the actors with the highest number of trade partners. This is a fairly 
standard measurement by which network-based node removal is conducted.   
3. Eccentricity targeting: nodes in the network will be removed based on their distance 
from a specific node to any other node. Eccentricity measures the maximum distance 
of one node to any other node in the network. As such, the eccentricity of a node in a 
connected network is the maximum distance between that node and another over all 
nodes in the network.   
It is important to note that betweenness centrality, while a staple of the network 
capital approach, was not featured as a targeting strategy as the Abraxas transactional 
network did not contain influential brokers which connected disparate parts of the network. In 
general, the directness of cryptomarket transactions does not allow for the existence of 
brokers as would be present in terrestrial criminal markets.  
Interventions that Target Only Human Capital: 
4. Unique items bought/sold targeting: nodes are removed based on the number of 
unique items bought or sold by an actor. 
5. Total purchase price targeting: nodes are removed based on the total revenue 
generated or spent by an actor.  
6. Reputation targeting: deletions are based on the cumulative reputation score of actors.  
Finally, I use five outcome variables to access the efficacy of each strategy:  
1) Mean geodesic distance in the network  
2) Number of nodes in the largest components in the networks  
3) Average number of nodes in components 
4) Number of components 
5) Number of isolates.  
The first outcome variable examines the mean of the shortest path lengths between 
any two actors in the network. Smaller mean geodesic distances indicate that information and 
resources can travel more quickly throughout the network, promoting criminal activity. Thus, 
increases in mean geodesic distances indicate greater network damage. The second, third, and 
fourth variables measure network hierarchy and actors’ integration into a centralized 
organization. Thus, they provide a measure of hierarchical network cohesion, where 
decreases in the size of the largest component, the average number of nodes in components, 
and the number of components reflect greater network damage. The fifth variable measures 
the fragmentation of the market based on the number of nodes without a tie. As the number of 
isolates increases, the network grows more fragmented and is generally less capable of 




It is, nevertheless, important to clarify differences between this simulation strategy 
and those pursued in other studies measuring the impact of interventions on cryptomarkets. 
Duxbury and Heynie (2019) leveraged three intervention strategies in their first study of a 
dark web opioid network: 1) high k vendors, 2) low k buyers, and 3) vendor rating. The 
impact of these interventions was measured across three impact measurements: number of 
ties, numbers of transactions, and network density. In their second study, Duxbury and 
Haynie (2020) used three attack strategies: 1) weak link attacks that delete large numbers of 
weakly connected vertices, 2) signal attacks that saturate the network with noisy signals, and 
3) targeted attacks that delete structurally integral vertices. These interventions were 
measured across the number of ties, network density, and number of isolates within the 
network.  
While this study shares some targeting strategies (lead k and vendor reputation) and 
outcome measurements (number of isolates) with the aforementioned studies, it provides a 
wider array of targeting strategies and outcome measurements that have not been attempted. 
As such, this study offers a more in depth look at the efficacy of cryptomarket targeting 
strategies, building upon prior research on this topic by more closely examining the relative 
and comparative impact of each targeting strategy. This adaptive simulation strategy qualifies 
as the most extensive within the scholarly literature on cryptomarkets. Moreover, the use of 
network and human capital frameworks adds a more rounded analytical focus, segmenting 
the targeting strategies based on a higher order functional objective premised on network 
position or human competency. This has not been attempted in prior cryptomarket simulation 
studies. 
Like Bright et al. (2017) and Gilbert & Troitzsch (2005), I perform 100 iterations of 
the simulation for each target strategy. Each outcome measure is then averaged over the 100 
runs to produce plots of the average value over time (Berk, 2008; Birks & Davies, 2017; 
Birks et al., 2012; Groff et al., 2018; Weisburd et al., 2017).  
Accounting for Network Adaptation  
Real‐world data on criminal networks are typically drawn from captured networks, 
rendering observations of the network before and after disruption almost impossible (Bright 
et al., 2018; Morselli, 2009). As such, sequential node deletion simulations must incorporate 
network adaption and preferential selection processes that are premised on some sort of 
ground truth. 
Following Bright et. al’s (2017) adaptation procedure, “network adaptation was 
modelled by giving the network an opportunity to replace an actor that was removed due to 
sequential node deletion”. In this study, I assumed that replacement actors should possess 
three necessary characteristics: 1) the same product bought/sold as the deleted actor, 2) the 
same shipped to/from location as the deleted, and 3) the highest possible reputation score of 
all eligible replacements. Each of these replacement criteria were weighed the same. In other 
words, replacement actors must match the base-level profile of the deleted actor while also 
possessing a relative high level of trustworthiness such that surrounding nodes would 
comfortably do business with them. Once a node had been removed in each sequential 
deletion, the first step was to identify how many nodes were made an isolate as a result of the 
deletion. Second, a single replacement node in the network which possessed the three 
aforementioned replacement characteristics was identified. Isolates were then given the 
opportunity to reconnect to the network via the identified replacement node. Importantly, the 




reconnection. All told, the network would replace an actor that was removed with the most 
suitable candidate. If a suitable candidate did not exist, the isolate did not re-join the network.  
This adaptation process is based on network redundancy. Redundancy, in this case, 
refers to the number of different relationships between actors in a network. Importantly, the 
more redundancy there exists in a network the more viable options there are for replacing lost 
human capital. In short, replacements in Abraxas with a reliable reputation and suitable 
shipping country and product listing will serve as replacements once similar actors have been 
deleted from the market.  
Findings 
Simulation Results 
Table 2 displays the results of all six simulated interventions across the five outcome 
measures. To facilitate comparisons across law enforcement strategies, I plot the five 
outcome measures on five separate graphs: number of active components (Figure 1(a)), 
number of isolates (Figure 2(b)), average number of nodes in components (Figure 1(c)), 
number of nodes in largest component (Figure 1(d)), and average geodesic distance (Figure 
1(e)). All five plots show the results of simulations in which network adaptation is included. 
For each plot, the x-axis shows the number of steps performed, operationalized as the number 
of nodes deleted sequentially. At each step, one actor is removed. The y-axis reflects the 
specific outcome measure featured in the simulation.  
Table 2 demonstrates the impact of deleting a single node per each intervention across 
all outcome measurements. Based on the number of isolates and components, it is readily 
apparent that eccentricity and random targeting are the least effective targeting strategies, 
producing the lowest average results per deleted node. Interestingly, degree centrality, 
reputation, total purchasing price, and unique items bought/sold each performed similarly 
across these two measurements. While the average is particularly stable for each targeting 
strategy across the average number of nodes in components, the number of nodes in largest 
component, and the average geodesic distance, clear differences are apparent based on the 
standard deviation and range. Again, eccentricity and random targeting are the least effective 
at disrupting the transactional network. Furthermore, degree centrality, reputation, total 
purchasing price, and unique items bought each perform similarly across these three 
measures, offering the greatest disruption per node deleted. Nevertheless, a closer look at 
speed of disruption for each targeting strategy across the five measures is warranted.  
 
Table 2: Impact of Single Node Deletions by Strategy and Outcome 
Measures Initial Value Mean SD Range 
Isolatesa     
Degree Centralityb 0 1.77 4.46 0-91 
Eccentricityb 0 0.03 0.18 0-3 
Randomb 0 0.03 0.18 0-3 
Reputationb 0 1.77 4.46 0-91 
Total Purchasing Priceb 0 1.7 4.52 0-91 
Unique Items Boughtb 0 1.67 4.52 0-90 
     




Degree Centralityb 29 1.76 4.58 0-91 
Eccentricityb 29 0.02 0.16 0-3 
Randomb 29 0.18 0.45 0-5 
Reputationb 29 1.75 4.58 0-91 
Total Purchasing Priceb 29 1.69 4.64 0-91 
Unique Items Boughtb 29 1.66 4.63 0-90 
     
Average Number of 
Nodes in Components a 
    
Degree Centralityb 96.35 0.04 1.35 0-70.48 
Eccentricityb 96.35 0.04 0.06 0-2.72 
Randomb 96.35 0.04 0.16 0-3.12 
Reputationb 96.35 0.04 1.35 0-70.48 
Total Purchasing Priceb 96.35 0.04 1.35 0-70.48 
Unique Items Boughtb 96.35 0.04 1.36 0-71.41 
     
Average Geodesic 
Distance a 
    
Degree Centralityb 64.62 0.04 0.63 0-30.45 
Eccentricityb 64.62 0.05 0.38 0-12.44 
Randomb 64.62 0.2 1.56 0-43.24 
Reputationb 64.62 0.04 0.63 0-30.45 
Total Purchasing Priceb 64.62 0.04 0.51 0-23.24 
Unique Items Boughtb 64.62 0.04 0.51 0-23.24 
     
Number of Nodes in 
Largest Component a 
    
Degree Centralityb 2726 0.98 6.47 0-169 
Eccentricityb 2726 0.98 0.59 0-27 
Randomb 2726 0.98 1.31 0-39 
Reputationb 2726 0.98 6.34 0-159 
Total Purchasing Priceb 2726 0.98 5.65 0-102 
Unique Items Boughtb 2726 0.98 6.11 0-117 
a indicates outcome measure; b indicates targeting strategy 
 
 As it pertains to the number of components, the maximal effect is measured as the 
highest number of components that are created upon intervention. In short, if the intervention 
is to be successful node deletion should yield a sizable increase in the number of components 
within the network (see Figure 1(a)). An increase in the number of components reflects 
network fragmentation and disruption of information flows. Upon closer examination, it is 
evident that degree centrality targeting yielded the fastest speed (by the narrowest margins) of 
relative disruption as the deletion of 251 nodes (9% of all nodes) yielded 2310 total 
components, a 7866% increase from the original 29 components. In comparison, reputation 
targeting yielded 2312 components after 244 nodes were deleted while total purchasing price 
targeting and unique items bought/sold resulted in 1948 and 2061 components after 288 and 
422 nodes were deleted, respectively. Perhaps unsurprisingly, random targeting yielded a 
high of 269 components once 2525 nodes were deleted. Curiously, eccentricity offered the 




With regard to the number of isolates, the maximal effect is measured as the highest 
number of isolates that are created upon intervention (see Figure 1(b)). Reputation targeting 
appears to be the most effective strategy as the deletion of the top 299 nodes (10.7%) yielded 
2202 isolates within the network. Degree centrality targeting offered the second fastest 
disruption with the deletion of the top 300 nodes yielding 2201 isolates. In this case, both 
strategies offered near identical results. Total purchasing price targeting and unique items 
bought/sold targeting created the third and fourth fastest disruptions, respectively. Total 
purchasing price yielded a high of 1841 isolates after 288 nodes were deleted while unique 
items bought/sold yielded 1559 isolates after 422 were removed. Eccentricity and random 
targeting offered the same maximal disruption, with 19 isolates created after 2765 nodes were 












The average number of nodes in a component reflects the average size of components 
within the network. As such, maximal disruption is premised around reductions in the 
average number of nodes in components. The smaller the components the more fragmented 
the transactional network. Based on rank-order vertex removal simulations, the size of 
components plummets as the number of nodes is removed. This is particularly the case for 
degree centrality targeting, total purchasing price targeting, reputation targeting, and unique 
items bought/sold targeting follow similar pattern (see Figure 1(c)). Degree centrality 
targeting yielded the fastest disruption, with 44 (1.6%) node deletions reducing the average 
component size to 1.99 nodes (a 97.9% reduction from the original 96.35 average). Similarly, 
reputation targeting yielded nearly identical disruption as the rank-ordered deletion of 47 
nodes reduced the average number of nodes within components to under two. In order to 
reduce the average number of nodes to 1.99, 70 and 71 nodes needed to be deleted for total 
purchasing price and unique items bought/sold, respectively. Random and eccentricity 
targeting yielded the slowest disruption as it required the random deletion of 2381 (85.2%) 
and eccentricity-based deletion of 2938 (98%) nodes to reduce the average component size to 
1.99 nodes.   
As it pertains to the number of nodes in largest component, the maximal disruptive 
effect is measured as the lowest number of nodes in the largest component following 
intervention. In order words, the smaller the largest component the more fragmented the 
network (see Figure 1(d)). Degree centrality targeting yielded the fastest speed of relative 




disruption as the deletion of 562 nodes reduced the largest component to 3 nodes. In 
comparison, reputation targeting yielded the same result after 815 nodes were deleted. Total 
purchasing price targeting and unique items bought/sold produced the same measure result (3 
nodes) after 2621 and 1351 nodes were deleted, respectively. Random and eccentricity 












While decreases in the average geodesic distance typically reflects improved 
communication between nodes as the distance from one node to all other nodes is short, this 
is not necessarily the case for the Abraxas transactional network. In this case, consistent 
decreases in the average geodesic distance pursuant to sequential node deletion are a product 
of a shrinking share of nodes which can be connected to. In short, the average geodesic 
distance decreases as there are less nodes to connect to. Reputation targeting appears to be the 
most effective strategy as the deletion of the top 99 nodes (10.7%) yielded an average 
geodesic distance of 0.41. Degree centrality targeting offered the second fastest disruption 
with the deletion of the top 96 nodes yielding an average geodesic distance of 0.93. Unique 
items bought/sold targeting and total purchasing price targeting created the third and fourth 
fastest disruptions, with the deletion of 226 and 230 nodes yielding an average geodesic 
distance of 0.8, respectively. Eccentricity and random targeting were again the least effective 










Figure 1(c): Average Number of Nodes in Components Figure 1(d): Number of Nodes in Largest Component 




Node Deletion Impact 
 Not every deleted node will have the same disruptive effect on a criminal network. By 
virtue of their influence and place within the network structure, the removal of specific nodes 
will have disproportionate impact on a network’s ease of operation. Figures 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 
2(d), and 2(e) illustrate the percentage of node deletion by the percentage of disruption 
impact for each strategic intervention across all outcome measures. It is immediately apparent 
from these figures that the impact of node deletion can either be linear, curvilinear, or power 
law. A linear relationship means that node deletion and disruption impact are proportional, 
implying that the removal of a large number of nodes will result in an equally large level of 
disruption. A curvilinear relationship implies that a moderate number of deleted nodes 
account for a large amount of disruption impact. Finally, a power law curve implies that 
small number of deleted nodes accounts for an outsized portion of disruption impact.  
 Based on Figure 2(a), degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase 
price targeting, and unique items bought/sold targeting are each based on a power law when it 
comes to the number of nodes in the largest component. In degree centrality targeting, 1% of 
deleted nodes accounted for 51.5% of disruption impact. This is also the case for the other 
three strategies as 1% of deleted nodes accounted for 46.2%, 50.8%, and 52.8% of disruption 
impact for total purchase price targeting, reputation targeting, and unique items bought/sold 
targeting, respectively. Random targeting is curvilinear with 10% of deleted nodes 
accounting for 26.6% of disruption impact while eccentricity targeting is linear. As it relates 
to the number of isolates (see Figure 2(b)), 5% of deleted nodes accounted for 45.2%, 45.8%, 
45.2%, and 45.8% of disruptive impact for degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, 
total purchase price targeting, and unique items bought/sold targeting, respectively. As such, 
each targeting strategy is governed by a power curve. Random and eccentricity targeting 












As it relates to the number of components (see Figure 2(c)), 5% of deleted nodes 
accounted for 46.3%, 47.3%, 46.9%, and 47.2% of disruptive impact for degree centrality 
targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique items bought/sold 
targeting, respectively. Each of these targeting strategies is governed by a power curve. 
Random and eccentricity targeting appear to be linear. Power curves are also present among 




several targeting strategies as it relates to the average number of nodes in components (see 
Figure 2(d)). 1% of deleted nodes accounted for 86.3%, 85.8%, 86.2%, and 86% of disruptive 
impact for degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and 
unique items bought/sold targeting, respectively. Interestingly, random targeting abides by a 
less pronounced power curve, with 1% of deleted nodes accounting for 41.3% of disruption 
impact. Unsurprisingly, eccentricity targeting follows a linear curve. Curiously, all targeting 
strategies abide by a power curve when it comes to measured impact on average geodesic 
distance. 1% of deleted nodes accounted for 73.8%, 85.8%, 74.6%, 60.3%, and 60.3% of 
disruptive impact for degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price 
targeting, unique items bought/sold targeting, and random targeting, respectively. 5% of the 





















Outcome Measure Carry-Over and Node Characteristics 
Table 3 shows the percentage of the top 100 deleted nodes for each target strategy that 
are also held in common with each other respective targeting strategy for each outcome 
measure. In short, this table shows how many nodes within the top 100 simulated deletions 
are held in common by all targeting strategies. Based on these results, it is apparent that the 





majority (> 50%) of deleted nodes are held in common among degree centrality targeting, 
reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique items bought/sold targeting for 
nearly all outcome measures. In fact, there appears to be a congruence of 90% or greater for 
isolates and components. This in part explains why the aforementioned disruption impact was 
so similar among these targeting strategies as the deleted nodes were the same actors. 
Moreover, these four targeting strategies did not share the same nodes with both eccentricity 
and random targeting. This again explains the sharp differences in their disruption 
performances as the same actors where not targeted for deletion as they were for degree 
centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique items 
bought/sold targeting. 
 












Isolates      
Eccentricity 10% - - - - 
Total Purchasing 
Price 
95% 9% - - - 
Reputation 99% 10% 95% - - 
Unique Items Bought 94% 10% 95% 95% - 
Random 7% 5% 7% 7% 8% 
      
Components      
Eccentricity 6% - - - - 
Total Purchasing 
Price 
92% 5% - - - 
Reputation 100% 6% 92% - - 
Unique Items Bought 93% 6% 95% 93% - 
Random 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
      
Average Number of 
Nodes in Components 
     
Eccentricity 4% - - - - 
Total Purchasing 
Price 
85% 5% - - - 
Reputation 92% 5% 85% - - 
Unique Items Bought 76% 4% 68% 73% - 
Random 2% 2% 3% 2% 6% 
      
Average Geodesic 
Distance 
     
Eccentricity 0% - - - - 
Total Purchasing 
Price 
73% 0% - - - 
Reputation 86% 0% 74% - - 




Random 0% 7% 2% 1% 1% 
      
Number of Nodes in 
Largest Component 
     
Eccentricity 2% - - - - 
Total Purchasing 
Price 
85% 2% - - - 
Reputation 97% 2% 85% - - 
Unique Items Bought 78% 3% 78% 79% - 
Random 0% 2% 2% 1% 3% 
 
Table 4 presents a complete array of descriptive statistics for the top 100 deleted 
nodes that are held in common across all outcome measures. Of the top 100 nodes deleted 
based on degree centrality targeting, 78 were held in common across the five outcome 
measures. Notably, eccentricity targeting and random targeted yielded no common deleted 
nodes across the outcome measures. Of the targeting strategies with commonly held deleted 
nodes, an overwhelming majority sold or bought drugs, with stimulants, cannabis, and 
ecstasy being the top products of choice. To this extent, these particular actors predominantly 
dealt in one product type but could diversify with two to three additional products. Among 
the countries shipped from or shipped to, the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Netherlands were the top three. These findings indicate that the actors most influential to the 
network stability of Abraxas bartered primarily in stimulants and were affiliated with the 
United States in some capacity. Notably, all deleted nodes across the applicable interventions 
were vendors. 
 




















      
Vendor 100% (78) - 100% (68) 100% (76) 100% (43) - 
Buyer 0% (0) - 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) - 




      
1 85.9% (67) - 83.8% (57) 85.5% (65) 74.4% (32) - 
2 10.3% (8) - 11.8% (8) 10.5% (8) 18.6% (8) - 
3 0% (0) - 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) - 
4 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
5 2.6% (2) - 2.9% (2) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
       
Listing 
Categories 
      
Custom 
Listing 




Digital Goods 7.7% (6) - 4.4% (3) 9.2% (7) 16.3% (7) - 
Drug 
Paraphernalia 
2.6% (2) - 4.4% (3) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
Drugs 96.2% (75) - 100% (68) 94.7% (72) 90.7% (39) - 
Other 3.8% (3) - 4.4% (3) 3.9% (3) 7.0% (3) - 
Services 6.4% (5) - 5.9% (4) 6.6% (5) 11.6% (5) - 




      
1 35.9% (28) - 35.3% (24) 34.2% (26) 18.6% (8) - 
2 23.1% (18) - 25% (17) 23.7% (18) 18.6% (8) - 
3 23.1% (18) - 23.5% (16) 23.7% (18) 32.6% (14) - 
4 3.9% (3) - 2.9% (2) 4% (3) 4.7% (2) - 
5 6.4% (5) - 5.9% (4) 6.6% (5) 11.6% (5) - 
6 2.6% (2) - 2.9% (2) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
7 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
8 2.6% (2) - 1.5% (1) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
9 0% (0) - 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) - 
10+ 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
       
Listing 
Subcategories 
      
Benzos 11.5% (9) - 10.3% (7) 11.8% (9) 14% (6) - 
Cannabis 43.6% (34) - 47.1% (32) 44.7% (34) 48.8% (21) - 
Data 3.8% (3) - 2.9% (2) 5.3% (4) 9.3% (4) - 
Dissociatives 10.3% (8) - 10.3% (7) 10.5% (8) 14% (6) - 
Drugs 2.6% (2) - 0% (0) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
Drugs 
Paraphernilia 
1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
E-Books 5.1% (4) - 2.9% (2) 6.6% (5) 11.6% (5) - 
Ecstasy 34.6% (27) - 33.8% (23) 34.2% (26) 46.5% (20) - 
Electronics 2.6% (2) - 2.9% (2) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
Erotica 3.8% (3) - 1.5% (1) 3.9% (3) 7% (3) - 
Fraud 2.6% (2) - 1.5% (1) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
Hacking 2.6% (2) - 1.5% (1) 3.9% (3) 7% (3) - 
IDs and 
Passports 
1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
Information 5.1% (4) - 2.9% (2) 5.3% (4) 9.3% (4) - 
Miscellaneous 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
Money 2.6% (2) - 1.5% (1) 2.6% (2) 4.7% (2) - 
N/A 12.8% (10) - 13.2% (9) 13.2% (10) 20.9% (9) - 
Opioids 24.4% (19) - 25% (17) 25.0% (19) 25.6% (11) - 
Other 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
Prescription 11.5% (9) - 11.8% (8) 11.8% (9) 14% (4) - 
Psychedelics 15.4% (12) - 14.7% (10) 13.2% (10) 20.9% (9) - 
RCs 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
Security 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 




Steroids 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
Stimulants 52.6% (41) - 58.8% (40) 51.3% (39) 51.2% (22) - 
Weapons 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 





      
1 76.9% (60) - 79.4% (54) 76.3% (58) 67.4% (29) - 
2 18% (14) - 14.7% (10) 18.4% (14) 23.3% (10) - 
3 3.9% (3) - 4.4% (3) 4% (3) 7% (3) - 
4 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.3% (1) - 
       
Locations 
Shipped From 
      
Australia 9% (7) - 11.8% (8) 9.2% 7.1% (3) - 
Belgium 2.6% (2) - 1.5% (1) 2.6% - - 
Belize 1,3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.4% (1) - 
Bulgaria 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.4% (1) - 
Canada 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) - - 
Denmark 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) - - 
Europe/EU 11.5% (9) - 11.8% (8) 13.2% (10) 21.4% (9) - 
France 2.6% (2) - 2.9% (2) 2.6% (2) 2.4% (1) - 
Germany 21.8% (17) - 22.1% (15) 21.1% (16) 21.4% (9) - 
India 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.4% (1) - 
Italy 1.3% (1) - 1.5% (1) 1.3% (1) 2.4% (1) - 
Netherlands 17.9% (14) - 17.6% (12) 17.1% (13) 19% (8) - 
Norway - - 1.5% (1) - - - 
Spain 2.6% (2) - 1.5% (1) 2.6% (2) 4.8% (2) - 
UK 19.2% (15) - 17.6% (12) 18.4% (14) 14.3% (6) - 
United States 19.2% (15) - 22.1% (15) 19.7% (15) 26.2% (11) - 
Unknown or 
N/A 
14.1% (11) - 8.8% (6) 14.1% (11) 21.4% (9) - 
 
Discussion 
Adaptive sequential node deletion was applied to test the efficacy of six law 
enforcement strategies in disrupting the ease of operation of the Abraxas cryptomarket. In a 
real-world setting, this mimics law enforcement efforts to target, apprehend, and/or arrest 
individual actors within a network’s value chain. As it is apparent from the results, random 
targeting was found to be the least effective strategy across the five outcome measures, 
producing minimal disruptive effect at a relatively slow pace. These results are consistent 
with findings from other criminal network research (Bright, Greenhill, and Levenkova, 2010; 
Keegan et. al, 2010; Westlake, Bouchard, and Frank, 2011) which found that “random 
interventions perform more poorly compared with strategies that target actors”.  
Curiously, random targeting was not the poorest performing strategy as eccentricity 
targeting proved to be the least disruptive. It is not clear why this is the case as eccentricity 




prove effective as a calibrated intervention. Yet, from closer examination, it appears that the 
eccentricity values among the nodes were so similar such that this intervention provided little 
strategic value as it targeted nodes that yielded negligible disruptive impact. In other words, 
there were no power law distribution in the eccentricity scores such that influential nodes 
could be removed from the network. This naturally resulted in the low impact node removals. 
Nevertheless, degree centrality and reputation targeting were the most effective strategies 
across all five outcome measures, consistently producing near-identical results.  
It is highly likely that these strategies are interrelated as the specific actors that are 
targeted are the same or similar. Degree centrality can be operationalized as the total number 
of unique buyers a vendor has done business with and vice-versa. The size of a vendor’s 
clientele list is indicative of a more broad-based form of trust. On the other hand, reputation 
targeting is the preeminent marker of trust on cryptomarkets. To be clear, the more trading 
partners an actor has the more likely it is that they possess an equally high cumulative 
reputation score (Christin, 2013; Decary Hetu et. al, 2017). 
While total purchasing price targeting and unique items bought/sold targeting were 
not quite as effective as degree centrality and reputation targeting, they did provide 
comparable levels of disruption to the transactional network. The disruption pattern 
demonstrated by these four targeting strategies was as such: the proportion of potential 
measurable values increases or decreases as more actors are removed. These values plateau as 
the network becomes completely fragmented. The disruptive effect begins to decline as the 
network size decreases due to vertex deletion. 
Targeting Based on Human and Network Capital 
This raises an interesting question about the underlying differences between these 
four targeting strategies. In short, are these strategies one in the same given their comparable 
patterns of disruption? Similarities between disruptive impact can be attributed more to the 
sameness of the actors targeted than to the idiosyncrasies of the targeting strategies. To 
elaborate, an actor that has a high degree centrality and an equally high cumulative reputation 
are also likely to have a high market share (revenue generated) and number of unique items 
bartered for. In fact, the majority (> 50%) of deleted nodes were held in common among 
degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique 
items bought/sold targeting for nearly all outcome measures (see table 3). High impact nodes 
are likely to dominate a market across a number of metrics tied to human and social capital.  
To this extent, it is evident that network and human capital metrics may not differ 
completely if the actors that are removed are the same. Contrary to previous studies (Bright, 
Greenhill, and Levenkova, 2010; Bright, Greenhill and Morselli, 2014; Tsvetovat and Carley; 
2003), I posit that targeting criminal actors based on a human capital approach may not 
always be accurate. In short, if the network and human capital measures are interrelated or 
correlated to some extent, preferencing one approach over the other is functionally moot as 
both approaches achieve similar or perhaps near-identical disruptive impact.  
However, there is one element of the human capital approach which stands out: the 
role of the actor. Similar to Duijn et al. (2014), I found that vendor deletion exclusively 
produced outsized impact on the transactional network (see table 4). Moreover, the removal 
of buyers was ineffectual as they were merely customers that did not supply illegal 
contraband. As such, their reduced engagement with actors on Abraxas precluded their 
prioritization by any targeting strategy aside from eccentricity and random targeting. While 




they purchase the products that are advertised, it is vendors that ultimately supply these 
products. As such, cryptomarket interventions should be vendor-centric.  
Aside from the role of the actor, it is evident that the top deleted nodes are product 
specialists that are based in Western nations like the United States and United Kingdom (see 
Table 4). In fact, the popularity of particular goods (stimulants and marijuana) and the 
countries from which they are shipped gives us an idea of what there is a demand for and 
where that demand comes from. As it relates to the general distribution of products and 
countries on Abraxas (see Appendix), cannabis (34.21%), stimulants (19.38%), ecstasy 
(13.8%), opioids (10.8%), and psychedelics (6.75%) account for the top five products sold 
while Germany, the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, and Australia accounted for 
25.1%, 19.34%, 13.78%, 9.22%, and 8.74% of nations shipped from, respectively. As such, 
law enforcement interventions against dark web markets might just as well prioritize vendors 
that sell a specific product or ship from a specific country. As the majority of cryptomarket 
transactions are conducted by a small number of product and country-specific vendors, it may 
be beneficial to calibrate interventions based on this. While most dark web markets will sell a 
wide assortment of products that are shipped from a wide variety of nations, it is evident that 
most transactions involve a small number of product types from a short list of countries.     
Metagames and Power Laws 
Consistent with research in criminal networks (Druxbury and Haynie, 2019; Wood, 
2017), I find that removing the most prolific vendors in sequential order fragments the 
network in relatively little time. Indeed, these results are not altogether different from 
Duxbury and Haynie (2020) who documented the existence of a scale-free online drug 
market and distribution network. To this extent, disassortative mixing in Abraxas, pursuant to 
preferential attachment, while necessary for successful transactions at scale produced clear 
vulnerabilities in the network structure of this market. However, this was only observed for 
degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique 
items bought/sold targeting. In short, Abraxas is comprised of a small number of influential 
actors whose deletion would result in a fragmentation cascade. Importantly, the removal of 
the top nodes across these four targeting strategies yielded cross-cutting impact, producing 
noticeable disruption across all five outcome measures. This is particularly noteworthy as it 
implies that the removal of prolific actors has universal disruptive impact on the transactional 
network.  
Furthermore, the findings indicate that when interventions are successful the 
disruption abides by a power law where a small number of deleted nodes produces an 
outsized portion of the disruption impact (see figures 2a-e). Importantly, this study 
establishes differences in linear, curvilinear, and power law disruption. A linear relationship 
means that node deletion and disruption impact are proportional, implying that the removal of 
a large number of nodes will result in an equally large level of disruption. A curvilinear 
relationship implies that a moderate number of deleted nodes account for a large amount of 
disruption impact. Finally, a power curve implies that small number of deleted nodes 
accounts for an outsized portion of disruption impact. Across the five outcome measures, 
degree centrality targeting, reputation targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique 
items bought/sold targeting all demonstrated power law properties whereas eccentricity and 
random targeting generally demonstrated linear properties but were sometimes curvilinear.   
Importantly, the disruptive impact of sequential node removal can be described as a 




such that understanding and abiding by them confers strategic dominance over those who 
understand and abide by baseline rules. In chess, the metagame involves anticipating what 
moves one’s opponent might make and making moves which manoeuvrers one’s opponent 
into a position favourable to one’s self. Moreover, one might make certain moves which set 
up successive moves which have a greater impact down the line.  
Sequential node removal has a similar metagame where disruptive impact can be 
maximized if certain nodes are first removed to make way for the removal of other nodes. In 
short, initial nodes must be removed in order for maximal impact to be achieved once the 
network is reformed following the initial intervention. When examining the disruption 
impact, it evident that the nodes which produced the greatest impact were often those that 
were not first removed (i.e. had the highest value per the parameters of a specific targeting 
strategy). In fact, nodes which had the greatest disruptive impact were often those outside of 
the first 10 nodes that were deleted. As it relates to law enforcement interventions, initial 
arrests or apprehensions should be used to set up future arrests or apprehensions that have a 
greater capacity for disrupting the criminal network. 
Conclusion 
 Adaptive computer simulations represent a novel means of testing the structural 
robustness of a criminal network as well as the effectiveness of strategic interventions. 
However, the results of these analyses are driven by pre-determined parameters which govern 
the behaviour of the actors within the network. While driven by educated and evidence-based 
suppositions, these parameters are fundamentally speculative. As such, these results should 
not be mistaken for actional intelligence gathered from a real-world experiment. They can 
only go so far in explicating the true dynamics which undergird the phenomenon of study. 
Randomized control trials represent the gold standard of research within the social sciences. 
In this regard, adaptative computer simulations are a secondary option. Future research into 
cryptomarket disruption strategies should consider experiments on live markets where 
interventions are attempted, and the results are measured. While the logistical difficulties of 
such an undertaking are understandably large, such an experiment represents the pinnacle of 
















Based on the various analyses conducted in this thesis, it is evident that cryptomarkets 
offer unique opportunities for researchers seeking to examine the macro-level structure of an 
illicit transactional network as well as the functional mechanisms which undergird consumer 
activity therein. To reiterate, this dissertation had two overarching objectives. First, it sought 
to push the theoretical boundaries of cryptomarket research in order to better understand the 
functional mechanisms of cryptomarkets. To specify, I sought to identify network dynamics 
between Abraxas participants pursuant to the formation of trust, the predictors of consumer 
satisfaction based on consumer feedback, and the efficacy of strategic interventions against 
cryptomarkets. The second aim of this dissertation was to leverage the various findings 
therein to inform targeted interventions by law enforcement against cryptomarkets. To this 
extent, the task of understanding which strategies work and which ones do not hinges on a 
more fluid understanding of a phenomenon.  
While Abraxas is by no stretch of the imagine representative of all cryptomarkets 
given its size and relative influence, it is nevertheless a platform which possesses all of the 
characteristics and qualities of a standard dark web market. As a result, while the results and 
conclusions drawn from these chapters are not perfectly generalizable to all cryptomarkets, 
they should serve to instruct law enforcement activity on the dark web. To this extent, 
analyses of the Abraxas trade network have provided key insight into three important areas of 
inquiry.  
As chapter one of this thesis functioned a large-scale literature review, no particular 
practical insight can be drawn from it. Nevertheless, this chapter served to illustrate the state 
of the scholarly literature on cryptomarkets and the areas where more research is needed. 
Importantly, these specific areas were covered in the successive chapters of this thesis. 
Following Duxbury and Haynie (2017), chapter two examined the network structure of 
Abraxas in order to identify the market-level metrics that predicted for vendor selection. 
These findings provide more insight into how trust among buyers and vendors determines the 
structure of a cryptomarket. In particular, this chapter sought to test the generalizability of 
Duxbury and Haynie’s (2017) initial study to determine if preferential attachment pursuant to 
trust dynamics played a role in the topology of a cryptomarket. Furthermore, this study 
offered insight into the predictors and the development trajectory of vendor trustworthiness. 
Chapter three identified and compared the determinants of customer satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction among buyers. It, moreover, was the first study to apply text mining methods 
to determine whether the sentiment structure of qualitative reviews differed between five-star 
and non-five-star ratings as well as transactions that were finalized early and those that were 
not. In short, this chapter sought to illuminate lexical features associated with consumer 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction on a cryptomarket. The theoretical thrust of this chapter 
centred on information asymmetry and its role in allowing buyers to make an informed 
decision on which vendors to do business with. Information asymmetry is a particularly 
important concept as it helps unravel the inner workings of trust dynamics as well as the 
network structure of cryptomarkets. For law enforcement operations against cryptomarkets to 
have a long-lasting impact, there should be a sombre consideration of how each operation can 




Adding to Duxbury and Haynie’s (2020) study, chapter four examined how sequential 
node deletion may affect a cryptomarket’s ease of operation. To this extent, computer 
simulations which incorporated network adaption and preferential selection were leveraged to 
better understand which strategic intervention(s) were most effective at disrupting the 
structural integrity of Abraxas’ network structure. This particular study is important for 
cryptomarket disruption strategies as it demonstrates that the behaviour of an illicit trade 
network can be modelled (Duxbury and Haynie, 2019) and subsequently vivisected through 
an evidence-based calculus. Moreover, it provides insight into how law enforcement might 
approach the curtailment of a cryptomarket. As cryptomarket takedowns and the 
opportunistic arrest of vendors are not particularly effective in the long-term disruption of 
these entities, a carefully calibrated intervention which considers network dynamics such as 
preferential selection is warranted.   
Summary of Findings 
Chapter 2  
Like Duxbury and Haynie (2017) and Norbutas (2018), social network analysis of the 
Abraxas cryptomarket revealed a large and diffuse network where the majority of buyers 
purchased from a small cohort of vendors. The transactional network is quite diffuse with a 
network density of 0.0007. Furthermore, the full network consisted of 29 components, with 
the largest component containing 97.6% (2726) of all nodes within the network. The 
remaining connected components consisted of 19 dyads, 7 triads, and single assortments of 
components of various sizes. In short, Abraxas buyers tended to purchase from a small 
number of vendors over time, which leads to the formation of a large group of sparsely 
connected users with very few isolated buyer-seller cliques. This theme of preferential 
selection of vendors on the part of buyers is repeated in other findings within this study. More 
generally, this study provides further evidence of the role of preferential attachment in the 
network structure of dark web markets.     
The average out-degree centrality was 2.16 whereas the average in-degree centrality 
was 20.2. This indicates that buyers did business with 2.15 vendors, on average, while 
vendors did business with an average of 20.2 buyers. This pattern can be gleaned from the 
community detection analysis. This revealed 158 unique communities formed around prolific 
vendors. The largest of these communities possessed 390 members, whereas the smallest 111 
communities have fewer than 10. Not surprisingly, 35 and 20 communities were dyads and 
triads, respectively. What is particularly telling is that the leading 20 communities accounted 
for 63% (1763) of all actors and 71.9% (3909) of all transactions. Moreover, the average 
community had 1.7 vendors and 15.98 buyers. In other words, each vendor and their 
respective buyers constitute individual communities. The Abraxas transactional network can 
then be viewed as set of transactional islands as opposed to a large, densely connected 
conglomeration of vendors and buyers. It is also important to note that these transactional 
communities within the network were country and product-specific, meaning that a specific 
product type was shipped to a single country.  
Regression analyses for vendor success, popularity, and affluence demonstrated that 
the cumulative reputation score of vendors was the predominant predictor for trust across all 
three proxy variables. Additionally, cumulative risk was the second statistically significant 
predictor across all three models. This indicates that a vendor’s willingness to incur the risks 




reputation for trustworthy conduct. This corroborates Decary-Hetu’s (2016) contention that 
cryptomarkets facilitate localized trading where buyers from a specific nation purchased from 
vendors who also ship to that specific nation. This is done to mitigate the risks associated 
with overseas shipping. However, each model differed on what particular estimates explained 
the variance in vendor success, popularity, and affluence. While cumulative purchase price, 
item categories, and item subcategories were positive predictors of vendor success, unique 
item listings and subcategories were predictors for vendor popularity and the average 
purchase price and number of words in the item description predicted vendor affluence. As 
such, it is evident that the price and the type of product sold influences how successful a 
vendor is relative to others operating on the same market.  
Finally, the results garnered from the social network analysis are corroborated by the 
trajectory analyses. Indeed, the trajectory models demonstrated that a small number of 
vendors become highly successful, popular, and affluent in a relative short period of time. 
Moreover, vendors that possess a specific ranking within the market will likely remain as 
such throughout the market’s operation as low-achieving will remain low-achieving while 
high-achieving vendors will become increasingly successful, popular, and affluent on the 
market. This is reflective of the law of accumulated advantage whereby those with many 
resources continue to gain more resources.   
This lends credence to the idea that buyers’ preference for a vendor has as much to do 
with the specific product and price requirements of buyers themselves than it does with the 
trustworthiness of a vendor. In short, buyers will select vendors with whom they trust but 
who are also providing the products they desire at the prices they can afford. For example, a 
buyer seeking to purchase marijuana will have no dealings with a vendor trafficking in 
counterfeit coins, regardless of their reputation. This particular bit of information should 
serve to inform future law enforcement interventions. Indeed, a law enforcement organization 
looking to destabilize a cryptomarket should first consider which products are popular on the 
market and which vendors are providing them. If the goal is general disruption, it makes little 
sense to target a vendor who traffics in a product that is not popular among buyers. For law 
enforcement organizations, this is the equivalent of knowing one’s audience.        
Chapter 3 
At the outset, it was evident that Abraxas feedback was governed by the Pollyanna 
principle where 96% (4683) of all purchases received a rating of five. As such, it would seem 
that Abraxas buyers were overwhelmingly satisfied with their transactions. Nevertheless, text 
mining revealed acute similarities and differences between the words used to describe five-
rated and non- five-rated transactions. Based on frequency analyses, “finalize” and “early” 
were the two most popular words among non-five-rated feedback and the second and third 
most popular words among five-rated feedback. However, the five-rated corpus possessed 
words with a positive connotation (“good”, “great”, “fast”, “stealth”, “thanks”, “quality”, 
“trust”, “best”, “top”, and “nice”) whereas words in the non-five-rating corpus were more 
negative or value-neutral (“update”, “scam”, “product”, “nothing”, “never”, “still”, and 
“waiting”). This suggests lexical differences between five and non-five feedback.  
Not surprisingly, word associations for five and non-five-rated transactions revealed 
that “finalize” and “early” were highly associated with one another, but also co-occurred with 
“trust”, “hope”, and “confidence”. Nevertheless, five-rated words associations are 
characterized by trust, satisfaction, and praise for the vendor, product, and process whereas 




negative when the transaction was described. This is also evident from the sentiment analysis. 
The five-rated corpus possessed a positive average polarity of 0.6 while the non-five-rated 
corpus was slightly negative with an average polarity of -0.01. This suggests that buyers, 
while dissatisfied, will not harshly criticize vendors or vent their frustrations when providing 
feedback to the rest of the market.  
Finally, the logistic lasso regression demonstrated that “fast”, “great”, “thank”, 
“good”, and “vendor” predicted a five rating while “product”, “finalize”, and “early” were 
more likely to be associated with a non-five rating. Furthermore, the odds of a five rating are 
130% and 115% greater when the words “great” and “thank” are found in the feedback than 
when they are not. In contrast, the presence of “product”, “finalize”, and “early” in buyer 
feedback increased the odds of a non-five rating by 2.1%, 3.1%, and 27.1%, respectively.  
As it evident from these findings, buyers are generally pleased with their transactions 
on Abraxas as long as the product arrives on time and is as advertised. In general, vendors 
have a relatively low bar to achieve when it comes to satisfying their customers. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that goods and services are transparently advertised on a 
cryptomarket. To elaborate, because buyers are made aware of the quality of the product from 
the advertisement, their satisfaction is earned if the product simply meets their expectations 
based on the advertisement. Only in rare circumstances do buyers award a vendor a rating 
below a 5. This generally occurs when expectations are not met. Intuitively, this suggests that 
vendors can become popular and successful if they merely keep their word to buyers. As trust 
is scarce in any criminal setting, the factors leading to its attainment are perhaps less 
strenuous if all vendors need do is to keep their word. This is perhaps why popular vendors 
can increase the prices of their products despite the quality of their products remaining the 
same. Buyers are perhaps accepting of price hikes as they understand that the rarity of a 
trustworthy vendor precludes paying a higher price for their services. This is similar in licit 
economies where buyers will pay exorbitant prices for brand name products as their quality is 
assured. 
Chapter 4 
Based on the results of the sequential node deletion, random targeting was found to be 
ineffective across the five outcome measures, producing minimal and a slow disruptive 
effect. This result was not altogether unexpected. However, eccentricity targeting proved to 
be the least disruptive. Degree centrality and reputation targeting were the most effective 
strategies across all five outcome measures, consistently producing near-identical results. 
While total purchasing price targeting and unique items bought/sold targeting were not quite 
as effective as degree centrality and reputation targeting, they did provide comparable levels 
of disruption to the transactional network. The disruption pattern demonstrated by these four 
targeting strategies was as such: the proportion of potential measurable values increases or 
decreases as more actors are removed. These values plateau as the network becomes 
completely fragmented.  
Furthermore, it is highly likely that these strategies are interrelated as the specific 
actors that are targeted are the same or similar. This suggests that while the stated objectives 
of these targeting strategies are different, their functional performance is the same or similar. 
To this extent, the network and human capital approaches pursued in this study are moot as 
the results were the same when sequential node deletion was undertaken. Importantly, this 
suggests that the most dominant vendors on Abraxas are universally dominant across a 




the disruptive impact of each targeting strategy, degree centrality targeting, reputation 
targeting, total purchase price targeting, and unique items bought/sold targeting are each 
based on a power law where a small percentage of deleted nodes is responsible for an 
outsized proportion of the disruptive impact across all five outcome measurements (e.g. 1-5% 
of deleted nodes were responsible for 45-90% of disruptive impact). Random and eccentricity 
targeting appear to be linear across four of the five outcome measurements, suggesting 
minimal disruptive impact.  
It is clear from these findings that the power law dynamics of Abraxas makes the 
market susceptible to targeted attacks. To this extent, law enforcement agencies need not 
target the entirety of the transactional network but should instead focus on the most 
influential vendors as they are involved in the majority of market activity. This fits an 
evidence-based policing calculus where the goal is to do more with less. In this case, the ease 
of operation of a cryptomarket may be effectively disrupted should law enforcement officials 
focus on the power few vendors.  
Implications for Dark Web Interventions 
Based in the available evidence addressed in chapter one, it appears that law 
enforcement interventions against cryptomarkets have been ineffective and perhaps 
counterproductive. In the aftermath of market closure, sales volumes generally returned to 
comparable pre-closure levels while new markets emerged to take the place of those shut 
down. In fact, the FBI’s effort to shut down the original Silk Road utterly fragmented the 
composition of the cryptomarket landscape. Indeed, a once consolidated market dominated 
by the Silk Road devolved into a hypercompetitive affair between various smaller 
cryptomarkets vying for volatile market shares. These new cryptomarkets included Agora, 
Silk Road 2.0, Black Market Reloaded, Sheep Marketplace and Pandora. Of course, Silk 
Road has itself undergone several resurrections, returning as Silk Road 2.0, Silk Road 3 
Reloaded, and the latest iteration Silk Road Reloaded.  
It is important to note that this fragmentation is partially due to the decentralized 
exchange networks of cryptomarkets. “In the event that a cryptomarket is shut down, the user 
community is able to persist; users either migrate to other sites or, as in the case of Silk Road 
1.0, they construct and quickly repopulate a replacement website” (Martin, 2014a, 23). This 
mobility and durability equate to a difficult-to-exterminate illicit entity. Though it is perhaps 
reprehensible to allow the unabated operation of organized crime, it is arguably far worse for 
law enforcement to destroy a criminal monopoly. We saw this again in 2014 and 2017 when 
law enforcement shut down some of the largest cryptomarkets in operation at the time.    
While it is imminently clear that largescale market closures are not the way forward, a 
broad-based focus on the trust dynamics within cryptomarket transactional networks may be. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, a carefully calibrated network-based approach which 
targets trusted, high-earning vendors may yield the most disruptive impact. Moreover, a 
strategy which randomly targets actors on a cryptomarket is not advisable from these 
findings. While controversial, a vendor-centric targeting strategy which exploits trust 
dynamics in the transactional network but leaves the market’s transactional structure intact 
would offer maximal disruptive impact without displacing actors to rival and/or new 
cryptomarkets. This particular strategy resembles wild animal population control where 




similar fashion, cryptomarkets are permitted to function, though at a heavily reduced 
capacity.  
Based on my findings, trust on Abraxas is predicated on a pareto distribution where a 
small number of trusted vendors reap the rewards of their reputation. To this extent, 
reputations serve as a tool for identifying the quality of merchandise and, to an extent, 
counteract uncertainty within a highly volatile environment. More importantly, however, trust 
played a key role in determining the transactional network of Abraxas. The global network 
structure of Abraxas is a product of initial and repeated transactions between buyers and 
vendors. Each vendor and their respective buyers constitute an individual community within 
Abraxas. These communities were also locational and product-specific, suggesting the 
importance of geographic distance and niche markets in moulding the network structure. This 
can be exploited by law enforcement.  
While trust between buyers and vendors fundamentally determines the structure of a 
transactional network it can also be exploited to undo this structure. Trust, in other words, 
operates as a double-edged sword as it allows buyers to identify top vendors and law 
enforcement to identify high priority targets. This reveals a game theoretic problem within 
cryptomarkets. When buyers attempt to mitigate risk by trading with the most trustworthy 
vendors this creates easily exploitable vulnerabilities in the network structure of the market.  
From the results in chapters two and four, the removal of vendors with the highest 
cumulative reputation scores (i.e. the most trusted vendors) yielded the largest disruptive 
impact to Abraxas. Importantly, actors with the highest cumulative reputation are also the 
actors with most trade partners, products sold, and revenue generated. Based on my findings, 
a targeting strategy which sequentially removed these prolific actors would likely result in a 
fragmentation cascade. Bereft of their primary vendor, buyers would presumably take their 
chances with a vendor they have little experience with or leave the market entirely. The scale 
and profitability of a cryptomarket might be curtailed by such a strategic intervention.  
As Duxbury and Haynie (2020) note, “When networks are attacked, actors grow more 
cautious about forging ties, connecting less frequently and only to trustworthy alters.” In 
short, the entire premise of such a targeted intervention against a cryptomarket would be to 
rattle the trust and confidence of those operating on the market. When the most trustworthy 
operators are taken off the board the overall level of trust within the market dissipates. In the 
abstract, the objective is not to target vendors but to target trust.    
In general, the scale free properties of Abraxas and the cryptomarket examined by 
Duxbury and Haynie (2017) suggests that these network topologies are premised on 
preferential attachment. As such, law enforcement organizations need not launch a large-
scale attack on the market, targeting the entirety of the vendor cohort. Instead, maximal gains 
can be achieved by focusing on the power few vendors who account for the majority of sales 
made, buyers transacted with, and revenue generated. The premise of evidence-based 
policing is doing more with less and this seems a sensible option for law enforcement 
organizations working with scarce resources.   
It is, however, important to note that there is a high-level metagame embedded within 




rules within a game such that understanding and abiding by them confers strategic dominance 
over those who understand and abide by baseline rules. In chess, the metagame involves 
anticipating the opponent’s probably move set and making counter moves which positions the 
opponent into a favourable position. Based on my findings, disruptive impact on 
cryptomarkets can be maximized if certain actors are first removed in order to set up higher 
impact removals. When examining the disruption impact in chapter four, it became evident 
that the nodes which produced the greatest impact were often those that were not first 
removed (i.e. had the highest value per the parameters of a specific targeting strategy). In 
fact, nodes which had the greatest disruptive impact were often those outside of the first 10 
nodes that were deleted. For law enforcement agencies, initial arrests or apprehensions of 
cryptomarket vendors should be used to set up future arrests or apprehensions that have a 
greater capacity for disrupting the criminal network.  
In general, metagame dynamics must be consciously considered by law enforcement 
organizations dealing with online and offline criminal organizations. The possibility of 
iatrogenic and backfiring effects must be carefully considered before an operation is 
launched. On the other hand, law enforcement must also consider the strategic value of an 
intervention at the macro-level. In other words, how might the disruption of one criminal 
entity affect the entire criminal ecosystem within which that entity resides? This was not 
considered by law enforcement who shut down cryptomarkets in 2011, 2014, and 2017. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, the optimal metagame strategy would involve the 
curtailment of existing cryptomarkets through the targeted removal of vendors as opposed to 
completely shutting these markets down. In summation, the targeting of key actors within a 
cryptomarkets serves to control the spread of market as opposed to completely eliminating it. 
Outright market seizure or elimination compounds the problem, creating larger and more 
sophisticated markets for which more resources will be required to police. 
It is, moreover, an open question as to whether prior interventions against 
cryptomarkets were simply ineffective or if the cryptomarket environment is antifragile, 
growing more robust with each major shock it suffers. If the latter supposition is correct, it 
would make little sense for law enforcement to pursue future operations which seek to 
dismantle these markets in their entirety (i.e. market seizure). Rather, law enforcement 
resources would be better spent in targeted (or pinprick) interventions which curtail the 
growth these markets through the removal of prolific actors that drive market activity. 
Indeed, the embeddedness of cryptomarkets may mean that these illicit entities are incapable 
of being eradicated in their entirety. Nevertheless, such a strategy would also rely on entropy 
within the cryptomarket environment. As markets are generally operational for several 
months (Christin, 2013) and are subject to closure due to the duplicity of the actors therein, 
law enforcement may seek to play to this dynamic when targeting prolific actors on large 
markets. To this extent, this might involve leaving small and uninfluential markets to their 
own devices while targeting actors generating the most active vendors on on the largest 
actors. In allegorical terms, this strategy equates to catching the biggest fish in the largest 
pond while leaving smaller fish to die as smaller ponds dry up.   
This notion of “leaving cryptomarkets to their own devices” is a particularly 
controversial decision as it implies that law enforcement organizations are simply allowing 




limited within a policing context, not all crime and criminals can or should be policed 
equally. Indeed, criminals and crime events are not equal in the damage the cause or the 
resources that are required in order to adequately police them. Such is the aim of strategies 
like hotspots policing or targeted foot patrols which target offline crime. These particular 
strategies prioritize the areas most afflicted by crime, allocating resources to locales which 
need them most. A similar logic can be applied to the cryptomarket intervention strategy I 
have proposed. The overarching goal is to optimize the resources expended. In other words, 
such a strategy intends to get the most bang for one’s buck, targeting areas of the dark web 
environment where the largest possible impact can be made without compounding the 
problem further.  
Nevertheless, something must be said about the potential for displacement in the face 
of targeted interventions. Based on the criminological literature (Johnson, Guerette, and 
Bowers, 2014), there is scant evidence of widespread geographic crime displacement 
following targeted patrols. To this extent, 30 years of research on this topic suggests that 
crime is displaced in only a small number of cases. There is, moreover, a diffusion of crime 
reduction benefits where surrounding areas experienced a pronounced crime drop that was 
comparable to the targeted areas (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). This pattern has been 
acknowledged and further proven by several meta-analyses and systematic reviews (Bowers 
et al., 2010; Braga et al., 2012, Telep et al., 2014). Still, there is one glaring limitation with 
regard to research on crime displacement: the extensive focus on geography. Indeed, 
comparatively little is understood about other forms of displacement and diffusion. This 
includes temporal, target, tactical (use of method or tools), and crime type displacement 
(Hesseling, 1994).  
While our understanding of crime displacement in physical settings is generally well-
developed from a geographical perspective, this is not the case for displacement in a 
cyberspace. Indeed, we know very little about the vicissitudes of crime displacement in this 
environment, and far less about its occurrence on cryptomarkets. Unlike terrestrial 
environments where criminal opportunities are predicated on unique environmental 
characteristics, cryptomarkets are not themselves diverse entities. Rather, many, if not all, 
cryptomarkets possess the same infrastructure, financial risk reduction competencies, and 
operational practices. As such, if one market were to shut down, buyers and vendors would 
simply migrate to another market. In this case, crime displacement of some sort is a clear and 
ever-present reality in the cryptomarket environment. However, this dynamic might differ 
somewhat when we consider the removal of specific vendors and the resultant displacement 
of buyers to other vendors on the same or different markets.  
To this extent, crime displacement on cryptomarkets might occur in four forms: 
market-based displacement, vendor-specific displacement, product-based displacement, and 
platform-based displacement. While market-based displacement (movement from one 
cryptomarket to another) is easily understood, vendor-specific displacement refers to the 
movement of buyers from one vendor to another following the removal or absence of a 
vendor on the same cryptomarket. As discussed, much of this is predicated on the 
development of trust where reputable vendors can serve as viable replacements to vendors 
that are no longer present on a cryptomarket. Similar to crime type displacement in terrestrial 




of buyers where the removal of a specific product type engenders movement toward the 
purchase of a different product type. For example, the widescale removal of fentanyl from 
cryptomarkets may encourage buyers to purchase a lower grade synthetic opioid to 
compensate. Finally, platform-based displacement refers to the movement of vendors and 
buyers away from cryptomarkets into terrestrial markets. 
Given these varying forms of displacement, one cannot rule out the possibility that 
any proposed intervention, whether premised on computer simulations or otherwise, cannot 
and will not yield some level of displacement. As a conceptual matter, displacement is always 
a possibility in an environment where criminal opportunities are contingent on environmental 
factors. This is more so the case when these criminal opportunities are present on an online 
platform which is not subject to the same constraints levied upon offline platforms. Indeed, 
the strategic and incremental removal of high-value vendors from a cryptomarket might 
encourage to buyers to move to another vendor or market. Moreover, buyers might switch to 
another product or outright leave the dark web for an offline market. Moreover, given the 
anonymity of dark web marketplaces, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
displacement may occur as actors are liable to use different profiles when engaging on 
different markets.      
Bastions of Responsible Use 
 Given the aforementioned issues and questionable benefits of cryptomarket 
interventions, it is an open question as to whether law enforcement should target these 
markets at all. There is, moreover, an extensive and long-running debate regarding the harm 
reduction capabilities of drug enforcement. Given the negative externalities created by police 
crackdowns on drug markets, the goal of law enforcement may not involve the eradication of 
drug markets, but the reduction of the potential harm caused by the transaction and 
consumption of illicit substances. Cryptomarkets fit neatly within this discussion as they are, 
in many ways, a viable and more preferable alternative to terrestrial markets and street 
dealing.  
Cryptomarkets serve to mitigate the negative externalities endemic to terrestrial drugs 
markets, namely physical violence. Indeed, violence is difficult to actuate on cryptomarkets 
given the immateriality of cybercrime. To this extent, the anonymity and geographical 
dispersion afforded to cryptomarkets means that participants cannot simply harm other actors. 
The improbability of violence on cryptomarkets lies in the platform’s dematerialization of 
voluntary economic transactions. This has been documented in several studies (Aldridge and 
Decary-Hetu, 2014; Morselli et al., 2017; Van Hout and Bingham, 2013a). One study found 
that cryptomarket vendors had a smaller likelihood of experiencing violence relative to 
“street” dealers as most of their clientele were middle-class, university students that were 
averse to violence (Mohamed and Fritsvold, 2010). Furthermore, Barratt et al. (2016), 
surveying 3794 respondents from 57 countries on drug use, found that 1.3% and 1% of 
cryptomarkets users experienced “threats to personal safety” and “physical violence”, 
respectively. In contrast, 14% and 6% of those who purchased from friends, 24% and 10% of 
those who purchased from known dealers, and 35% and 15% of those who purchased from 
strangers experienced “threats to personal safety” and “physical violence”, respectively. In 




circumvention of face-to-face meetings with potentially dangerous dealers (Barratt, Lenton, 
and Allen, 2016; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b).  
Martin (2018) contends that “cryptomarkets are displacing potentially violent drug 
market norms in favour of more cordial relationships between market participants.” Martin 
(2018), moreover, refers to this as the “gentrification hypothesis” whereby the safety and 
anonymity of illicit online transactions precludes the use of and necessity for violence. 
Cryptomarket vendors compete on the basis of reputation, relying on the quality of their 
products and marketing campaign. As Martin indicates, the cryptomarket vendors are 
encouraged to create a “socially constructive public image that is both free from violence and 
more attuned to the perceived priorities of their customer base” (2014a, 40). Creating rapport 
and behaving in a trustworthy manner go farther on cryptomarkets that would violence were 
it an option available to actors.  
The importance of vendor reputations is intimately tied to the quality of goods and 
services offered on cryptomarkets. To this extent, consumer feedback mechanisms serve to 
reward the accountability of vendors. As a result, the quality of products on cryptomarkets is 
likely to be higher compared to offline markets. As Horton-Eddison et al. (2021, 6) contend, 
“this is important because some drug harms arise from uncertain content and strength, 
thereby creating the risk of unwanted effects or overdose.” Furthermore, vendors will often 
provide warning labels which inform buyers of the potential dangers of specific products. 
This allows buyers to make safer purchases which they could not otherwise do in a terrestrial 
market where street dealers are less than forthcoming about their wares. Furthermore, 
cryptomarkets may opt to remove or ban products that are harmful to users. Such is case for 
fentanyl, assassinations, child pornography, and weapons of mass destruction. 
“In addition, cryptomarket discussion forums have provided a rich source of drug 
safety information (e.g., quality, purity, adulterants, dosing), enabling buyers and vendors 
alike to share information about product and batch content, and about buying and selling 
more safely” (Horton-Eddison et al., 2021, 7). This information is often absent in clearnet 
forums much less offline markets. While the information provided on cryptomarket forums 
are not guaranteed to be accurate, the adoption and spread of best practices on these platforms 
are often hosted by qualified drug harm reduction professionals. Such is the case of Dr. 
Fernando Caudevilla who provided expert harm reduction advice to buyers and vendors 
operating on the Silk Road and other dark web markets.      
While outright support for cryptomarkets by state actors is unfeasible, there is an 
argument to be made about the merits of toleration. To this end, state actors may choose to 
allow these platforms to operate as they may offset the violence and customer harm endemic 
to terrestrial markets. This may involve the conversion of illegal markets into licit markets. 
Such is the case of Portugal and some states in the United States that have legalized specific 
drug markets.    
Theoretical Contribution to Criminology 
 As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, cybercrime, much like terrestrial 
crime, is the product of the intersection of three requisite factors: a suitable target, motivated 




(Cohen and Felson, 1979). Per Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory, the infiltration of a 
database or distribution of malware, for example, must possess these qualities for it to have 
taken place (Grabosky and Smith, 2001). While some researchers (Yar, 2005) have 
questioned the straightforward application of routine activities theory to cybercrime, it is my 
contention that routine activities theory explains much about the operation of cryptomarkets 
and the dynamics of buyer-vendor relations therein. 
 When choosing to engage in voluntary economic transactions, a cryptomarket buyer 
must have some level of trust in a vendor’s ability to make good on their promises. Indeed, 
trust is the key element which allows partnerships in the criminal world to form and proceed 
forward. While a crime must take place at a specific time, at a specific location, using 
specific tools, against a specific target, trust is the constituent element which must be present 
if the crime has more than one offending party. While logically sound in its description of 
criminal activity, routine activities misses one major element of criminal activity: 
interpersonal trust. Indeed, based on the various results of this thesis, trust pursuant to 
interpersonal relations among prospective criminals is a fundamentally important element 
which must be established for a crime to take place when more than one offender is involved. 
Rarely is crime an individual activity. Rather, is it an activity that is, more often than not, 
born out of the coordination and collaboration of multiple actors. This is certainly the case 
when we examine cryptomarkets.  
Nevertheless, trust is a difficult-to-establish element in the criminal world. Wright and 
Decker (1994) and Hamill (2011) observed that betraying one’s friends, family, and 
associates is normal in the criminal underworld. Indeed, the situational constraints with which 
a criminal must contend (death, arrest, betrayal, etc.) certainly encourages thoughts of 
reneging on contractual obligations and turning tail when circumstances dictate. To make 
matters worse, these contractual obligations are not upheld by a principal authority as they 
would be in licit markets. Nevertheless, trust is the tool which allows criminals to cooperate, 
ultimately permitting the heist, assassination, or arson to move forward. It is, moreover, 
important to consider how one determines whether or not their fellow criminal can be trusted. 
Williamson (1993) maintains that this requires a trustee to demonstrate to the truster a 
temporary suspension of selfish desires for the sake of cooperation (458). The trust deficit 
within the criminal world is particularly problematic for trusters. 
Crucially, trust has a curious effect on the other strands of routine activities theory. 
Moreover, it can also be affected by the presence or absence of these requisite characteristics. 
Indeed, the motivation of offenders might differ based on the trust offenders has in one 
another. Low trust among criminals might reduce their motivation to move forward with the 
crime while high levels of trust might engender greater motivation. Of course, it may also be 
the case that offender motivation also affects trust. To this extent, sufficiently high levels of 
motivation among offenders may increase the likelihood of trust between them. As such, trust 
and the motivation to commit crime are circularly linked with each element affecting the 
other.  
Nevertheless, trust might also affect how offenders view the feasibility of committing 
a prospective crime. Indeed, the trust one puts in their fellow criminal might affect how an 




advantage of a crime opportunity on the part of criminals. Perhaps it is the case that trust 
must reach a sufficient level such that the criminal opportunity is seen as worthwhile. Of 
course, it may also be the case that the difficulty of completing the criminal opportunity 
might have an affect on the trust criminals put in one another. For example, a difficult heist 
might strain relations between co-offenders given the intricacy of the crime in question. 
Finally, the presence or absence of a capable guardian assuredly affects the trust offenders 
put in one another. Trust is likely to be higher in the absence of a capable guardian and lower 
when a capable guardian is absent. 
While the criminological literature (Gambetta, 2000; von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; 
Gambetta, 2009; Campana and Varese, 2013) has emphasized the trust deficit within the 
criminal world, these observations reflect criminal activities which take place in terrestrial 
markets. However, based on the findings of this dissertation, these trust dynamics are not 
altogether different in cyberspace. As a theoretical matter, trust follows a power law 
distribution on Abraxas and, in all likelihood, on other criminal markets. To this extent, there 
is a suffusion of trust in a small number of cryptomarket vendors. This raises another 
question: is trust a finite commodity in criminal environments? 
While this question cannot be precisely answered without ethnographic data, the 
presence of a power law on Abraxas serves as circumstantial evidence. Indeed, a small 
number of vendors become highly successful, popular, and affluent in a relative short period 
of time. In other words, trust is disproportionately concentrated in a small number of vendors 
who reap the rewards. In this case, it seems likely that trust on Abraxas is predicated on a 
“winner-take-all” schema where select vendors who are able to attain the trust of buyers 
come to dominate the market throughout its operation. This is evident in the network 
structure of Abraxas as well the effects of the sequential removal of nodes.  
When choosing to engage in crime, criminals working with a partner must evaluate 
the criminal opportunity, the presence or absence of a capable guardian, and their own 
motivation. However, each of these elements is contingent on the trust they bestow upon their 
partner. From this perspective, if offenders do evaluate the risks and rewards associated with 
the commission of a crime, they must also consider how their partners might also perceive 
these risks and rewards. The calculus is further complicated by the addition of more criminal 
actors, with each additional actor creating new considerations for all involved.   
Future Research 
 Cryptomarkets represents a fascinating area of study for researchers interested in the 
intersection of cybercrime and network science. Indeed, these platforms present a novel 
opportunity for researchers to test the accuracy of key theoretical precepts that are present in 
terrestrial markets. 
The studies featured in this thesis had the explicit aim of either examining sparsely 
researched or entirely unresearched topics in the cryptomarket scholarship. Given the dearth 
of research on the network structure and resilience of cryptomarkets and the determinants of 
consumer satisfaction among cryptomarket buyers, these are all areas where more research is 
required. As such, it is suggested that future research continue to examine these particular 
topics, testing their generalizability on other markets. There are, moreover, a number of 
different methodological approaches that might be pursued in these future studies. It is likely 




used. As such, researchers should endeavour to push the methodological boundaries of 
cryptomarket research, developing standard procedures by which data can be more efficiently 
analysed.  
Aside from these topics, there are number of other areas where more research is 
needed. According to Barratt and Aldridge (2016), “we do not yet have good evidence to 
indicate what proportion of the population may be sourcing drugs from cryptomarkets, and 
whether their numbers may be increasing” (9). Given the increasing technological 
sophistication of younger generations, it is also an open question as to whether cryptomarkets 
are primarily frequented by those defined as millennials and gen z. Moreover, it is unclear 
why these individuals choose to purchase drugs and other illegals goods and service on the 
dark web as opposed to or in tandem with terrestrial markets.  
In this regard, there are several pressing questions which must be asked and 
potentially answered by cryptomarket scholars. What is role of cryptomarkets in facilitating 
new trends in drug use? To this extent, what role, if any, have cryptomarkets played in the 
proliferation of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids? What is the demographic profile of 
those who set up and operate cryptomarkets? While administrators such as Ross Ulbricht 
have been arrested, it is unclear who exactly establishes cryptomarkets and, more 
importantly, what their motivations are. At a macro-level, how does migration from terrestrial 
markets to cryptomarkets affect the incidence of violence as well as the wellbeing of 
cryptomarket participants? While it is clear from the literature that cryptomarkets reduce 
violence, it is unclear how much violence is potentially reduced as a result. This bears 
political implications as the widespread use of cryptomarkets may engender calls for further 
drug legalization. How have cryptomarkets innovated in response to law enforcement 
interventions? How fast were these adaptations made and how effective have they been? This 
particular set of question deals with the innovative nature of cryptomarkets, an area which 
may aid law enforcement in understanding the potential outcomes of future interventions. 
These are some of the more pressing questions which should be answered by 
researchers examining cryptomarkets. Nevertheless, this is not an exhaustive list as more 
questions abound. Nevertheless, cryptomarkets represent a potentially worthwhile area for 
criminologists to research. Given the increasing technologization of crime, it is one 













Appendix (Chapter 4) 
 
Descriptive Statistics on the Abraxas Cryptomarket 
Descriptive Statistics Mean (SD) or Total Range 
Vendor Reputation   
Cumulative Reputation 98.76 (191.46) 0-1628 
Average Reputation 4.85 (0.54) 0-5 
Cumulative Positive Reputation 97.43 (189.7) 0-1625 
Cumulative Negative Reputation 1.327 (4.67) 0-59 
   
Ratings   
0 1.4% (74) - 
1 0.4% (23) - 
2 0.2% (10) - 
3 0.5% (26) - 
4 1.1% (59) - 
5 96.5% (5242) - 
   
Listing Categories   
Drugs 92.9% (5050) - 
Digital Goods 5.9% (321) - 
Services 0.4% (21) - 
Drug Paraphernalia 0.3% (17) - 
Other 0.3% (14) - 
Custom Listing 0.2% (11) - 
   
Listing Subcategories   
Cannabis 34.21% (1859) - 
Stimulants 19.38% (1053) - 
Ecstasy 13.8% ()750 - 
Opioids 10.8% (587) - 
Psychedelics 6.75% (367) - 
Benzos 3.7% (201) - 
N/A 2.72% (148) - 
Prescription 2.19% (119) - 
Dissociatives 1.25% (68) - 
Information 1.03% (56) - 
E-Books 0.98% (53) - 
Erotica 0.9% (49) - 
Fraud 0.59% (32) - 
Steroids 0.35% (19) - 
RCs 0.22% (12) - 
Data 0.2% (11) - 
Drugs (Cyber) 0.17% (9) - 
Hacking 0.15% (8) - 
Money 0.11% (6) - 




Electronics 0.09% (5) - 
IDs and Passports 0.07% (4) - 
Other 0.06% (3) - 
Software 0.06% (3) - 
Miscellaneous 0.04% (2) - 
Security 0.04% (2) - 
Drugs Paraphernalia 0.02% (1) - 
Services 0.02% (1) - 
   
Purchase Price (in USD)   
All Purchases 109.41 (173.51) 0.23-2800.03 
<$1 2.2% (121) - 
$1-$4.99 3.3% (178) - 
$5-$9.99 3.1% (168) - 
$10-$19.99 8.7% (472) - 
$20-$49.99 24.7% (1344) - 
$50-$99.99 28.2% (1532) - 
$100-$199.99 16.3% (884) - 
$200-$499.99 10.8% (589) - 
$500-$999.99 1.9% (201) - 
>$1000 0.8% (44) - 
   
Locations Shipped From   
Australia 8.74% (475) - 
Belgium 0.83% (45) - 
Belize 0.02% (1) - 
Bulgaria 0.64% (35) - 
Canada 0.61% (33) - 
China 0.02% (1) - 
Colombia 0.02% (1) - 
Czech Republic 0.09% (5) - 
Denmark 0.81% (44) - 
Europe/EU 7.19% (391) - 
France 0.74% (40) - 
Germany 25.10% (1364) - 
Hungary 0.06% (3) - 
India 0.18% (10) - 
Italy 0.99% (54) - 
Mexico 0.02% (1) - 
Netherlands 9.22% (501) - 
Norway 0.29% (16) - 
Poland 0.11% (6) - 
South Africa 0.2% (11) - 
Spain 2.37% (129) - 
Switzerland 0.39% (21) - 
UK 13.78% (749) - 
United States 19.34% (1051) - 
Unknown or N/A 8.23% (447) - 




Locations Shipped To   
Australia 8.19% (445) - 
Europe 15.73% (855) - 
Europe and US 0.07% (4) - 
Europe except Italy 0.18% (10) - 
Europe except UK 0.48% (26) - 
Germany 1.23% (67) - 
Switzerland 0.13% (7) - 
UK 4.42% (240) - 
United States 17.32% (941) - 
US and Canada 0.04% (2) - 
Worldwide 36.53% (1985) - 
Worldwide with exceptions 7.16% (389) - 
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